A role-playing game as a tool to facilitate social learning and collective action towards Climate Smart Agriculture: Lessons learned from Apuí, Brazil

Addressing the global challenges of climate change (CC), food security and poverty alleviation requires enhancing the adaptive capacity and mitigation potential of land use systems. To this end, Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) aims to identify land use practices that sustainably increase productivity, enhance climate change (CC) adaptation and contribute to CC mitigation. A transition towards CSA requires technical, but also socio-institutional changes, for improved smallholder agricultural systems. Such changes may be triggered by stakeholder participation processes that stimulate social learning and collective action. This article evaluates whether a role-playing game (RPG) is an effective participatory tool to encourage social learning and collective action among local stakeholders towards adoption of CSA strategies. We designed and implemented an RPG with three groups of farmers in Apuí (Southern Amazonas), evaluating the game’s impact on social learning by interviewing each farmer before and after the RPG. Our findings show that the RPG induced not only technical learning, but also socio-institutional learning and engagement for collective action, though outcomes varied between different RPG sessions and among farmer participants.     

Coalition formation in fisheries with potential regime shift

A system can undergo rapid regime shift in which the growth of natural resources suddenly and permanently declines. We examine how the threat of such a shift alters the strategic management of a common pool renewable resource. We consider exogenous and endogenous threats and examine their effects on both incentives to join a coalition and harvest decisions. We find that an exogenous threat of reduced resource growth may cause the coalition to grow in size, and, perhaps of most interest, we identify conditions under which members of the stable coalition reduce harvest while non-members increase harvest in response to the threat. In contrast, an exogenous threat of total stock collapse may destabilize coalitions, resulting in higher harvest from former members, but reduced harvest by non-members. When the threat of either type of shift is endogenous, the threat of regime shift can induce stable coalitions with more than two members. In particular, we identify cases in which the first best (full cooperation) is sustained as an equilibrium outcome. Finally, we find that the relation between the magnitude of the shift and the size of stable coalitions may be negative.