全文获取类型
收费全文 | 255篇 |
免费 | 29篇 |
国内免费 | 72篇 |
专业分类
安全科学 | 36篇 |
废物处理 | 8篇 |
环保管理 | 35篇 |
综合类 | 135篇 |
基础理论 | 53篇 |
污染及防治 | 26篇 |
评价与监测 | 11篇 |
社会与环境 | 33篇 |
灾害及防治 | 19篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 1篇 |
2022年 | 7篇 |
2021年 | 10篇 |
2020年 | 5篇 |
2019年 | 5篇 |
2018年 | 7篇 |
2017年 | 10篇 |
2016年 | 18篇 |
2015年 | 11篇 |
2014年 | 13篇 |
2013年 | 28篇 |
2012年 | 13篇 |
2011年 | 32篇 |
2010年 | 21篇 |
2009年 | 16篇 |
2008年 | 16篇 |
2007年 | 23篇 |
2006年 | 14篇 |
2005年 | 11篇 |
2004年 | 16篇 |
2003年 | 10篇 |
2002年 | 8篇 |
2001年 | 5篇 |
2000年 | 10篇 |
1999年 | 6篇 |
1998年 | 9篇 |
1997年 | 7篇 |
1996年 | 7篇 |
1995年 | 4篇 |
1993年 | 3篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 4篇 |
1987年 | 1篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 1篇 |
1970年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有356条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
71.
以太湖的表层沉积物为研究对象,运用相平衡分配法(EqP)探讨了沉积物中4种重金属(Cu, Pb, Zn, Cd)的沉积物质量基准(CSQC)值;根据美国国家环境保护局(US EPA)基于水生生物对重金属的最终慢性毒理水平的淡水水质基准,制定了太湖4种重金属(Cu, Pb, Zn,和Cd)的沉积物质量基准值分别为145.2,308.72,293.01,0.46mg/kg.以此CSQC为参比值,参考潜在生态危害指数法对各元素赋予不同的权重值,运用综合污染指数法对太湖沉积物重金属的环境质量进行评价,结果显示,2010年8~9月太湖沉积物质量基本为良.这一结果与沉积物重金属总量分析结果一致. 相似文献
72.
针对软弱基底露天矿排土场普遍存在的变形破坏问题,结合胜利东二露天矿南排土场南帮边坡的工程实际,基于极限平衡理论,给出了通过探槽及滑坡变形反分析综合确定基底赋存条件及抗剪强度指标的方法;提出了对软弱基底排土场的变形治理措施;根据已有监测数据,对南帮边坡治理效果进行了评价。结果表明:在实施削坡减载措施后,各地表监测点的累计位移趋于平缓,边坡治理措施效果明显,解决了胜利东二露天矿迫切的安全问题,为同样具有软弱基底的其他露天矿排土场变形及破坏治理提供了指导。 相似文献
73.
V.V. Mazalov 《Ecological modelling》2010,221(12):1545-1553
In this paper, a discrete-time game model related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) is considered. We divide a fishery into regions, which are exploited by single players. The center (referee) shares a reservoir between the competitors. The players (countries), which harvest the fish stock are the participants of this game.We assume that there are migratory exchanges between the regions of the reservoir. Therefore, the stock in one region depends not only on the previous stock and catch in the region, but also on the stock and catch in neighboring regions. We derive the Nash and cooperative equilibria for an infinite planning horizon.We consider two ways to maintain the cooperation: incentive equilibrium and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We investigate the cooperative incentive equilibrium in the case when the center punishes players for a deviation.Also we consider the case when the center is a player and find the Shapley value and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We introduce a new condition which offers an incentive to players to keep cooperating. 相似文献
74.
75.
Abstract There is an obvious departure from the regional equilibrium of developments between the upper and lower reaches of the Pearl River in Guangdong, which resulted in “the effects of contra-geography-grads development”. It is mainly because the upriver mountainous areas have been deeply stuck in industrialization delay and marginalization plights, so that nearly 40 million local people have conceived a dream to get rid of “the vicious circle of poverty” by speeding up industrial development. But the problem is that such industrialization efforts on a large scale in mountainous areas are encountering the bottleneck of environmental capacity that strictly limits industrial emissions along the upper reaches of any water system. As a solution, an institutional arrangement called “the Local Area Quotas for Industrial Emis-sions along the Pearl River” is put forward supposed to give corresponding compensation to the rights of industrial development yielded by some areas with lower environmental capacity through the distribution and trading of IDQs. 相似文献
76.
77.
78.
Abdelkrim Araar Jean-Yves Duclos 《Journal of Environmental Economics and Management》2011,61(2):227-243
This study assesses the incidence of pollution control policies on households. In contrast to previous studies, we employ an integrated framework combining a multisector general equilibrium model with a stochastic dominance analysis using household-level data. We consider three policy instruments in a domestic emission trading system: (i) an output-based allocation (OBA) of permits; (ii) the use of the proceeds of permit sales to reduce payroll taxes (RPT); (iii) and the use of these proceeds to reduce consumption taxes instead (UCS). The general equilibrium results suggest that the return to capital is more negatively affected than the wage rate in all simulations, since polluting industries are capital intensive. Abstracting from pollution externalities, the dominance analysis suggests that all three policies have a normatively robust negative (positive) impact on welfare (poverty). Formal dominance tests indicate that RPT first-order welfare dominates OBA over all values of household incomes. UCS also first-order poverty dominates RPT for any choice of poverty line below $CAN 18,600, and poverty dominates for any poverty line (and thus welfare dominates) at the second order. Finally, while the three pollution control policies do not have a numerically large impact on inequality (in comparison to the base run), statistical tests indicate that inequality increases significantly more with OBA and RPT than with UCS. 相似文献
79.
Ecosystem constraints are both ontic and epistemic. They limit activity, and as problems to be solved they drive organization, which is our hypothesis:
The driver of organization is constraint.Solutions proliferate further constraints in an unending spiral of problem (constraint) generation and solution. As constraints proliferate, behavior narrows, and species diversify to compensate (paradox of constraint). Resource enrichment reduces constraints, releases behavior, and reduction of challenges decreases diversity (paradox of enrichment)—high diversity is expressed in low-resource environments and low diversity in high-resource environments. A three-part model of constraints is formulated for non-living systems, and also for goal-directed, problem-solving biota. Mode 1: dynamical means behavior is co-determined by internal states and external inputs. Mode 2: cybernetic employs negative feedback to keep dynamics within goal-oriented operating limits. Mode 3: model-making entails ability to represent (model) physical reality and respond to both phenomenal (modeled) and physical inputs; this property distinguishes living from nonliving systems. Principal sections of the paper elaborate dynamical constraints (three classes), boundary constraints (expressed in edge effects and trophic dynamics), physical constraints (space, time, temperature), chemical constraints (environment fitness, ecological stoichiometry, chemical evolution, limiting factors), coding constraints (environmental vs. genetic coding), network and pathway constraints (connectivity), and natural selection constraints (fitting to the biosphere). Consideration of how the world would look without constraints suggests how fundamental these are in ecosystem emergence, and how the next property in this series, differentiation, would be unmotivated without them. We conclude that constraints as a category are under-studied in ecology, poorly understood in ecological phenomenology, and (our hypothesis) comprise a ubiquitous organizing force in nature. 相似文献
80.
The main principle of the economic approach to a trophic system we propose here lies in assuming that there is a transfer of food along a path between a prey and a predator if, for the predator, the benefits are greater than costs of predation on this path. Conversely, if the costs exceed the benefits, there are no flows. This trade-off, considered all along the food chains of an ecosystem, together with ecological processes (assimilation, somatic maintenance) results in a model coupling mass balance equations (biological constraints) and complementarity principles (Walras’ law). Here is the core of the Network Economics Approach to Trophic Systems (NEATS). 相似文献