Optimal charges on river effluent from lumped and distributed sources

We propose a modelling framework for the design of a Pigouvian effluent tax, in an environmental management problem implicating several economic agents located in a river basin. The proposed charging system allows for the agents' geographical position relative to the river's sections, at which environmental standards are to be enforced, and takes into account the possible different market structures within which the agents are operating. In particular, we consider industrial agents competing on an oligopolistic market, and a set of farmers acting as price takers on a large market. A regional authority's goal is to induce agents to some sort of cooperation which would result in the satisfaction of the common environmental constraints. The economic process on one side, and the pollution transport and accumulation on the other, constitute two dynamic processes in two different time scales. As the economic process is much slower than the other process we can neglect the latter's transients and concentrate on the time invariant steady state solutions to the transportation equation. The model thus constructed has some noncooperative game and optimal control problem's features with space being the ‘running’ variable. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Dynamic taxation schemes to manage irrigation-induced salinity

This paper uses a dynamic model to explore the issue of irrigation-induced salinity, which puts irrigation at risk in most irrigated areas throughout the world. We address the design of instruments that an irrigation district board could implement to induce irrigators to take sustainable irrigation decisions. In our approach, the irrigators located above an aquifer participate in the accumulation of groundwater, a stock pollution. We analyse input-based instruments to induce the agents to follow the optimal stock path.     

Negotiating environmental agreements under ratification constraints

We analyze the impact of ratification constraints on the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). For this, we combine the literature on IEAs with the public choice literature on two-level games. By also incorporating uncertain preferences of the pivotal voter in the ratification stage, we make several important contributions: (i) we contribute to a more realistic modeling of the temporal structure of international agreements, (ii) we show a surprising, yet intuitive non-monotonic relationship between the optimal commitment level and the variance of ratification decisions, (iii) we identify reasons to expect a larger number of countries to join international negotiations than predicted by most of the coalition formation literature based on a representative agent model. Ratification constraints thereby can improve the welfare gains from stable international agreements.     

北京核与辐射恐怖事件风险分析

采用风险分类-要素分析-风险排序的思路,对北京市核与辐射恐怖事件风险进行分析。根据国际上1998—2006年该类恐怖事件的实例,从事件所涉及的材料、场所角度将核与辐射恐怖事件分为6大类。结合北京市的实际情况进行涉核恐怖事件的要素分析,将北京市各类场所划分为4类敏感区并与5类涉核恐怖事件结合起来,得到北京市核与辐射恐怖事件风险构成图。通过风险分析,笔者认为北京市发生核与辐射恐怖事件风险最大的场所为核研究机构,最容易发生的核与辐射恐怖事件类型为涉及放射源的恐怖事件,结合分析结果对从阻止、探测、响应3个层次上提出了奥运核安保工作的反核恐工作建议。     

Fish wars and cooperation maintenance

In this paper, a discrete-time game model related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) is considered. We divide a fishery into regions, which are exploited by single players. The center (referee) shares a reservoir between the competitors. The players (countries), which harvest the fish stock are the participants of this game.We assume that there are migratory exchanges between the regions of the reservoir. Therefore, the stock in one region depends not only on the previous stock and catch in the region, but also on the stock and catch in neighboring regions. We derive the Nash and cooperative equilibria for an infinite planning horizon.We consider two ways to maintain the cooperation: incentive equilibrium and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We investigate the cooperative incentive equilibrium in the case when the center punishes players for a deviation.Also we consider the case when the center is a player and find the Shapley value and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We introduce a new condition which offers an incentive to players to keep cooperating.     

Spatial effects and strategic behavior in a multiregional transboundary pollution dynamic game

We analyze a transboundary pollution differential game where pollution control is spatially distributed among a number of agents with predetermined spatial relationships. The analysis emphasizes, first, the effects of the different geographical relationships among decision makers; and second, the strategic behaviour of the agents. The dynamic game considers a pollution stock (the state variable) distributed among one large region divided in subregions which control their own emissions of pollutants. The emissions are also represented as distributed variables. The dynamics of the pollution stock is defined by a parabolic partial differential equation. We numerically characterize the feedback Nash equilibrium of a discrete-space model that still captures the spatial interactions among agents. We evaluate the impact of the strategic and spatially dynamic behaviour of the agents on the design of equilibrium environmental policies.     

国际碳减排活动中的利益博弈和中国策略的思考

博弈论能够解释许多经济活动和国际关系中出现的现象和问题。利用博弈论的相关理论。对《京都议定书》各利益集团之间的利益争斗进行了分析。指出各利益集团之间斗争的内在原因。并对中国在新一轮谈判中的策略提出了一些建议：由于《京都议定书》生效,而美国仍拒绝批准《京都议定书》。并同时抛出自己的减排方案。这必然会引起新一轮的减排博弈。面对美国等一些国家施加的压力,中国在这场新的博弈中要有所准备。提出具有建设性的建议和意见。既要维护中国和大多数发展中国家的利益。又要有助于减排。     

Exploring management strategies for community-based forests using multi-agent systems: A case study in Palawan, Philippines

This paper describes the experiences and lessons learned in applying a multi-agent systems (MAS) model to study the dynamics and complex interactions among stakeholders in the management of community-based forests. The MAS model is developed using the companion modelling (ComMod) approach, which allows for a collaborative development of the model between the stakeholders and researchers. This approach involves the development and application of role-playing games (RPGs) and computer simulation as learning tools and to validate the model. Inferences are drawn from the learning and negotiation processes that the stakeholders and researchers underwent in the collaborative development of the MAS model. These processes ultimately led to the development of a collaborative resource management plan. The approach and the MAS model were applied to a case study involving a community-based forest managed by three villages in the island of Palawan, Philippines.     

Visual Climate Change Communication: From Iconography to Locally Framed 3D Visualization

Climate change is an urgent problem with implications registered not only globally, but also on national and local scales. It is a particularly challenging case of environmental communication because its main cause, greenhouse gas emissions, is invisible. The predominant approach of making climate change visible is the use of iconic, often affective, imagery. Literature on the iconography of climate change shows that global iconic motifs, such as polar bears, have contributed to a public perception of the problem as spatially and temporally remote. This paper proposes an alternative approach to global climate change icons by focusing on recognizable representations of local impacts within an interactive game environment. This approach was implemented and tested in a research project based on the municipality of Delta, British Columbia. A major outcome of the research is Future Delta, an interactive educational game featuring 3D visualizations and simulation tools for climate change adaptation and mitigation future scenarios. The empirical evaluation is based on quantitative pre/post-game play questionnaires with 18 students and 10 qualitative expert interviews. The findings support the assumption that interactive 3D imagery is effective in communicating climate change. The quantitative post-questionnaires particularly highlight a shift in support of more local responsibility.     

A game model for dominance relations among group-living animals

We present here an attempt to understand behaviors of dominant individuals and of subordinate individuals as behavior strategies in an asymmetric “hawk-dove” game. We assume that contestants have perfect information about relative fighting ability and the value of the resource. Any type of asymmetry, both relevant to and irrelevant to the fighting ability, can be considered. It is concluded that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) depend on the resource value (V), the cost of injury (D), and the probability that the individual in one role will win (x). Different ESSs can exist even when values of V, D, and x are the same. The characteristics of dominance relations detected by observers may result from the ESSs that the individuals are adopting. The model explains some characteristics of dominance relations, for example, the consistent outcome of contests, the rare occurrence of escalated fights, and the discrepancy between resource holding potential (RHP) and dominance relations, from the viewpoint of individual selection. Received: 7 May 1997 / Accepted after revision: 17 October 1997