Financial incentives,professional values and performance: A study of pay‐for‐performance in a professional organization

We investigated the effect of financial incentives on performance in a professional organization. Whereas agency theory treats tangible rewards such as money as a potentially powerful motivator for improving performance, the professional control perspective posits that the motivational effects of financial incentives will depend on the intended recipients attitudes toward the incentives relative to their professional values. The study setting was a large network of physician practices that adopted a financial incentive program to improve physician performance in the management of diabetic patients. Consistent with agency theory, performance did improve following the introduction of the incentive. However, consistent with the professional control perspective, physicians' psychologically based attitudes toward the incentive program regarding its impact on their own work autonomy and the importance of the performance goals moderated the effect of the incentive on performance. Study findings indicate that agency theory and professional control are complementary theoretical perspectives for understanding how professionals will respond to the imposition of performance‐related financial incentives. In terms of practice, pay‐for‐performance programs aimed at professional organizations should be designed to take into account the values and goals of an organization's professionals to maximize the effect of financial incentives on performance. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Motivating the Workforce: The Value of External Health and Safety Awards

This paper considers the prevalence and use of external health and safety awards by companies in the United Kingdom. A review is provided of the types of award schemes currently available. The results from two small research projects present data on the benefits that motivate participation in these awards. The results demonstrate that award schemes are used to motivate the workforce, and a comparison is made with company incentive schemes. However, there are a number of further benefits that can be identified. These benefits may have commercial implications, and include improved opportunities in the competitive tendering process and strengthening of community relations. Benefits may also include positive feedback for the health and safety professional that could lead to acknowledgement by senior management of their contribution to the health and safety performance in the organization.     

激励生态农业发展的环境经济政策分析

本文着重探讨了激励生态农业发展的环境经济政策分析过程。该方法体系从农业环境经济系统的起始元——农户入手 ,建立了农户环境经济行为模式 ,进而通过指向农户的环境经济政策激励机制模型分析 ,寻找促进生态农业发展的环境经济政策包。     

委托代理理论视角下特种设备安全监管改进研究

针对特种设备数量和种类不断增多与安全监管力量不足问题,首先阐述特种设备安全监管内涵,分析其涉及的委托代理关系;然后基于委托代理理论构建特种设备安全监管委托代理数学模型,并利用激励相容约束条件讨论监管力度、安全投入、公众信任度等因素对特种设备安全监管效果的影响及内在机制;最后提出进一步提高特种设备安全水平的改进策略.结果...     

基于系统动力学的安全生产监管有效性研究

为改善我国安全生产监管的效果,研究引入激励性监管措施后的安全生产监管效果。运用系统动力学(SD)建模方法,对比单用约束性监管措施的效果与综合运用约束性监管措施和激励性监管措施的效果。研究结果表明:单独使用约束性监管措施时,提高检查罚金和事故赔偿额,会使企业净收益、政府与企业的净收益总和增加。然而,综合使用约束性监管措施和激励性监管措施时,企业的净收益额增加,政府的净收益额减少,而企业与政府的净收益总额变化不大,但结合对事故负外部性的考虑,通常会使社会福利额外提高。     

麻疯树种子油生命周期的经济、环境与能量效率

要成为化石能源的有效替代品,生物燃料必须能提供净能量收益,能产生环境效益,具有经济效率,且在大量生产的情况下不引起粮食危机。麻疯树作为第二代生物柴油的重要原料作物,在国内得到大力推广,但实际效率尚不清楚。基于将麻疯树种子油与化石柴油直接混合使用的技术选择,利用生命周期评估法分析了麻疯树种子油生命周期的经济、环境和能量效率。结果表明：（1）在当前产量和生产技术水平下,生产和使用麻疯树种子油的财务净现值为负,要促进麻疯树种子油的生产,需要每年为种子生产者提供8817 元/hm2以上的补贴,为榨油厂商提供268 元/L的补贴;（2）生产和使用每升麻疯树种子油可减少约13 kgCO2当量的温室气体排放,固碳价值为补贴生产提供了部分经济依据,但是仅考虑种子油和固碳的价值时,生产和使用麻疯树种子油尚不具有经济可行性;（3）当仅考虑种子油的能量产出时,只有当种子产量达到795 kg/hm2以上才具有能量效率;当把树枝和果壳等所包含的生物质能计算在内时,在较低种子产量的情况下,也具有显著的能量效率。敏感性分析表明,随着麻疯树种子产量的增加,财务净现值趋于下降,但是种子油的成本下降,减排温室气体的贡献和能量效率都增加。最后,基于麻疯树种子油的生命周期分析,提出了提高经济、环境和能量效率的途径。〖     

Research on challenges and strategies for China’s green economy development

The last 20 years have been the fastest economic developing period of China,and China has made great economic achievements through undertaking international industrial transfer.However,undertaking international industrial transfer has brought about severe environmental problems to China and the process of undertaking international industry transfer is also a process of undertaking international transfer of natural resource consumption and environmental pollution.Nowadays,China has the heaviest ecological burden and highest environmental risk in the world,and is gradually losing international competitive advantages among traditional industries.China is facing unprecedented pressure of economic transformation.Besides the advantages like huge domestic demands and abundant civil capital,China faces more challenges in its green economy development.First,China is still in the middle of industrialization and urbanization processes,hence the huge demands for traditional industries will only last 10-15 more years.Meanwhile,China lacks core technologies for transforming traditional industries,which means these industries will have high shut-down risks.Second,the domestic market share for new green industries is limited,since the market is dominated by traditional energy industries.Third,the value of land,water,mineral,and other natural resources is extremely underestimated because the environmental cost is excluded from the enterprises’cost-benefit calculation.China should foster and expand green industries based on domestic demands,and then strive for competitive advantages in the international market in the future.Therefore,China should focus on the following four points in order to promote green industry development:establishing a forced-upgrading-mechanism for traditional industries,an incentive-development-mechanism for new green industries and a TFP-based(total factor productivity based)economic development evaluation system;promoting the integration of new-type urbanization,new emerging industries,and new employments;taking the model of"technology innovating-patent formulating-standard establishing-market guiding"to enhance the global competitiveness of China’s new emerging industries;and building green consumption patterns in the whole society.     

城市生活垃圾分类回收治理激励监督机制研究

考虑政府政策激励监督对城市生活垃圾分类回收治理的影响,构建政府监管-企业处理-居民参与的演化博弈模型,借助演化博弈理论分析4种不同情境下城市生活垃圾分类回收治理的演化稳定策略,并借助数值仿真分析了政府激励监督对各方策略选择的影响.研究发现：居民进行垃圾分类获得的收益大于参与分类的成本两倍及以上时,才会主动参与垃圾分类,否则不会主动参与分类,同时居民对政府正向激励补贴的变化比企业更为敏感.政府实施较高的负向激励力度时可有效约束企业行为,但过高的监管成本会造成垃圾回收治理的管理困境.     

ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR AGRICULTURAL NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL1

ABSTRACT. The limited success of command-and-control policies for reducing nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution mandated under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) has prompted increased interest in economic incentive policies as an alternative control mechanism. A variety of measures have been proposed ranging from fairly minor modifications of existing policies to substantial revisions including watershed-wide polices that rely on economic incentives. While greater use of economic incentive policies, such as environmental bonds and point/nonpoint source trading is being advocated in the reauthorization of the CWA, the expected effects of individual proposals will be modest. The characteristics of NPS pollution, namely uncertainty and asymmetrical information, underscores that there is no single, ideal policy instrument for controlling the many types of agricultural NPS water pollution. Some of the usual incentive-based policies, such as effluent taxes, are not well suited to the task. Individual incentive policies proposed for the reauthorized CWA, such as pollution trading or deposit/refund systems, are not broadly applicable for heterogeneous pollution situations. Economic incentive policies may be appropriate in some cases, and command-and-control policies will be preferable in others and may in fact complement incentive policies.     

Remodelling reparation: changes in the compensation of victims of natural catastrophes in Belgium and the Netherlands

The paper presents a comparative analysis of the development and present state of compensation for victims of catastrophes in Belgium and the Netherlands. These two neighbouring countries have both seen legislative changes in this field in recent years, albeit with different outcomes. The paper thus analyses to what extent the two compensation scheme structures allow for conclusions as to the comparative benefits of a comprehensive insurance scheme for natural disasters. From the perspective of law and economics, the evolution of private insurance and public intervention through compensation funds, the preference for private or public solutions and the actual financing of these are examined. Drawing on practical experience, such as the case of flood risks, the solutions are tested in view of incentive-based financing. The paper concludes that the private insurance market is more developed in Belgium than it is in the Netherlands, where the reform process has not yet ended.