准市场条件下的水权交易双层动态博弈定价机制实证研究

在经济新常态背景下,水资源的准公共产品特征具有更加重要的管理价值,如何依托市场与行政的两手发力,提升我国水资源管理水平,更好地服务于"两个百年"奋斗目标,具有十分重要的理论与现实意义。水权交易制度是利用市场与行政手段提高水资源利用率,解决人水冲突的重要技术手段,如何在准市场条件下构建符合我国国情的水权交易定价机制已成为实现水权交易制度的核心技术。因此,针对政府-企业-公众等多利益相关者参与下的水权交易定价问题,本文引入生态经济学理论构建了水权价值测度模型,进而引入合作博弈理论,构建了准市场条件下的水权交易双层动态博弈定价模型,主要包括买方政府和卖方政府的微分博弈模型,以及买方政府与水务公司的Nash-Bargaining合作定价模型,运用HJB条件求解多利益相关者合作框架下的水权交易均衡水价空间,进而以江西省萍乡市水权交易实践为例开展实证研究,结果表明:均衡水价主要受上级政府协调能力k、水量需求系数β影响,且均为正相关,针对萍乡实践而言,由于水量需求主要体现在中长期发展规划阶段,上级政府协调能力显著性强于水量需求系数;均衡水价随着上级政府协调能力k值增大呈现由快转慢再转快的趋势,整体服从逻辑函数分布,均衡水价随着水量需求系数β的增大呈现由快转慢趋势,整体服从对数函数分布,针对萍乡实践而言,水权交易中市场与行政力量的两手发力存在稳定状态,二者缺一不可;随着议价能力系数提高,Nash-Bargaining的水权交易价格随之升高,表明政府与公司之间的合作关系对水价具有直接的影响能力。     

从政府与农户的动态博弈分析退耕还林工程的可持续性

退耕还林工程的实施取得了一定的成绩，但是也存在一些问题，制约了工程的可持续性。其中一个重要的原因就是补偿问题。通过经济学中的博弈理论构建退耕还林动态模型，从补偿的角度分析了退耕还林工程中存在的问题，并提出工程可持续性建议，即：①对生态林和经济林实行差别补偿；②对不同地区实行差别补偿标准；③延长补偿期限，实行分年度对农户进行不同数量的补偿；④对工程区进行产业结构调整，加强农户技能培训。     

基于非对称演化博弈的应急疏散人员行为冲突研究

为了真实地描述紧急疏散过程中人员行为冲突的演化过程,提高疏散效率,基于非对称性演化博弈模型,首先,从生理角度出发,界定人员之间的非对称性;其次,基于非对称性“鹰鸽博弈”模型,探析各人员策略选择的规律,分析非对称性因子、冲突的成本收益对系统稳定与合作状态概率的影响;最后,在此基础上,探讨博弈双方的合作心理收益对系统演化的影响。研究结果表明：非对称性因子越大,冲突的单位成本越小,越有利于人员合作行为的演化;较大的合作心理收益促使双方开展合作。非对称性“鹰鸽博弈”模型揭示应急疏散情形下人员冲突行为的演化规律,为推动疏散人员开展合作,减少冲突,提高突发事件下的疏散效率提供参考。     

基于博弈论组合赋权灰靶模型的煤矿安全综合评价

为了合理准确地评价煤矿安全现状,建立了基于博弈论组合赋权耦合灰靶决策的煤矿安全评价模型。运用层次分析法、熵权法和神经网络算法单独计算出各个指标的权重,再根据最优线性组合系数确定博弈论组合赋权。以河南义马煤业5组矿井安全现状为例,运用博弈论组合赋权耦合灰靶决策计算矿井偏离靶心度,同时将该模型的评价结果与层次分析法耦合灰靶决策模型、熵权灰靶决策模型和神经网络算法耦合灰靶决策模型的评价结果进行对比分析。结果表明:博弈论组合赋权耦合灰靶决策模型的评价结果与煤矿实际安全情况基本一致,且该模型相较其他模型的评价结果更加精准简便。     

异质性减排政策下碳资产质押融资演化博弈分析

政企融协同创新背景下的碳资产质押融资是助力绿色金融发展、实现碳达峰与碳中和的重要举措。然而多方努力下,控排企业与金融机构的融资积极性尚未被完全激发,致使碳资产质押融资业务发展缓慢。本文拟考虑异质性减排政策,构建地方政府、控排企业和金融机构的演化博弈模型,分析碳资产质押融资过程中各方主体的损益关系,并通过数值仿真探究相关参数对政企融协同创新策略的影响。结果表明：①单一碳交易政策下强化推进碳减排政策有利于促进政企融协同创新。②复合碳减排政策对地方政府和控排企业双主体的策略选择影响较大,甚至致弱控排企业向质押策略演化。③地方政府可在单一碳交易政策下降低碳价管制成本和企业超排罚款;在复合碳减排政策下适当加征罚款,最大限度地发挥政策效力并正确引导企业的减排行为。     

新闻媒体环保监督视角下环境污染治理演化博弈

为督促政府严格履行环境监管职责,应引入新闻媒体,与政府、企业共同参与污染治理。本文使用演化博弈理论通过构建博弈支付矩阵,研究不同情形下政府与企业间、新闻媒体与政府间的演化稳定策略（ESS）,探究新闻媒体监督对环境污染治理的影响,并通过数值算例对演化结果进行验证。演化过程及数值仿真结果表明：①对企业、政府而言,当某种策略的期望利润始终更大时,其决策过程将不受另一方与新闻媒体策略的影响,且此时存在ESS;②新闻媒体进行环保监督一定程度上能促进企业和政府组成的系统向优良状态演化,但新闻媒体是否进行环保监督受政府对环境监管程度的影响,取决于报道成本和预期收益的大小;③政府的作用举足轻重,增大单位环境税额和处罚力度能促使企业合法减排,而对其不严格监管可能使环境质量恶化。因此,为促进环境质量改善,需不断推动环保理念传播,设法降低企业减排成本和政府监管成本,扩大新闻媒体监督职责范围,提高其监督的主动性,并对政府增加生态环境保护维度考核。     

磁场协同交变脉冲电化学场处理垃圾渗滤液

以自行研制的交变脉冲电源为基础,在自制的磁场-电化学场一体化水处理反应器中,使用铝片为可溶性电极,并同时施加磁场和交变脉冲电解电流,对垃圾渗滤液进行处理.在磁感应强度为0.08 T,脉冲峰值电流密度为5 A/dm2,平均脉冲峰值电压为2.0 V,脉冲电流周期为3 s及处理时间为90 min的工艺条件下,相对于相同电化学条件的单一交变脉冲电絮凝处理,新鲜垃圾渗滤液的COD_Cr与NH₃-N的去除率分别提高了8.41%和6.56%;老龄垃圾渗滤液的COD_Cr与NH₃-N的去除率分别提高了16.01%和7.82%.表明磁场与电化学场的协同作用明显地提高了废水的处理效果.      

Competitive and cooperative adsorption behaviors of phenol and aniline onto nonpolar macroreticular adsorbents

The adsorption behaviors of phenol and aniline on nonpolar macroreticular adsorbents(NDA100 and Amberlite XAD4) were investigated in single or binary batch system at 293K and 313K respectively in this study. The results indicated that the adsorption isotherms of phenol and aniline on both adsorbents in both systems fitted well Langmuir equation, which indicated a favourable and exothermic process. At the lower equilibrium concentrations, the individual amount adsorbed of phenol or aniline on macroreticular adsorbents in single-component systems was higher than those in binary-component systems because of the competition between phenol and aniline towards the adsorption sites. It is noteworthy, on the contrast, that at higher concentrations, the total uptake amounts of phenol and aniline in binary-component systems were obviously larger than that in single-component systems, and a large excess was noted on the adsorbent surface at saturation, which is presumably due to the cooperative effect primarily arisen from the hydrogen bonding or weak acidbase interaction between phenol and aniline.     

Correlates of bushmeat in markets and depletion of wildlife

We used data on number of carcasses of wildlife species sold in 79 bushmeat markets in a region of Nigeria and Cameroon to assess whether species composition of a market could be explained by anthropogenic pressures and environmental variables around each market. More than 45 mammal species from 9 orders were traded across all markets; mostly ungulates and rodents. For each market, we determined median body mass, species diversity (game diversity), and taxa that were principal contributors to the total number of carcasses for sale (game dominance). Human population density in surrounding areas was significantly and negatively related to the percentage ungulates and primates sold in markets and significantly and positively related to the proportion of rodents. The proportion of carnivores sold was higher in markets with high human population densities. Proportion of small‐bodied mammals (<1 kg) sold in markets increased as human population density increased, but proportion of large‐bodied mammals (>10 kg) decreased as human population density increased. We calculated an index of game depletion (GDI) for each market from the sum of the total number of carcasses traded per annum and species, weighted by the intrinsic rate of natural increase (r_max) of each species, divided by individuals traded in a market. The GDI of a market increased as the proportion of fast‐reproducing species (highest r_max) increased and as the representation of species with lowest r_max (slow‐reproducing) decreased. The best explanatory factor for a market's GDI was anthropogenic pressure—road density, human settlements with >3000 inhabitants, and nonforest vegetation. High and low GDI were significantly differentiated by human density and human settlements with >3000 inhabitants. Our results provided empirical evidence that human activity is correlated with more depleted bushmeat faunas and can be used as a proxy to determine areas in need of conservation action.     

Game theoretic analysis of environmental impact assessment system in China

Environmental impact assessment (EIA) system has been established in China since 1973. In present EIA cases, there are four participants in general: governments, enterprises, EIA organizations and the public. The public has held responsible for both social costs and social duties. The public supervises social costs produced by enterprises discharging pollutant in EIA. However public participation is mostly deputized by governments, which severely weaken the independence of the public as one participant in EIA. In this paper, EIA refers to the different attitudes of the participants whose optional strategies may be described by a proper game model. According to disfigurements in EIA, three sides (governments, enterprises, and EIA organizations) dynamic iterative game theory, dynamic game theory of incomplete information, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium theory to analyze the reciprocity relation among governments, EIA organizations and enterprises. The results show that in a short period, economic benefit is preponderant over social benefit. Governments and enterprises both do not want to take EIA to reveal social costs. EIA organizations’ income comes from enterprises and the collusions are built between them to vindicate economic benefit. In a long run, social benefit loss caused by environmental pollution must be recuperated sooner or later and environmental deterioration will influence the achievements of economic benefit, so both governments and enterprises are certain to pursue high social benefit and willing to take EIA, helpful to increase private benefit. EIA organizations will make fair assessment when their economic benefit are ensured. At present, the public as silent victims can not take actual part in EIA. The EIA system must be improved to break the present equilibrium of three sides, bringing the public to the equilibrium to exert public supervision.