浅谈安全生产标准化建设

系统阐述了大冶有色金属公司安全生产标准化建设内容、安全生产指标制定准则、建设体系以及建设效果，为现代企业安全生产管理积累了经验，可供借鉴。     

论建立我国安全管理硕士教育制度

论述了安全科学技术的地位和作用，我国安全科学与工程学科的特点，安全工程师必备的知识体系，培养安全工程专业人才的要求，目前安全工程人才培养与实际需要的差距，我国安全科学技术的前景和已有的多层次安全教育体系等，在此基础上，首次提议了建立我国的安全管理硕士（MSA）教育制度，以便满足高层次安全管理人才的迫切需要，同时，还探讨了MSA人才的基本培养方案，比较了MSA和MBA（工商管理硕士）的共同特征，提出MSA教育可以借鉴MBA教育的经验。     

浅谈安全生产标准化建设

阐述了大冶有色金属公司安全生产标准化建设内容，安全生产标准制定准则，建设体系以及建设效果，为现代企业安全生产管理积累了经验，可供借鉴。     

工伤保险与安全管理

从我国安全管理实际出发,分析了借助于工伤保险的经济杠杆作用实现国家对企业安全管理制约机制的必要性,并对建立制约机制有关的指标体系及综合评估模型,以及该机制实现等问题进行了深入探讨.     

电厂机组大修的安全管理及保障措施

针对电厂机组大(小)修中所遇到的安全管理方面的各种实际问题,提出了针对性强、可操作性强、实用有效的防范措施和管理方法.     

煤矿安全量化管理方法的深化研究

对煤矿安全量化管理方法进行了理论上的深化和手段上的完善,提出了利用层次分析法确定安全管理目标标准分的方法,研制了实用、有效的应用软件系统。     

经济靠市场调节安全要政府监督--对市场经济条件下安全工作的思考

建立健全新型安全生产管理体制是市场经济条件下劳动安全卫生管理的客观要求.分析了当前劳动安全卫生工作的现状,指出了存在的问题,强调了加强法治的必要性和紧迫性,提出了实现国家监督制约机制的主要途径.     

矿山顶板分级管理方法初探

提出了金属矿山顶板分级管理的2种基本方法,就如何建立与完善矿山顶板分级管理制度提出了一些有益建议.     

The determinants of employee participation in occupational health and safety management

This article focuses on employee direct participation in occupational health and safety (OHS) management. The article explains what determines employee opportunities to participate in OHS management. The explanatory framework focuses on safety culture and safety management at workplaces. The framework is empirically tested using Estonian cross-sectional, multilevel data of organizations and their employees. The analysis indicates that differences in employee participation in OHS management in the Estonian case could be explained by differences in OHS management practices rather than differences in safety culture. This indicates that throughout the institutional change and shift to the European model of employment relations system, change in management practices has preceded changes in safety culture which according to theoretical argument is supposed to follow culture change.     

Analysis of underlying causes of investigated loss of containment incidents in Dutch Seveso plants using the Storybuilder method

In the Netherlands there are around 400 “Seveso” sites that fall under the Dutch Major Hazards Decree (BRZO) 1999. Between 2006 and 2010 the Dutch Labour Inspectorate's Directorate for Major Hazard Control completed investigations of 118 loss of containment incidents involving hazardous substances from this group. On the basis of investigation reports the incidents were entered in a tailor-made tool called Storybuilder developed for the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment for identifying the dominant patterns of technical safety barrier failures, barrier task failures and underlying management causes associated with the resulting loss of control events. The model is a bow-tie structure with six lines of defence, three on either side of the central loss of containment event. In the first line of defence, failures in the safety barriers leading to loss of control events were primarily equipment condition failures, pre start-up and safeguarding failures and process deviations such as pressure and flow failures. These deviations, which should have been recovered while still within the safe envelope of operation, were missed primarily because of inadequate indication signals that the deviations have occurred. Through failures of subsequent lines of defence they are developing into serious incidents. Overall, task failures are principally failures to provide adequate technical safety barriers and failures to operate provided barriers appropriately. Underlying management delivery failures were mainly found in equipment specifications and provisions, procedures and competence. The competence delivery system is especially important for identifying equipment condition, equipment isolation for maintenance, pre-start-up status and process deviations. Human errors associated with operating barriers were identified in fifty per cent of cases, were mostly mistakes and feature primarily in failure to prevent deviations and subsequently recover them. Loss of control associated with loss of containment was primarily due to the containment being bypassed (72% of incidents) and less to material strength failures (28%). Transfer pipework, connections in process plant and relief valves are the most frequent release points and the dominant release material is extremely flammable. It is concluded that the analysis of a large number of incidents in Storybuilder can support the quantification of underlying causes and provide evidence of where the weak points exist in major hazard control in the prevention of major accidents.