When all life counts in conservation

Conservation science involves the collection and analysis of data. These scientific practices emerge from values that shape who and what is counted. Currently, conservation data are filtered through a value system that considers native life the only appropriate subject of conservation concern. We examined how trends in species richness, distribution, and threats change when all wildlife count by adding so-called non-native and feral populations to the International Union for Conservation of Nature Red List and local species richness assessments. We focused on vertebrate populations with founding members taken into and out of Australia by humans (i.e., migrants). We identified 87 immigrant and 47 emigrant vertebrate species. Formal conservation accounts underestimated global ranges by an average of 30% for immigrants and 7% for emigrants; immigrations surpassed extinctions in Australia by 52 species; migrants were disproportionately threatened (33% of immigrants and 29% of emigrants were threatened or decreasing in their native ranges); and incorporating migrant populations into risk assessments reduced global threat statuses for 15 of 18 species. Australian policies defined most immigrants as pests (76%), and conservation was the most commonly stated motivation for targeting these species in killing programs (37% of immigrants). Inclusive biodiversity data open space for dialogue on the ethical and empirical assumptions underlying conservation science.     

Emergent conservation outcomes of shared risk perception in human-wildlife systems

Human perception of risks related to economic damages caused by nearby wildlife can be transmitted through social networks. Understanding how sharing risk information within a human community alters the spatial dynamics of human-wildlife interactions has important implications for the design and implementation of effective conservation actions. We developed an agent-based model that simulates farmer livelihood decisions and activities in an agricultural landscape shared with a population of a generic wildlife species (wildlife-human interactions in shared landscapes [WHISL]). In the model, based on risk perception and economic information, farmers decide how much labor to allocate to farming and whether and where to exclude wildlife from their farms (e.g., through fencing, trenches, or vegetation thinning). In scenarios where the risk perception of farmers was strongly influenced by other farmers, exclusion of wildlife was widespread, resulting in decreased quality of wildlife habitat and frequency of wildlife damages across the landscape. When economic losses from encounters with wildlife were high, perception of risk increased and led to highly synchronous behaviors by farmers in space and time. Interactions between wildlife and farmers sometimes led to a spillover effect of wildlife damage displaced from socially and spatially connected communities to less connected neighboring farms. The WHISL model is a useful conservation-planning tool because it provides a test bed for theories and predictions about human-wildlife dynamics across a range of different agricultural landscapes.     

The moral residue of conservation

Should conservationists use lethal management to control introduced wildlife populations? Should they kill individual animals to protect endangered species? Are trade-offs that prioritize some values at the expense of others morally appropriate? These sorts of ethical questions are common in conservation. In debating such questions, conservationists often seem to presume 1 of 2 possible answers: the act in question is right or it is wrong. But morality in conservation is considerably more complex than this simple binary suggests. A robust conservation ethic requires a vocabulary that gives voice to the uncertainty and unease that arise when what seems to be the best available course of action also seems to involve a measure of wrongdoing. The philosophical literature on moral residue and moral dilemmas supplies this vocabulary. Moral dilemmas arise when one must neglect certain moral requirements to fulfill others. Under such circumstances, even the best possible decision leaves a moral residue, which is experienced emotionally as some form of grief. Examples of conservation scenarios that leave a moral residue include management of introduced rabbits in Australia, trophy hunting in Africa, and forest management trade-offs in the Pacific Northwest. Moral residue is integral to the moral experience of conservationists today, and grief is an appropriate response to many decisions conservationists must make. Article impact statement: Defensible conservation decisions may neglect moral requirements, leaving a moral residue; conservationists should respond with grief.     

Sustainable tourism for remote atolls in the Pacific

SUMMARY

Coral atolls, as visitor destinations, have received little attention in the literature of tourism on mid-oceanic islands. However, the current trend of nature-based tourism, which involves travelling to relatively remote and undisturbed places, makes the atolls a desirable destination. This paper explores ways of how appropriate tourism can be introduced to atoll society within the context of traditional resource uses and the application of intermediate technologies. With the acceptance of a code of ethics for tourist behaviour and technologies aimed at reducing dependency of foreign imports, atoll tourism could become a viable economic alternative to the continued over-exploitation of marine resources.     

The Harm Principle and Genetically Modified Food

It is suggested that the Harm Principle can be viewedas the moral basis on which genetically modified (GM) food iscurrently regulated. It is then argued (a) that the concept ofharm cannot be specified in such a manner as to render the HarmPrinciple a plausible political principle, so this principlecannot be used to justify existing regulation; and (b) that evenif the Harm Principle were a plausible political principle, itcould not be used alone in the regulation of GM food, since itdoes not express a concern for the expected benefits of suchfood.     

A Short History of Food Ethics

Moral concern with food intake is as old asmorality itself. In the course of history, however,several ways of critically examining practices of foodproduction and food intake have been developed.Whereas ancient Greek food ethics concentrated on theproblem of temperance, and ancient Jewish ethics onthe distinction between legitimate and illicit foodproducts, early Christian morality simply refused toattach any moral significance to food intake. Yet,during the middle ages food became one of theprinciple objects of monastic programs for moralexercise (askesis). During the seventeenth andeighteenth century, food ethics was transformed interms of the increasing scientific interest in foodintake, while in the nineteenth century the socialdimension of food ethics was discovered, with theresult that more and more attention was given to theproduction and distribution of food products. Becauseof the increasing distance between the production andconsumption of food products ever since, theoutstanding feature of contemporary food ethics is itreliance and dependence on labeling practices.     

Teaching Agricultural Ethics

A survey was conducted in the United Statesin 1998 and 1999 to determine what members of theNational Association of State Universities and LandGrant Colleges (NASULGC) and of the AmericanAssociation of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU)offered agricultural ethics as an undergraduatecourse. Of the 59 responses, the survey found 15 USuniversities that have a course on agricultural ethicsor one that includes the topic. This paper willdiscuss the survey's findings and offer six reasonsthat explain why so few universities includeagricultural ethics in their curriculum. The sixreasons are: 1) lack of education in ethics andphilosophy on the part of agricultural scientists; 2)lack of institutional or disciplinary incentives foragricultural scientists to reflect on their work andits effects; 3) lack of administrative leadership incolleges of agriculture due to their failure tounderstand the benefits of agricultural ethics; 4)continuance of the prevailing assumption thatagriculture is inherently ethically correct; 5) thefelt necessity by agricultural scientists to defendthemselves against what are perceived to be unjust andinaccurate criticisms of agriculture; and 6) areluctance to engage in ethical reflection because itmay raise more problems than it solves. The paper'scentral question is why ethics is not taught in morecolleges of agriculture. Those who teach know thattheir students are tomorrow's farmers, businesspeople, professors, and policy makers. If we who nowteach and administer fail to include true ethicalstudy in our student's education, our students willstill be defensive when confronted with an ethicalissue and unable to respond except with assertionsbased on the production paradigm, the correctness ofwhich, although unexamined, we taught them. If theagricultural faculty does not recognize theopportunity and the obligation to participate in theshaping of values, then the values of agriculture willbe shaped elsewhere in the institution and insociety.     

工程监理的安全责任研究

为了研究工程监理单位是否应该承担安全监理的责任问题,从工程监理制度与安全施工的关系,从法律、行政法规、技术规范等多方面对工程监理的安全责任进行了全面的分析和详细的研究,最后从法理和现实入手,对工程监理单位的安全责任进行了总结和归纳,对一些条文规定进行了深入的解析。研究结果表明,目前的《建设工程安全生产管理条例》和某些地方政府和行业主管部门对工程监理单位的安全监理责任有扩大化的倾向,应予以制止。     

可持续发展的环境伦理透视

环境与可持续发展存在着内在的逻辑映射关系,这种一对一的指向关系内在地要求可持续发展理论的基本内核必然是关于环境的,而环境也就从根本上奠定了可持续发展理论形成与发展。这种发展自然地触及到了人类伦理道德的理论范畴。本文通过对环境和可持续发展理论的阐述,深刻分析了其与伦理观念的内在联系,而且提出了可持续发展作为生态道德的原则内涵,从而进行一场人类道德意识的革命。     

从摩尔的理论看环境伦理学的自然价值观

摩尔在伦理学原理一书中,首次分析了传统伦理学关于善的那种性质。指出善并不是一种自然之属性。而是一种非自然的属性。在严格的意义上说,善是不可定义的。并认为传统伦理学是犯了一种自然主义的谬误。摩尔的理论也波及到环境伦理学,特别是罗尔斯顿的自然价值理论受到了挑战。罗尔斯顿对自然主义的批评作出了回应。他把伦理义务的条件置于科学规律之前,并站在自然主义的立场上,指出自然界的生态平衡才是一切价值的基础。