Non-linear incentives,plan design,and flood mitigation: the case of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's community rating system

A basic proposition of ‘agency theory’ is that output-based performance incentives encourage greater effort. However, studies find that incentive schemes can distort effort if rewards for performance are discrete or non-linear. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Community Rating System (CRS) is a flood mitigation programme with a non-linear incentive design. Under this programme, localities are incentivised to implement a mix of 18 flood mitigation activities. Each activity is performance scored, with accumulated scores corresponding to a percent discount on flood insurance premiums for residents that hold National Flood Insurance policies. Discounts range from 0 to 45% and increase discretely in increments of 5%. With multivariate statistical and Geographic Information Systems analytic techniques, tests are made to find whether observed changes in annual CRS scores for participating localities in Florida are explained by non-linear incentives, adjusting for hydrologic conditions, flood disaster histories, socio-economic and human capital controls that can plausibly account for local mitigation activity scores over time. Results indicate that local jurisdictions are discount-seeking, with mitigation efforts partially driven by the non-linear incentive design of the CRS programme. The paper ends with recommendations to improve the operation FEMA's flood mitigation programme.     

Colombia's discharge fee program: Incentives for polluters or regulators?

Colombia's discharge fee system for water effluents is often held up as a model of a well-functioning, economic incentive pollution control program in a developing country. Yet few objective evaluations of the program have appeared. Based on a variety of primary and secondary data, this paper finds that in its first 5 years, the program was beset by a number of serious problems including limited implementation in many regions, widespread noncompliance by municipal sewerage authorities, and a confused relationship between discharge fees and emissions standards. Nevertheless, in some watersheds, pollution loads dropped significantly after the program was introduced. While proponents claim the incentives that discharge fees created for polluters to cut emissions in a cost-effective manner were responsible, this paper argues that the incentives they created for regulatory authorities to improve permitting, monitoring, and enforcement were at least as important.     

Efficacy of Two Lion Conservation Programs in Maasailand,Kenya

Lion (Panthera leo) populations are in decline throughout most of Africa. The problem is particularly acute in southern Kenya, where Maasai pastoralists have been spearing and poisoning lions at a rate that will ensure near term local extinction. We investigated 2 approaches for improving local tolerance of lions: compensation payments for livestock lost to predators and Lion Guardians, which draws on local cultural values and knowledge to mitigate livestock‐carnivore conflict and monitor carnivores. To gauge the overall influence of conservation intervention, we combined both programs into a single conservation treatment variable. Using 8 years of lion killing data, we applied Manski's partial identification approach with bounded assumptions to investigate the effect of conservation treatment on lion killing in 4 contiguous areas. In 3 of the areas, conservation treatment was positively associated with a reduction in lion killing. We then applied a generalized linear model to assess the relative efficacy of the 2 interventions. The model estimated that compensation resulted in an 87–91% drop in the number of lions killed, whereas Lion Guardians (operating in combination with compensation and alone) resulted in a 99% drop in lion killing. Eficacia de Dos Programas de Conservación de Leones en Maasailand, Kenia     

Legal requirements for risk and vulnerability assessments in Norwegian land-use planning

Land-use planning has been promoted as an important tool for adaptation to climate change. However, its success depends on effective communication between researchers and decision-makers. A “risk and vulnerability assessment” (RVA) is one method to facilitate the interaction between the groups. RVAs have been performed in Norwegian land-use planning for about 20 years, and been mandatory for new development the last few years. The first part of the article reviews the history and current legal regulation of RVAs in Norway. Continuing, the main part discusses the distribution of authority and responsibility for different parts of the process and result. The key finding is that significant decisions are deferred to municipal discretion, for example, the necessity (if doubtful) and scope of the assessments. Other topics (such as the burden of costs and eligible performers) are largely unregulated, prompting some arguments about the need for further legislative effort.     

论中国环境民事公益诉讼激励机制之完善

2015年1月6日,最高人民法院发布《最高人民法院关于审理环境民事公益诉讼案件适用法律若干问题的解释》,解决了近十几年来学者们普遍关注的问题,但尚未解决环境民事公益诉讼的根本问题.环境公益本质上属于公共物品的范畴,受制于集体行动的逻辑,加之高昂的诉讼成本,"理性人"一般不愿参与.因此,原告胜诉奖励制度、法律援助制度以及专项基金制度成为现阶段打破环境民事公益诉讼僵局的重要途径.     

Effects of Fisheries Closures and Gear Restrictions on Fishing Income in a Kenyan Coral Reef

Abstract: The adoption of fisheries closures and gear restrictions in the conservation of coral reefs may be limited by poor understanding of the economic profitability of competing economic uses of marine resources. Over the past 12 years, I evaluated the effects of gear regulation and fisheries closures on per person and per area incomes from fishing in coral reefs of Kenya. In two of my study areas, the use of small‐meshed beach seines was stopped after 6 years; one of these areas was next to a fishery closure. In my third study area, fishing was unregulated. Fishing yields on per capita daily wet weight basis were 20% higher after seine‐net fishing was stopped. The per person daily fishing income adjacent to the closed areas was 14 and 22% higher than the fishing income at areas with only gear restrictions before and after the seine‐net restriction, respectively. Incomes differed because larger fish were captured next to the closed area and the price per weight (kilograms) increased as fish size increased and because catches adjacent to the closure contained fish species of higher market value. Per capita incomes were 41 and 135% higher for those who fished in gear‐restricted areas and near‐closed areas, respectively, compared with those who fished areas with no restrictions. On a per unit area basis (square kilometers), differences in fishing income among the three areas were not large because fishing effort increased as the number of restrictions decreased. Changes in catch were, however, larger and often in the opposite direction expected from changes in effort alone. For example, effort declined 21% but nominal profits per square kilometer (not accounting for inflation) increased 29% near the area with gear restrictions. Gear restrictions also reduced the cost of fishing and increased the proportion of self‐employed fishers.     

Urban development grant — an early assessment of regional implications

An examination of the Urban Development Grant during its first round of operation reveals that certain regions, particularly the West Midlands and London, are winning considerably more funding than others. A change in this trend is likely to require a reassessment, by the Government, of the targetting criteria presently used to direct the grant to areas of need.     

Household Demand for Waste Recycling Services

Municipalities everywhere are coping with increasing amounts of solid waste and need urgently to formulate efficient and sustainable solutions to the problem. This study examines the use of economic incentives in municipal waste management. Specifically, we address the issue of recycling, if and when this waste management option is—on social welfare grounds—a preferred solution.A number of studies have recently assessed the monetary value of the externalities of alternative solid waste management options. In the present context, these subsidies could be interpreted as the implicit value of the benefits from reducing environmental externalities associated with landfilling as perceived by local government authorities. We surmise that the difference between mean households willingness to pay (WTP) for recycling services, via the purchase of a subsidized waste disposal facility, and the above (proxy) value of externalities reflects the difference between private and public perception regarding the negative externality associated with landfilling. We believe that this information is useful in determining the level of subsidization needed (if at all) to sustain any recycling program.The study is unique in the sense that its conclusions are based on revealed household behavior when faced with increased disposal costs, as well as information on WTP responses in hypothetical but related (and, therefore, familiar) scenarios. The article also explores the influence of the subsidization schemes on recycling rates. It was found that with low levels of effort needed to participate in a curbside recycling program, households participation rates are mainly influenced by economic variables and age, and households are willing to pay a higher price for the recycling scheme. When the required effort level is relatively high, however, households would pay a lower price, and the rate is influenced mainly by their environmental commitment and by economic considerations. We found that in both cases a subsidy would be required in order to achieve an efficient level of recycling. The median price that households are willing to pay for recycling devices is found to be about NIS 370 (New Israeli Shekel, approximately $90).     

STATE POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAMS - A REVIEW1

ABSTRACT: This review of state pollution control programs suggests that states have brought imaginative thought to environmental programs. While manpower and funds have been concentrated in such traditional areas of concern as air and water quality enforcement, many states have attempted to defray the industrial costs of pollution control by increasing public waste treatment facilities, providing tax incentives for pollution control equipment and authorizing pollution control revenue bond financing.