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41.
42.
David Sztybel 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》2001,14(3):259-273
Even if animal liberation were to be adopted, would rights for animals be redundant – or even deleterious? Such an objection, most prominently voiced by L. W. Sumner and Paul W. Taylor, is misguided, risks an anthropocentric and anthropomorphic conception of autonomy and freedom, overly agent-centered rights conceptions, and an overlooking of the likely harmful consequences of positing rights for humans but not for nonhuman animals. The objection in question also stems from an overly pessimistic construal of autonomy-infringements thought to result from extending rights to animals, and also, of confusions that supposedly may ensue from ascribing animal rights. Whether or not a case for animal liberation and/or animal rights can cogently be made, the redundancy-or-worse objection to animal rights need pose no barrier. 相似文献
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Hugh Lehman 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》1988,1(2):155-162
According to a rights view it is acceptable to kill animals if they are innocent threats or shields or are in a lifeboat situation. However, according to advocates of such a view, our practices of killing animals for food or scientific research may be morally unacceptable. In this paper we argue that, even if we grant the basic assumptions of a rights view, a good deal of killing of animals for food and scientific research continues to be morally acceptable. 相似文献
46.
Deborah Slicer 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》1995,8(2):161-170
I offer a very qualified argument to the effect that rights are grounded in a certain sort of prejudice that privileges individualistic and perhaps masculinist ways of thinking about moral life. I also propose that we look carefully at other conceptions of social ontology and moral life, including the much discussed care conception. 相似文献
47.
Several writers on animal ethics defend the abolition of most or all animal agriculture, which they consider an unethical exploitation of sentient non-human animals. However, animal agriculture can also be seen as a co-evolution over thousands of years, that has affected biology and behavior on the one hand, and quality of life of humans and domestic animals on the other. Furthermore, animals are important in sustainable agriculture. They can increase efficiency by their ability to transform materials unsuitable for human consumption and by grazing areas that would be difficult to harvest otherwise. Grazing of natural pastures is essential for the pastoral landscape, an important habitat for wild flora and fauna and much valued by humans for its aesthetic value. Thus it seems that the environment gains substantially when animals are included in sustainable agricultural systems. But what about the animals themselves? Objections against animal agriculture often refer to the disrespect for animals’ lives, integrity, and welfare in present intensive animal production systems. Of the three issues at stake, neither integrity nor animal welfare need in principle be violated in carefully designed animal husbandry systems. The main ethical conflict seems to lie in the killing of animals, which is inevitable if the system is to deliver animal products. In this paper, we present the benefits and costs to humans and animals of including animals in sustainable agriculture, and discuss how to address some of the ethical issues involved. 相似文献
48.
The continuing existence of zoos and their good purposes such as conservation, science, education, and recreation, can be
ethically justified only if zoos guarantee the welfare of their animals. The usual criteria for measuring animal welfare in
zoos are physical health, long life, and reproduction. This paper looks at these criteria and finds them insufficient. Additional
criteria are submitted to expand the range of welfare considerations: natural and abnormal behavior; freedom and choice; and
dignity. All these criteria should play a role in analyzing zoo animal welfare and interests but dignity has the overriding
part because it impacts on both animal and human interests. 相似文献
49.
Ethical reflection deals not only with the moral standing and handling of animals, it should also include a critical analysis
of the underlying relationship. Anthropological, psychological, and sociological aspects of the human–animal-relationship
should be taken into account. Two conditions, asymmetry and ambivalence, are taken as the historical and empirical basis for
reflections on the human–animal-relationship in late modern societies. These conditions explain the variety of moral practice,
apart from paradoxes, and provide a framework to systematize animal ethical problems in a broader field. This allows the development
of ideal relationships as moral orientation across anthropocentric or sentientistic ethical theories. These ideal relationships
are called the patronage-model, the friendship-model and the partnership-model. The ethical problem of creating transgenic
animals is discussed in the light of these ideal relationships. 相似文献
50.
Kathryn Paxton George 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》1992,5(2):217-233
In response to Evelyn Pluhar'sWho Can Be Morally Obligated to Be a Vegetarian? in this journal issue, the author has read all of Pluhar's citations for the accuracy of her claims and had these read by an independent nutritionist. Detailed analysis of Pluhar's argument shows that she attempts to make her case by consistent misappropriation of the findings and conclusions of the studies she cites. Pluhar makes sweeping generalizations from scanty data, ignores causal explanations given by scientists, equates hypothesis with fact, draws false cause conclusions from studies, and in one case claims a conclusion opposite of what the scientist published. Such poor reasoning cannot be the basis of an argument for moral vegetarianism. A broader search of the literature and attention to reviews and textbooks in nutrition shows that each of Pluhar's claims is suspect or incorrect. Pluhar has not undermined my central claims: even if animals have certain rights and well-planned vegetarian diets are safe in complex industrialized societies, these diets cannot be so regarded if the presuppositions of high levels of wealth, education, and medical care do not exist; and, women, children, the aged and some ill persons are at greater risk on restrictive vegan diets. Thus, any duty of moral vegetarianism is not categorical but provisional in nature. 相似文献