Identifying extremely large values using composite sample data

Quantifying a composite sample results in a loss of information on the values of the constituent individual samples. As a consequence of this information loss, it is impossible to identify individual samples having large values, based on composite sample measurements alone. However, under certain circumstances, it is possible to identify individual samples having large values without exhaustively measuring all individual samples. In addition to composite sample measurements, a few additional measurements on carefully selected individual samples are sufficient to identify the individual samples having large values. In this paper, we present a statistical method to recover extremely large individual sample values using composite sample measurements. An application to site characterization is used to illustrate the method.The paper has been prepared with partial support from the United States Environmental Protection Agency Number CR815273. The contents have not been subject to Agency review and therefore do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Agency and no official endorsement should be inferred.     

浅谈环保守法证明

以环保守法证明的现状、起源和发展为主线，以排污许可证制度为依托，系统阐述了环保守法证明的深刻内涵与外延，以及存在问题和社会定位。     

Tying enforcement to prices in emissions markets: An experimental evaluation

We present results from laboratory emissions permit markets designed to investigate the transmission of abatement cost risk to firms' compliance behavior and regulatory enforcement strategies. With a fixed expected marginal penalty, abatement cost shocks produced significant violations and emissions volatility as predicted. Tying the monitoring probability to average permit prices effectively eliminated noncompliance, but transmitted abatement cost risk to monitoring effort. Tying the penalty to average prices reduced violations, but did not eliminate them. Some individuals in these treatments sold permits at low prices, presumably in an attempt to weaken enforcement. While tying sanctions directly to prevailing permit prices has theoretical and practical advantages over tying monitoring to prices, our results suggest that tying sanctions to prices may not be as effective as predicted without additional modifications.     

Policy, Principle, and Practice in Industrial Pollution Control: Views from the Regulatory Interface

There has been much criticism of the system for the control of industrial pollution, but not much is known about the views of the regulators and the industry. The objective of this study was to explore the attitudes at this regulatory interface towards the current and proposed regulatory system and make recommendations for improvements. The methodology involved a questionnaire survey sent to over 700 key personnel. Statistical analysis revealed similarities and significant differences between the views of industry and the regulator on the effectiveness of the current regime. Weaknesses related to the derivation and enforcement of standards were identified. The Environmental Quality Standards system was acknowledged to be flawed by both operators and regulators who agreed it should be improved by the expansion of listed chemicals, the introduction of sediment environmental quality standards and direct toxicity assessment of effluents. This paper concludes that these measures should be incorporated into the regulatory system, together with more rigorous enforcement of environmental performance standards including serious sanctions for non-compliance. In the longer term, a reappraisal of the regulatory system is required in order to establish an appropriate framework to ensure that environmental policy commitments are implemented.     

基于改进达标检测法的跨区域排污权交易体系研究

由于污染排放存在时空与行业"热点"(hot spots)问题,针对非均匀污染物建立跨区域排污权交易体系具有一定困难。基于一种新的污染外部性度量系数,本文对传统的达标检测方法进行了改进,在此改进达标检测法上构建的跨区域排污权交易体系,能够在简化交易机制和管理工作的同时较好地解决"热点"问题,在社会总产出和总排污量不变的情况下实现社会福利的帕累托改进。     

Compliance with Canada’s Fisheries Act: A Field Audit of Habitat Compensation Projects

Loss of fish habitat in North America has occurred at an unprecedented rate through the last century. In response, the Canadian Parliament enacted the habitat provisions of the Fisheries Act. Under these provisions, a “harmful alteration, disruption, or destruction to fish habitat” (HADD) cannot occur unless authorised by Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), with legally binding compensatory habitat to offset the HADD. The guiding principle to DFO’s conservation goal is “no net loss of the productive capacity of fish habitats” (NNL). However, performance in achieving NNL has never been evaluated on a national scale. We investigated 52 habitat compensation projects across Canada to determine compliance with physical, biological, and chemical requirements of Section 35(2) Fisheries Act authorisations. Biological requirements had the lowest compliance (58%) and chemical requirements the highest (100%). Compliance with biological requirements differed among habitat categories and was poorest (19% compliance) in riparian habitats. Approximately 86% of authorisations had larger HADD and/or smaller compensation areas than authorised. The largest noncompliance in terms of habitat area occurred in riverine habitat in which HADDs were, on average, 343% larger than initially authorised. In total, 67% of compensation projects resulted in net losses of habitat area, 2% resulted in no net loss, and 31% achieved a net gain in habitat area. Interestingly, probable violations of the Fisheries Act were prevalent at half of the projects. Analyses indicated that the frequency of probable Fisheries Act violations differed among provinces. Habitat compensation to achieve NNL, as currently implemented in Canada, is at best only slowing the rate of habitat loss. In all likelihood, increasing the amount of authorised compensatory habitat in the absence of institutional changes will not reverse this trend. Improvements in monitoring and enforcement are necessary to move towards achieving Canada’s conservation goals.     

The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly

We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement under incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs, enforcement costs, and pollution damage. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm, except possibly when a regulator can base the probabilities of detecting individual violations on observable correlates of violators’ actual emissions. Moreover, optimality requires discriminatory taxes, except when a regulator is unable to use observable firm-level characteristics to gain some information about the variation in firms’ abatement costs or monitoring costs.     

Regulation with direct benefits of information disclosure and imperfect monitoring

We model the optimal design of programs requiring heterogeneous firms to disclose harmful emissions when disclosure yields both direct and indirect benefits. The indirect benefit arises from the internalization of social costs and resulting reduction in emissions. The direct benefit results from the disclosure of previously private information which is valuable to potentially harmed parties. Previous theoretical and empirical analyses of such programs restrict attention to the former benefit while the stated motivation for such programs highlights the latter benefit. When disclosure yields both direct and indirect benefits, policymakers face a tradeoff between inducing truthful self-reporting and deterring emissions. Internalizing the social costs of emissions, such as through an emissions tax, will deter emissions, but may also reduce incentives for firms to truthfully report their emissions.     

Assessing the impact of Cross Compliance measures on nitrogen fluxes from European farmlands with DNDC-EUROPE

We investigated the effects of the agricultural Cross Compliance measures for European cultivated lands, focusing on nitrogen (N) fluxes from corn fields. Four scenarios have been designed according to some conservation farming practices, namely no-till, max manure, catch crop and N splitting. Results indicated that (1) in the no-till scenario the N₂O fluxes are decreased during the first simulated years, with a return to default fluxes in following years; no-till particularly decreased N₂O emission in the dryer and colder simulation spatial units (HSMUs); (2) the no-till and the N splitting scenarios slightly increased the N surplus because of a decrease in plant uptake; (3) introducing a rotation with alfalfa decreased the N leaching in the corn crops following the catch crops; and (4) the application of fertilizer and manure during the cold and wet seasons led to an increase of N leaching.     

Pragmatics of Policy: The Compliance of Dutch Environmental Policy Instruments to European Union Standards

Despite a general decrease in Dutch environmental emission trends, it remains difficult to comply with European Union (EU) environmental policy targets. Furthermore, environmental issues have become increasingly complex and entangled with society. Therefore, Dutch environmental policy follows a pragmatic line by adopting a flexible approach for compliance, rather than aiming at further reduction at the source of emission. This may be politically useful in order to adequately reach EU targets, but restoration of environmental conditions may be delayed. However, due to the complexity of today’s environmental issues, the restoration of environmental conditions might not be the only standard for a proper policy approach. Consequently this raises the question how the Dutch pragmatic approach to compliance qualifies in a broader policy assessment. In order to answer this question, we adapt a policy assessment framework, developed by Hemerijck and Hazeu (Bestuurskunde 13(2), 2004), based on the dimensions of legitimacy and policy logic. We apply this framework for three environmental policy assessments: flexible instruments in climate policy, fine-tuning of national and local measures to meet air quality standards, and derogation for the Nitrate Directive. We conclude with general assessment notes on the appliance of flexible instruments in environmental policy, showing that a broad and comprehensive perspective can help to understand the arguments to put such policy instruments into place and to identify trade-offs between assessment criteria.