贫困地区生态综合补偿转移支付法制研究

生态综合补偿的提出表明国家对生态补偿关注的重点从资金的来源转向资金使用的效果，其中转移支付法制是影响生态综合补偿效果的主要变量。从中央和地方两个层面的立法来看，贫困地区生态补偿转移支付立法从维护公平正义提供倾斜性补偿资金，转向促进“绿色发展”“绿色减贫”的生态补偿整体性效益建设。然而，整体上，相关法制建设尚显不足，如贫困地区利益未充分表达、补偿资金使用自主权未能充分发挥、整体性监督考核机制不健全等。原因在于，扶贫政治思维淡化了贫困地区生态综合补偿法律制度的属性，覆盖面难以普及；不同利益诉求造就了贫困地区生态综合补偿转移支付制度约束；行政放权的非制度化影响贫困地区生态补偿转移支付整体性效益。应以实现可持续的自我发展权新理念加强贫困地区生态综合补偿转移支付的法律制度化建设，明晰贫困地区生态综合补偿中转移支付的重要地位，夯实基础性财权，同时构建适应生态综合补偿的整体性考核机制。     

Mixed signals: market incentives, recycling, and the price spike of 1995

Environmental economics assumes that reliance on price signals, adjusted for externalities, normally leads to efficient solutions to environmental problems. We explore a limiting case, when market volatility created ‘mixed signals’: prices of waste paper and other recycled materials were suddenly extremely high in 1994–1995, then plummeted back to traditional low levels in 1996. These rapid reversals resulted in substantial economic and political costs. A review of academic and business literature suggests six possible explanations for abrupt price spikes. An econometric analysis of the prices of wood pulp and waste paper shows that factor which explained price changes in 1983–1993 contribute very little to understanding the subsequent price spike. From the econometric analysis and from other sources, we conclude that speculation must have played a major role in the price spike, perhaps in combination with modest effects from changes in government policy and in export demand. If speculatively driven price spikes can disrupt an environmentally important industry such as recycling, what is the appropriate role for public policy? When price volatility is sufficiently disruptive, then measures to control or stabilize prices, rather than interfering with the market, might help to make it more efficient.     

循环经济发展战略下的企业决策行为研究——以天津滨海新区为例

在循环经济发展战略下,企业呈现出不同的行为模式,选择差异性目标和决策成本构成了企业的决策过程。转变经济发展方式的要求强化了企业所面对的市场竞争,而企业发展循环经济是具有内在动力机制的市场化行为。     

加大行政奖惩力度是中国环境绩效改善的主要原因吗?

"十一五"、"十二五"规划时期,中国单位GDP能耗、SO_2排放总量、COD排放总量等节能减排指标均实现了国家规划目标,这与"十五"计划三项指标均未完成形成鲜明对比。现有研究对此的解释存在宏观和微观层面上的不一致。其重要原因在于现有研究将环境绩效改善的原因完全归于行政奖惩所体现的正式制度的作用,而忽视了非正式制度对节能减排绩效的积极影响。本文建构了以包含正式激励和非正式激励的二元委托代理激励模型为基础的分析框架,利用基于717名不同级别官员的问卷数据,采用结构方程方法对上述模型进行了检验。实证结果表明,与约束性指标相关的正式制度中规定的11项奖惩措施所产生的激励对官员的环境治理行为力度并没有显著影响,而体现为顺应中央政府导向和上级领导注意力所代表的非正式制度激励对官员环境治理行为力度产生了显著影响。非正式制度激励对环境治理行为力度的影响存在两条路径。在第一条路径中,官员压力是中介变量,即非正式制度产生对官员压力的影响,官员压力又进一步影响官员环境治理行为。在这一路径中,晋升偏好、服从偏好为正向调节变量,正式奖惩的执行严格程度为负向调节变量。这一路径表明,官员晋升偏好越强、正式奖惩执行严格程度越弱,非正式制度激励对地方官员压力的影响越大;官员服从上级偏好程度越强,官员压力对环境治理行为力度的影响越大。在第二条路径中,非正式制度激励被认为直接影响环境治理行为力度,服务偏好是正向调节变量。这一路径表明,地方官员为人民服务的偏好越强,非正式激励对环境治理行为的影响越大。本文的研究发现调和了环境政策执行领域的理论冲突,为深化对中国"压力型"体制的理解提供实证证据。     

Welfare environmentality and REDD+ incentives in Indonesia

This paper applies the concept of welfare environmentality to analyse Indonesia’s emerging national and project-based incentive frameworks, a key component to the climate programme reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+). The paper adapts governmentality theory to explore the rationale and design of various incentive instruments, including government institutions to disburse financial payments and co-benefits to multiple recipients, as well as a local demonstration project in Central Kalimantan Province. These REDD+ incentives are often conflated with the neoliberalisation of the climate agenda, focused on the adoption of market instruments and the commodification of forest carbon. However, REDD+ incentives in Indonesia include diverse policy mechanisms and encompass multiple objectives – such as the delivery of social services and employment schemes aimed at improving community livelihoods. These incentives employ a welfare environmentality, where government agencies and their partners deliver certain rights and socio-economic security for communities in return for adopting practices that improve carbon and forest management. The application of welfare environmentality shows how incentive frameworks operate as a state intervention designed to restructure relations between people and environmental resources.     

政企合谋下的策略减排困境——来自工业废气层面的度量考察

结合当前GDP导向下的晋升激励与层层加压的减排任务考核现实,立足于政治经济学角度,提出了政企合谋下策略性减排困境的假说,并利用1997-2011年间的相关数据进行双向固定效应下的普通面板与空间计量的检验。实证分析发现,相对于环境库茨涅茨曲线、污染天堂以及财政分权假说,晋升压力下本地晋升官员与企业合谋追求产出最大化的行为才是导致废气排放屡禁不止的主要原因;而即使考虑到政策时滞效应以及地区之间的空间依赖效应之后,政企合谋核心变量始终显著,但其他污染假说的备择变量依旧未能通过显著性检验,表明政企合谋导致外溢性物品排放恶化的假说十分稳健;同时,通过显著性检验的年度虚拟变量表明,尽管减排约束影响了合谋行为,但地方政府仅在检查力度较大的人事变动时期有限度的减排,而在后期无节制的增排,从而导致了废气排放与党代会同步的周期性波动;庆幸的是,尽管政企合谋假说十分稳健,但基于经济地理矩阵的空间滞后系数表明,晋升激励与考核任务的双重约束使得邻近地区之间,因为经济增长的短期不确定性与晋升博弈的残酷性而在短期内不敢贸然增排以避免陷入增长无法兑现的同时遭受约束性任务惩罚的尴尬境地,从而形成了经济差距下邻近地区之间废气排放的区域分化策略;最后,我们基于当前的政企合谋下策略性减排假说验证的基础上,认为要想扭转当前的减排困境,必须着力提升年轻官员与鼓励异地调任、给予环境污染以更多的激励权重、努力缩小地区经济差距以及改变单维GDP考核机制,方能从根本上转变当前的不利局面。     

Aftermath of natural disasters: Coping through residential mobility

Most studies of population movement have concentrated on the more developed nations and on trends that have not been influenced by man-made or natural disasters. The experience of developing countries in the Caribbean basin, as studied after the Guatemalan earthquake of 1976 and the impact of Hurricane David in the Dominican Republic of 1979, highlights the importance of socio-economic factors in the decision to make permanent migrations after a disaster, regardless of whether the migrant had personally suffered losses. In many cases the opportunities for personal betterment created by the disaster acted as a catalyst and accelerated a previously-existing trend of migration.     

Status of Species Conservation Banking in the United States

Abstract:  Receiving financial gains for protecting habitat may be necessary to proactively protect endangered species in the United States. Species conservation banking, the creation and trading of "credits" that represent biodiversity values on private land, is nearly a decade old. We detail the biological, financial, and political experience of conservation banking in the United States. We contacted agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and bank owners and compiled comprehensive accounts of the experiences of current banks. There are 76 properties identified as conservation banks in the United States, but only 35 of these are established under a conservation banking agreement approved by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). The 35 official conservation banks cumulatively cover 15,987 ha and shelter a range of biodiversity, including more than 22 species listed under the U.S. Endangered Species Act. Financial motives drove the establishment of 91% of conservation banks, and the majority of for-profit banks are breaking even or making money. With credit prices ranging from $3,000 to $125,000/0.41 ha (1 acre), banking agreements offer financial incentives that compete with development and provide a business-based argument for conserving habitat. Although the bureaucracy of establishing an agreement with the USFWS was burdensome, 63% of bank owners reported they would set up another agreement given the appropriate opportunity. Increasing information sharing, decreasing the time to establish agreements (currently averaging 2.18 years), and reducing bureaucratic challenges can further increase the amount of private property voluntarily committed to banking. Although many ecological uncertainties remain, conservation banking offers at least a partial solution to the conservation versus development conflict over biodiversity.     

On Finding Solutions to Ethical Problems in Agriculture

A distinction should be made betweentwo types of ethical problems. A Type I ethicalproblem is one in which there is no consensusas to what is ethical. A Type II ethicalproblem is one in which there is a consensus asto what is ethical, but incentives exist forindividuals to behave unethically. Type Iethical problems are resolved by making,challenging, and reasoning through moralarguments. Type II ethical problems areresolved by changing the institutionalenvironment so that people do not haveincentives to behave unethically. Type Isolutions, however, will not be effective insolving Type II problems. Examples inagriculture and elsewhere show howdistinguishing between Type I and Type IIethical problems will help in theidentification of solutions to ethical issuesin agriculture.     

新型农业经营主体参与低碳农业发展的激励机制设计

新型农业经营主体在一定程度上使得我国农业呈现集约化发展,为低碳农业发展提供组织保障,但是其自身没有发展低碳农业的动力。本文基于多任务委托-代理模型,从低碳农业发展过程中政府和新型农业经营主体之间的委托—代理关系为视角,设计政府激励和约束新型农业经营主体参与低碳农业发展的激励机制,促使其兼顾经济效益、环境效益和社会效益。结果表明由于缺乏评价标准,政府对新型农业经营主体在固碳减排效益方面比经济效益方面的不确定性更加明显,而不确定性程度与新型农业经营主体努力结果的可观测性呈负相关关系,固碳减排效益的不确定因素无限大的时候,其激励强度趋于0;在政府的补贴过程中,成本系数越高、绝对风险率越高和不确定因素越多,则政府的激励契约对新型农业经营主体的激励强度就越低,需要强化对新型农业经营主体在固碳减排效益和社会服务效益方面的激励强度;政府对经济效益的最优激励因子与其绝对风险规避呈正向相关,因此政府在对处于高风险规避期的新型农业经营主体组织给予较高的激励,而对于风险规避率较低的处于成熟期的新型农业经营主体组织给予较低的激励。最后对结论进行整理,并作出实际的解释和提出针对性的对策建议。