水平衡法在采油清洁生产审核中的应用

在采油清洁生产审核中发现,对生产过程的物质消耗和废物排放难以准确地进行分析和测试。针对这一问题,提出了水平衡分析法。对水平衡及其生产过程进行了评估,分析了清水损耗和废水产生的原因和环节,探讨了节约水资源、提高污水回用率的途径和方法,并提出了改进的目标和对策,形成了清洁生产审核方案。清水、污水平衡分析方法简单可靠,易于实施,同时可以为能量平衡、污染因子平衡的建立和分析提供借鉴和参考。     

Landfill space consumption dynamics in the Lower Rio Grande Valley by grey integer programming-based games

The Lower Rio Grande Valley (LRGV) region in South Texas emerges as a warehouse and transportation center between Central America and the US with positive growth impacts due to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In 10 years time, a 39.8% population increase has resulted in a 25% boost in solid waste per capita disposal rate in the region. A landfill space shortage drives a need for landfill operators to understand their optimal management strategies in this highly-competitive market. Initially, a strategic plan for optimal solid waste pattern distribution minimizes net costs for cities. This is accomplished through a grey integer programming algorithm that encapsulates all uncertainty present in the solid waste system. Secondly, a series of grey integer submodels construct payoff matrices for a zero-sum two-person game. The ensuing game theoretic analysis is critical for evaluating optimal pricing strategies for tipping fees available to the most significant regional landfills (e.g. Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI) and City of Edinburg) as they compete over disposal contracts. The BFI landfill intrinsically benefits from its competitive pricing policy and central location to solid waste generators. The City of Edinburg landfill, on the other hand, wishes to secure its lucrative solid waste management revenue. It desires a gaming strategy backed by optimality that integrates ambiguity in solid waste generation, design capacity boundaries, and unitary shipping costs. Results show that a two-tiered analysis via grey integer programming-based games may pave the way for 'grey Nash equilibria' pricing tactics that will help the Edinburg landfill maintain its waste contracts.     

复合溶剂萃取氨基酸的初步研究

以Lewis酸性萃取剂和Lewis碱性萃取剂组成的复合萃取剂(正辛烷为稀释剂)萃取L-苯丙氨酸为研究对象，研究了Lewis酸／Lewis碱配对以及pH值对萃取分配系数的影响。N263与辛酸、月桂酸等组成的复合溶剂萃取规律比较复杂。红外谱图研究表明，己酸与TOA配对组成的复合溶剂(正辛烷为稀释剂)为离子对溶剂、己酸、辛酸、月桂酸及P204分别与TOA配对组成的复合溶剂萃取L-苯丙氨酸，在低pH条件下为阳离子交换反应，在高pH条件下为阴离子交换反应。     

深圳市某滑坡稳定性评价

深圳地区低山丘陵所占面积较大,进行工程建设活动时,场地边坡稳定性评价是普遍存在的重要岩土工程问题。本文以梧桐山某滑坡工程为实例,用多种方法进行分析,对类似工程问题的评价、治理有一定的实际意义。     

非平衡自组织理论在城市环境系统中的应用研究

结合国内外非平衡自组织理论应用的成功实例 ,本文对该理论在城市环境系统中的应用作了阐述并对该理论建模定量分析应用的特点进行了重点探讨 ,最后展望了该理论进一步深入研究的发展方向     

干旱季节水库水质pH值增高原因探析

随着水库蓄水量的减少,水生生物快速大量生长,破坏了水体中碳酸氢盐的水解平衡,伴随生物利用水中二氧化碳进行光合作用的过程,水中氢氧根离子含量增加,氢氧根离子又使碳酸氢根的电离平衡向生成碳酸根离子方向移动,导致水中碳酸根离子浓度增大,总碱度增加,同时湖库底质盐碱土和草甸土的碳酸氢盐以及碳酸盐的平衡释放也使水体的碳酸氢盐得到外源补充.周而复始使水体的碳酸盐碱度和总碱度不断增加,pH也逐步增高.在相对往年引入嫩江水容量较少的情况下,干旱、高温、少雨、水体表面的物理蒸发和生物蒸腾作用,水库水容量急剧减少,上述情况进一步加剧.并通过对水库出口的碱度进行修正,推算出水体的生物量,和理论生物量计算值相符合.     

The chemical stability of heavy metals in a natural water system

A comprehensive investigation of heavy metal pollutants in Xiangjiang river was accomplished to evaluate their chemical stability through three different ways: (1) Chemical speciation by direct measurements; (2) Chemical equilibrium model simulation; (3) Sediment extraction experiments. All the results demonstrated that the directly bioavailable fraction was in a very limited amount. The metal bound to organic ligands, adsorbed particles and precipitated species presented a buffer for solution species. The majority of metals occured in the residues as solid particulates. It was inferred that the heavy metal pollutants in this aquatic system exhibited a high chemical stability. The critical limits of discharging load and pH values were suggested.     

关于征收生态环境补偿费问题的探讨

上海市浦东新区是国家征收生态环境补偿费的试点之一。探讨完善“生态环境补偿机制”已迫眉睫。文章首先分析征收生态环境补偿费的背景。然后提出了有关的收费政策，最后简要简明了在制定和实施过程中的若于建议。生态环境补偿费是涉及非非常广的新课题，已引起许多国家和组织一重关注，对实行生态环境补偿收费的可行性，建立收费标准体系，形成一套管理办法等，都需要进行研究，探索，完善，同时也需加强宣传，解释，使公众较快地理     

利用非平衡态等离子体降解甲苯研究

采用介质阻挡放电产生的非平衡态等离子体对含有易挥发性有机化合物甲苯的空气进行了处理．甲苯体积分数为０２６％的空气（１０１３２５Ｐａ）放电１ｓ，可使其中的甲苯去除７０３％．还研究了甲苯在纯氧中的放电和甲苯浓度、电极间电压对非平衡态等离子体法降解甲苯的影响．     

The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy

We evaluate the efficacy of international trade in carbon emission permits when countries are guided strictly by their national self-interest. To do so, we construct a calibrated general equilibrium model that jointly describes the world economy and the strategic incentives that guide the design of national abatement policies. Countries’ decisions about their participation in a trading system and about their initial permit endowment are made non-cooperatively; so a priori it is not clear that permit trade will induce participation in international abatement agreements or that participation will result in significant environmental gains. Despite this, we find that emission trade agreements can be effective; that smaller groupings pairing developing and developed-world partners often perform better than agreements with larger rosters; and that general equilibrium responses play an important role in shaping these outcomes.