基于3S技术的环境污染治理对策论应用模型研究

探讨了基于3S技术的现代空间信息系统支持下的对策论多元合作对策费用分摊策略问题。首先．从对策论基本原理出发，分析了费用分摊对策模型。针对大气环境污染防治多元决策问题，提出了采用3S综合集成技术确定污染源及盛行污染路径、确定污染区域面积和污染损失、污染损失费用分摊分析模型与方法。介绍了模型在大气环境污染防治多元决策领域中的应用实例。3S技术为对策论模型提供科学决策数据，有效地解决对策论应用中的瓶颈问题。     

重庆灰霾治理试点工作中的政企动态博弈分析

针对重庆市挥发性有机物整治试点工作中面临的与企业博弈的实际问题,设定模型边界条件,建立基于完全信息的动态博弈分析模型,通过逆推归纳法分析博弈不同阶段下参与企业与政府的理性策略选择,求解此完全信息动态博弈模型的子博弈精炼纳什均衡并获得该情况下的博弈双方最终支付。研究表明,提高“许诺的可信性”和“威胁的可信性”是动态博弈的核心问题,通过交出决定权、切断沟通等多种方式可破解VOC试点博弈僵局。     

2001年～2008年及奥运会期间天津市大气污染特征分析

根据天津市大气质量监测数据,对2001年～2008年及奥运会期间天津市大气污染特征和主要大气污染物的变化规律进行了分析。结果表明,2001年～2008年天津市的PM10、SO2和NO2污染总体呈下降趋势,但质量浓度仍相对较高。2008年8月奥运会期间天津市PM10和SO2质量浓度达到国家空气质量二级标准,NO2质量浓度达到国家空气质量一级标准,空气质量良好。天津市PM10污染相对稳定,SO2和NO2的污染分布呈现明显的季节性,时间上表现为冬强夏弱。气象条件对污染物浓度影响明显,沙尘、大雾等天气可使污染物浓度急剧升高。     

低碳技术国际转移的双重博弈研究

为探求《联合国气候变化框架公约》(以下简称《公约》)下促进低碳技术国际转移的机制,本文运用博弈论方法,构建了一个双重博弈模型框架,分别从企业层面和国家层面的角度建立相应的博弈模型,并将二者结合起来,分析相应的均衡及其政策含义。研究表明,国家在低碳技术国际转移中起着关键作用,存在广阔的政策空间;在巴厘路线图谈判中,国际社会应该积极推进气候变化领域《技术合作议定书》的建立,提出《公约》下对发达国家的可测量、可报告、可核实的技术转移义务,规定发达国家必须通过技术转移在发展中国家实现量化的减排;《公约》下应该建立单独的技术转移资金机制,设立专门的技术转移基金,发达国家通过任务分担(辅之以赠款)提供资金,鼓励和资助技术转移;对于转移难度太大或者涉及核心竞争力的低碳技术,发展中国家(企业)必须加强自主研发。     

Transaction costs,communication and spatial coordination in Payment for Ecosystem Services Schemes

Agricultural producer participation and spatial coordination of land use decisions are key components for enhancing the effective delivery of ecosystem services from private land. However, inducing participation in Payment for Ecosystem Services schemes for coordinating land management choices is challenging from a policy design perspective owing to transaction costs associated with participation. This paper employs a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of such costs on participation and land use in the context of an Agglomeration Bonus (AB) scheme. The AB creates a coordination game with multiple Nash equilibria related to alternative spatially-coordinated land use patterns. The experiment varies transaction costs between two levels (high and low), which affects the risks and payoffs of coordinating on the different equilibria. Additionally, an option to communicate is implemented between neighbors arranged on a local network to facilitate spatial coordination. Results indicate a significant difference in participation and performance under high and low transaction costs, with lower uptake and performance when transaction costs are high. These effects are, however, impacted by transaction costs faced in the past. Communication improves both AB participation rates and performance with the effect being greater for participants facing high transaction costs.     

北京大型体育赛事突发事件及应急处理

系统研究了北京大型体育赛事突发事件特点及应急处理的相关问题,涉及的主要内容有:北京大型体育赛事的特点,大型体育赛事突发事件的特点及种类,国内外处理大型体育赛事突发事件的经验及面临的突出问题,北京大型体育赛事突发事件应急处理体系的建立和完善等.本研究成果对北京大型体育赛事突发事件应急处理具有借鉴和参考价值.     

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

Asymmetric sexual conflict over parental care in a biparental cichlid

Theoretical models predict that parents should adjust the amount of care both to their own and their partner’s body condition. In most biparental species, parental duties are switched repeatedly allowing for repeated mutual adjustment of the amount of care. In the mouthbrooding cichlid Eretmodus cyanostictus, terms are switched only once with females taking the first share. The timing of the shift of the clutch between mates strongly determines both partners’ brooding period and thereby their parental investment. Females signal their readiness to transfer the young several days before the male finally takes them, suggesting sexual conflict over the timing of the shift. In a lab experiment, we reduced the body condition of either the female or the male of a pair to test whether energy reserves affect the timing of the shift and whether female signalling behaviour depends on energetic state. Males with a lowered condition took the young later and incubated for a shorter period, which prolonged the incubation time of their female partners. When female condition was lowered, female and male incubation durations remained unchanged, although females signalled their readiness to shift more intensely. Our results suggest that males adjust their parental investment to own energy reserves but are unresponsive to their mate’s condition. Females appear to carry the entire costs for the male’s adjustment of care. We propose that intrinsic asymmetries in the scope for mutual adjustment of parental investment and the costs of negotiation crucially influence solutions of the conflict between sexes over care.     

Incentive mechanisms to enforce sustainable forest exploitation

Using a two-player differential game approach, this paper deals with the issue of tropical deforestation. The assumption is that developing forestry countries (called the South) do not, or cannot, necessarily have the same utility for forest conservation than the developed countries (called the North). Given the global nature of the problem, we assume that it may be wise that the North offers financial support to the South to help in achieving a sustainable forest policy. We derive sustainable and short-run deforestation policies and provide a transfer mechanism which insures that the South will indeed implement the sustainable one.     

A role-playing game as a tool to facilitate social learning and collective action towards Climate Smart Agriculture: Lessons learned from Apuí, Brazil

Addressing the global challenges of climate change (CC), food security and poverty alleviation requires enhancing the adaptive capacity and mitigation potential of land use systems. To this end, Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) aims to identify land use practices that sustainably increase productivity, enhance climate change (CC) adaptation and contribute to CC mitigation. A transition towards CSA requires technical, but also socio-institutional changes, for improved smallholder agricultural systems. Such changes may be triggered by stakeholder participation processes that stimulate social learning and collective action. This article evaluates whether a role-playing game (RPG) is an effective participatory tool to encourage social learning and collective action among local stakeholders towards adoption of CSA strategies. We designed and implemented an RPG with three groups of farmers in Apuí (Southern Amazonas), evaluating the game’s impact on social learning by interviewing each farmer before and after the RPG. Our findings show that the RPG induced not only technical learning, but also socio-institutional learning and engagement for collective action, though outcomes varied between different RPG sessions and among farmer participants.