Toward a delineation of the circumstances in which cooperation can be sustained in environmental and resource problems

Play in standard laboratory Public Good games suggests that on average, humans are quite prone to cooperate. Yet cooperation is often absent in real world social dilemmas, including many environmental problems. We propose that this discrepancy arises because in the Public Good game, the worst freeriders can do is to not contribute to the public account, while in many real world environmental situations freeriders can even appropriate contributions made by others before the public good is produced. We introduce the Claim Game that modifies the Public Good game by allowing for appropriating the contributions of others before the public good is produced. The impact of such possible takings on public good production is dramatic. No public good is produced, not even in the initial stages of interaction. We link our findings to the relevance of common pool games for modeling environmental problems, and stress the need to experimentally test environmental institutions within harsher social dilemmas than the standard Public Good game.     

基于系统动力学的建筑安全监管博弈研究

为研究影响建筑安全的因素,探讨科学的建筑安全监管策略,在建筑企业与政府安全监管部门具有有限理性的前提下,建立建筑安全监管的演化博弈模型。对稳定状态的分析表明,模型并不总是存在演化稳定策略。在此基础上,建立系统动力学模型,借助数据仿真分析不同变量对建筑安全状况的动态影响。研究结果表明,奖惩力度、监管失误率、监管成本、安全投入、惩罚机制等因素的变化对建筑安全状况产生影响。建筑安全长效监管可从加大对监管部门的奖惩力度、减少监管部门的监管失误率、降低建筑安全监管成本、合理控制安全措施投入、设计合理的建筑企业惩罚机制等方面着手。     

碳交易政策下的物流与制造业联动减排随机演化博弈

考虑外部环境的不确定性,构建由地方政府、制造商与物流企业构建的三方随机演化模型,对模型的稳定性进行讨论得到稳态条件,结合数值仿真方法对博弈主体策略演化进行研究.结果表明：规制成本与上级政府的倒查机制是影响地方政府策略选择的重要因素,较高的碳交易价格将促进博弈系统向（积极规制,绿色生产,绿色运输）理想策略集演化,理想策略集下初始策略选择概率的改变一定程度上影响了主体演化的速率,即便制造商在博弈初期的绿色生产策略选择概率为0.1,仍能以最快的演化速率向绿色生产稳定策略收敛.联动发展下制造商的绿色生产策略将带动物流企业选择绿色运输策略,物流企业对碳交易价格与碳配额的敏感性要大于制造商,物流企业向绿色运输演化速率与碳配额成负相关,与碳交易价格成正相关.碳交易财政收入的增加促进了地方政府的积极规制行为,但当财政收入系数增加至0.3时可能导致物流企业的策略选择不稳定.伴随着随机干扰强度的升高,制造商保持了最高的稳定性,在情形一、二中的波动幅度分别为0.4667~1与0.5618~1,而物流企业的策略选择波动性最强,在情形一、二中得波动幅度分别为0.3856~1与0.4616~1,且在演化初期长期处在不稳定状态.     

Combining payment for crop damages and reward for productivity to address wildlife conflict

Conflict caused by wild herbivores damaging crops is an almost universal problem in conservation. We designed and implemented a game-theory-based system for supporting farmers whose crops were being heavily damaged by wild herbivores. In this community-operated system, farmers self-report their production, which is endorsed by neighboring farmers. The average deficit in production is compensated for by a payment that is directly proportional to the average deficit in production of the group and to the individual farmer's productivity. As a result, farmers are compensated for the average damage (support) and rewarded for individual productivity (reward) (i.e., support cum reward [SuR]). The design of the game is such that only honest reporting gives maximum returns. Farmers who underreport receive less payment because the SuR amount is proportionate to their self-reported productivity. The endorsing farmers, in their own self-interest, prevent overreporting. The system involves multiple game situations, the combined result of which is a stable strategy based on honesty and hard work. In 2 villages along the western boundary of Tadoba Andhari Tiger Reserve in central India, we tested the system with 75 farmers over 6 crop seasons. After a few initial attempts to cheat, honesty prevailed throughout the group. Average crop productivity increased 2.5-fold, in spite of damage, owing to increased effort by farmers. Apart from wildlife conflict resolution, the model offers a promising alternative to crop insurance and a potential behavioral green revolution in agriculture.     

我国生态旅游利益相关者分析

发展生态旅游需要在不同利益主体之间建立一个合理的利益协调和分配机制，而利益相关者角色的错位、缺位，其间关系的交叉、矛盾是制约我国生态旅游发展的关键。为了确保生态旅游的可持续发展，需要对现有的利益相关者角色和关系进行调整。真正使政府、当地牡区，旅游企业、保护地、旅游者、非政府组织、学术界及相关机构、媒体分别扮演好调控者、参与和受益者、执行者、执行监督者、实践者。协助者、研究指导者、宣传监督者的角色。     

基于施工安全的工程保险模式研究

分析了我国的建筑安全现状,提出加强工程保险的必要性.通过"建筑施工单位与保险公司是否投保与承保"的博弈模型的分析,得出结论:有必要实施强制性保险.通过"保险公司是否介入施工安全管理"的博弈模型的分析,得出保险公司介入施工安全管理是实现安全生产控制的一个有效手段.最后就工程保险的有效实施提出相关建议.     

基于知识服务的协同式装备维修技术支持平台

针对当前装备一线维修人员在技术支持上的存在的现实问题,提出了基于知识服务和协同模式构建协同式装备维修技术支持平台,在分析平台体系结构和功能的基础上,研究探讨了平台运作模式和关键技术。该平台为一线服务人员提供了"一站式"的技术支持和"定制式"的知识服务,实现了装备维修相关部门协同保障的"双赢"协作模式。     

When is female leadership an advantage? Coordination requirements,team cohesion,and team interaction norms

This study seeks to understand to what extent and in what contexts women leaders may be advantageous for teams. More specifically, this study examines how team leader gender relates to team cohesion, cooperative learning, and participative communication. Furthermore, the study argues that advantages derived from female leadership may be contingent on teams' coordination requirements. I propose that as teams' coordination requirements increase (i.e., with functional diversity, size, and geographic dispersion), teams with women leaders report more cohesion and more cooperative and participative interaction norms than those with men leaders. I aggregated survey responses from the members of 82 teams in 29 organizations at the team level. Findings from hierarchical linear modeling analyses suggest that female leadership is more positively associated with cohesion on larger and more functionally diverse teams and more positively associated with cooperative learning and participative communication on larger and geographically dispersed teams. These results call for more research on boundary conditions on the relationship between leader gender and team outcomes, on the role of relational leadership on complex and diverse teams and, ultimately, on the potential mediating role of cohesion and team interaction norms on the relationship between leader gender and team performance. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

政府激励企业环境技术创新的初步研究

本文分析了环境技术创新对可持续发展战略实施的重要作用，企业创新活动与政府环保目标的关系及政府激励企业环境技术创新中的博弈环节等，提出了政府激励企业环境技术创新的对策建议。     

组合措施下政府与企业排污行为演化博弈

为研究排污企业应对不同惩罚和补贴组合措施的行为策略，将演化博弈理论与系统动力学方法结合，构建基于政府与排污企业双方的演化博弈模型.以政府和排污企业双方利益为核心，对其在不同惩罚和补贴措施下的企业行为策略和演化稳定性进行分析.结果显示，在静态惩罚补贴措施下，政府和企业策略行为无法达到演化稳定点，政府静态政策不会对企业合法排污行为产生推动作用.在动态惩罚补贴措施下，动态惩罚和动态补贴措施对推动企业合法排污行为更为有效，政府可根据排污企业行为制定双边动态策略.