1种机器人工作区域协同搜索避障巡检策略

为解决工作区域搜索待操作目标的不确定性以及单一策略无法解决障碍物区域多搜索目标遍历与避障的问题,提出1种随机与固定搜索相结合的协同巡检策略。该策略在重点监测点通过引入非线性收敛因子及动态权重策略的改进灰狼优化算法遍历多任务点进行固定路线搜索;在非重点监测区域为差速转向移动机器人赋予三视野扫描线,并运用其灵活转动的特点进行随机路线搜索;通过交互式人工标记的方法定位搜索目标点并对其进行标记,运用改进灰狼优化算法对标记出的多目标点进行遍历顺序规划及D*算法避障到达;通过5个国际通用工程函数仿真测试改进的灰狼优化算法。结果表明:改进的灰狼优化算法能加快收敛速度,增强模型的求解精度,加强算法的稳定性,同时验证随机与固定相结合的区域协同搜索避障巡检策略的有效性。     

南岭中段弄蝶空间分布格局及多样性分析

为了分析南岭中段区域弄蝶(Hesperiidae)的物种组成、南坡与北坡的差异、不同海拔弄蝶的多样性及生态分布特点,选择南岭中段广东南岭自然保护区(南坡)和湖南莽山自然保护区(北坡)为监测区开展研究.2012—2015年共发现弄蝶83种,其中南坡73种,北坡43种,加之前人调查和记录的共有53属144种,其中东洋区占8...     

安全多方计算的应用研究

安全多方计算(SMC)在解决网络环境下进行合作时的信息安全问题具有重要价值。笔者首先介绍了安全多方计算的基本概念、密码学中相关基础知识,接着介绍和分析了安全多方计算的在电子选举、电子签名和门限签名等方面的基本应用;在该基础上,指出安全多方计算的新的应用方向,即在机械设计工程领域中的应用,如产品的异地设计和制造、敏捷和虚拟制造技术等;提出了值得进一步研究和探讨的、在保护隐私基础上合作的安全多方计算的热点问题。     

和谐社会构建中的企业安全文化建设研究

运用决策树对企业安全文化建设进行最优决策分析发现,企业一般不会自觉地投入资金来进行安全文化建设,而是存在一种侥幸心理,因此,需要对其施加监督外力;通过构建一个由政府安监部门和企业参与的监督博弈模型并进行分析表明,政府安监部门加大对企业不进行安全文化建设的处罚力度并不是最优策略,鼓励并帮助企业进行安全文化建设才是最优选择。和谐社会构建中仍需运用"和谐"原则来指导和帮助企业进行安全文化建设。     

基于贝叶斯最大熵的黑土区小流域土壤有机质空间分布预测

进行w（SOM）空间预测研究,对掌握区域w（SOM）空间分布现状、实施精准农业以及保护区域生态环境都有着重要意义.以土地利用类型为辅助变量,将不同土地利用类型所对应w（SOM）的概率分布作为“软数据”,采用BME（贝叶斯最大熵）方法对我国东北黑土丘陵区海沟河小流域表层w（SOM）的分布情况进行空间预测,并与以w（TN）和土地利用类型为辅助变量的CK（协同克里格）方法进行比较,探讨两种方法的可行性与精度.结果表明:我国东北黑土丘陵区海沟河小流域表层w（SOM）平均值为24.04 g/kg,空间变异程度为中等.w（SOM）与w（TN）呈极显著正相关,与土地利用类型存在较强的相关性,不同土地利用类型w（SOM）差异明显,w（TN）与土地利用类型能够用来辅助w（SOM）的空间分布插值.相较于CK方法,BME方法能更好地利用“软数据”进行空间插值,使对w（SOM）预测结果的平均误差（ME）、平均绝对误差（MAE）和均方根误差（RMSE）均有所降低,精度大幅提高,空间插值效果明显优于CK方法.研究显示,研究区w（SOM）以阶梯状自东向西依次递减分布,在南北方向上变化不大,空间变化特征较为明显,BME方法利用“软数据”插值后的结果能较好地反映研究区w（SOM）空间分布的实际情况.      

甲萘酚和甲萘胺在超高交联吸附树脂上的协同吸附行为

研究了水溶液中甲萘酚和甲萘胺在超高交联吸附树脂NDA103、NDA100上的协同吸附行为.实验结果表明,在较高平衡浓度范围内该吸附树脂对双组分水溶液中甲萘酚和甲萘胺双组分(摩尔比分别为3∶1、1∶1、1∶3)的吸附总量大于相同平衡浓度下对单组分水溶液中甲萘酚和甲萘胺的吸附量,呈现协同吸附现象,其主导机制是2种吸附质分子之间的氢键作用.单组分甲萘酚或甲萘胺水溶液和双组分共存水溶液中吸附质分子在吸附树脂上的吸附等温线均符合Langmuir模型.吸附温度由293K升至313K时,甲萘酚和甲萘胺在NDA103上的协同吸附效应的变化明显大于NDA100.NDA103树脂结构上的胺基既加强了对甲萘酚的吸附亲和力又增加了甲萘酚的协同吸附系数.     

Matching mechanism in global public goods games: a case of climate protection

In the setting of dealing with climate change, this article designs a matching mechanism for global public goods provision with the aggregative game approach. Given endowment and the technology of each country, we propose the conditions under which the matching mechanism is able to guarantee full participation and Pareto efficient provision, respectively, in the cases with certain and uncertain preference information. These conditions cannot only be adopted in international negotiation and cooperation, but also refines the theory of matching game. In comparative static analyses, we discover that: First, changes of initial stock of climate goods produce a wealth effect and the crowd-out effect is less than 1. Second, climate tax policies affect the supply and welfare of each country only when they produce wealth effects, and if tax revenue is transferred into climate goods with more advanced technology, they will produce positive wealth effects. Third, modifying matching plans dynamically and appropriately can urge countries to improve technology, and especially given a Pareto optimal mechanism, adjusting the matching plan to keep marginal rates of transformation unchanged as technology changes is still able to ensure full participation and efficient supply of climate goods.     

Subgame-perfect cooperative agreements in a dynamic game of climate change

We model climate change as a dynamic game and prove existence of a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) that is also Markov perfect. We interpret this unique SPNE as the business-as-usual (BAU) equilibrium and show that if the countries are not sufficiently symmetric then the familiar trigger strategy equilibria may not be Pareto improvements over the BAU equilibrium and may even lack efficiency properties. We then motivate and introduce a subgame-perfect cooperative agreement as an improvement over the BAU equilibrium in the sense that every country or coalition of countries is better off in every subgame, irrespective of the extent of heterogeneity of the countries. We characterize subgame-perfect cooperative agreements and identify sufficient conditions for their existence. We show that (direct or indirect) transfers between countries to balance the costs and benefits of controlling climate change are a necessity and not a matter of approach.     

高校垃圾分类回收监管机制演化博弈分析

本文以高校和大学生为研究对象,运用博弈论方法,通过建立双方的演化博弈模型,分析了影响主体进行垃圾分类策略选择的不同因素。将对垃圾分类行为具有较强约束的"声誉资本"引入模型中,研究不同情况下的演化均衡策略。结果显示:①大学生是否采取垃圾分类行为主要与学生进行垃圾分类支付的成本C_1、大学生因不参与垃圾分类造成的声誉损失h、学校的惩罚P以及参与垃圾分类得到的奖励R等因素有关。②大学生因不参与垃圾分类造成的声誉损失h对学生分类行为的影响显著。③学校是否采取监管策略主要与监管成本C有关。研究结果对于高校和政府制定环境监管政策具有重要的现实意义。     

Grid extension in German backyards: a game-theory rationale

A substantial extension of the electricity grid seems to be necessary in Germany in the coming decades for technical, economic, and ecological reasons. The increased usage of electricity from environmentally conscious sources is not undisputed and the question of where and how to extend the grid is at the centre of a controversial public discussion. One crucial point in this discussion concerns the fair sharing of the costs and benefits of such an extension. It is necessary to create a fair compensation mechanism. Therefore, an innovative mechanism is proposed in this paper that consists of cooperative game theory as well as auction elements. We interpret the German grid extension as a cooperative cost reduction game that allows the identification of fair cost shares and compensation payments. To solve the problem of non-cooperative behaviour, we propose the involvement of a sealed-bid auction. We show that this novel procedure is incentive compatible.