关于我国排污许可阶段性属性特征的研究

《排污许可管理条例》的制定需要明确排污许可的属性特征。研究发现,全国人民代表大会常务委员会法制工作委员会(简称全国人大法工委)与原中华人民共和国国务院法制办公室(简称国务院法制办)在对行政许可法的解读中对排污许可的属性特征判定不同,存在争议。排污许可包括排污许可证与排污登记两种形式,这两种形式具有不同的属性特征。《排污许可管理条例》发布实施后,根据国家生态环境保护形势和实践工作需要,将分为全面实施阶段和完善深化阶段。在不同阶段,排污许可证的属性特征会发生变化,并对排污权交易产生影响。     

Socially optimal and fund-balanced advanced recycling fees and subsidies in a competitive forward and reverse supply chain

Advanced recycling fees (ARFs) and government subsidy fees are important for curtailing the consumption of new products and encouraging recycling and disposal of end-of-life (EOL) products. We introduce a model consisting of a leader (the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA) and two groups of followers (MIS firms and recyclers) consisting of manufacturers, importers and sellers, and recyclers which compete in both consuming and recycling markets. The EPA determines the ARFs paid by the MIS firms and the fees subsidizing recyclers to maximize the social welfare in closed-loop supply chains where the MIS firms and recyclers attempt to maximize their respective profit functions. To compare with current practice, we describe a conceptual fund balance model to determine the ARF and subsidy fee on the basis of the balance between total collected ARFs and expenditure of subsidies. Using numerical examples for the laptop computer market in Taiwan, we demonstrate that our results outperform the current practice.