湖域工业初始排污权合作配置体系构建——以太湖流域为例

针对湖泊流域工业初始排污权配置问题,在分析太湖流域工业初始排污权配置背景基础上,结合我国基本国情,从多利益相关者合作的角度出发,构建了一种政策型政府主体监管、经营型政府主体主导、多利益相关者参与的太湖流域工业初始排污权政府限额定价合作配置体系。并构建了合作配置体系的概念结构,以及合作配置路径结构,给出实现合作配置路径结构的工作流程结构。进而针对实际情况,提出保障太湖流域工业初始排污权合作配置体系应用的政策建议     

Motivating children's cooperation to conserve forests

Forests are essential common-pool resources. Understanding children's and adolescents’ motivations for conservation is critical to improving conservation education. In 2 experiments, we investigated 1086 school-aged children and adolescents (6–16 years old) from the United States, China, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Testing participants in groups, we assessed their motivation for conservation based on collective-risk common-pool goods games in which they were threatened with losing their endowment unless the group donation exceeded a threshold needed to maintain the forest. Extrinsic motivations, rather than intrinsic, tended to lead to successful cooperation to maintain a forest. Certainty of losing individual payoffs significantly boosted successful cooperative conservation efforts across cultures (success rates were 90.63% and 74.19% in the 2 risk-extrinsic conditions, and 43.75% in the control condition). In U.S. participants, 2 extrinsic incentives, priming discussions of the value of forests and delay of payoffs as punishment, also increased success of cooperative conservation (success rates were 97.22% and 76.92% in the 2 extrinsic-incentive conditions, and 29.19% and 30.77% in the 2 control conditions). Conservation simulations, like those we used, may allow educators to encourage forest protection by leading groups to experience successful cooperation and the extrinsic incentives needed to motivate forest conservation.     

基于区块链的跨域环境合作治理研究

跨域环境合作治理是新时代生态文明体制改革的重要方向,也是国家区域发展战略的重要目标。传统跨域环境治理实践呈现"权威达标型治理"的运作逻辑,在取得区域环境质量改善的同时,难免存在"人工失灵""不稳定性""弱激励性"等局限困境。为此,本文建议,基于区块链"去中心性""强信任化""高共享化"等优势特征,新时代推进跨域环境合作治理应建立全域化环境信息系统,构建协商化合作组织平台,实施精准化联合防控行动,塑造共赢化生态发展格局。