亚硝酸盐型甲烷厌氧氧化微生物特性研究进展

亚硝酸盐型甲烷厌氧氧化(nitrite-dependent anaerobic methane oxidation,N-DAMO)是新近发现的生物反应,是偶联碳氮循环的关键环节,是环境领域和微生物领域的重大发现.N-DAMO的发现对于完善碳氮生物地球化学循环、丰富微生物学内容和研发新型生物脱氮除碳工艺均具有巨大的推动作用.催化N-DAMO反应的微生物为Candidatus Methylomirabilis oxyfera(M.oxyfera),其隶属于一新发现的细菌门——NC10门.近年来,M.oxyfera的生物学研究取得了许多突破性进展,如初步探明了其个体形态特征、细胞化学组分特征、富集培养特征、生理生化特征及生态学特征,最突出的例子包括发现了M.oxyfera独特的细胞(星状)形态及特殊的脂肪酸(10Me C16∶1Δ7)组分等.最近,N-DAMO的机制研究方面也有了突破性进展:发现了地球上第4种生物产氧途径.目前认为,M.oxyfera具有内产氧功能,其首先将NO-2还原为NO,然后将2分子NO进行歧化反应生成N2和O2,最后利用生成的O2对甲烷进行氧化.本文系统地介绍了M.oxyfera各方面的微生物特性.     

循环热处理对高速钢超塑性的影响

此文研究了循环热处理工艺对W6Mo5Cr4V2钢超塑性的影响.结果表明:该钢在1040℃两次循环淬火是实现其超塑性的最佳热处理工艺;按此工艺进行预处理后,在810℃、初始应变速率为5.56×10~(-1)s~(-1)的条件下,该钢的超塑延伸率可达187%.     

Ecosystems and human health: The local benefits of forest cover in Indonesia

This paper documents the effect of primary forest cover loss on increased incidence of malaria. The evidence is consistent with an ecological response. I show that land use change, anti-malarial programs or migration cannot explain the effect of primary forest cover loss on increased malarial incidence. Falsification tests reveal that the effect is specific to malaria, with forest cover having no discernible effect on other diseases with a disease ecology different from that of malaria. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that the morbidity-related malaria-reducing local benefits of primary forests are at least $1-$2 per hectare.     

The ecological insurance trap

Common pool resources often insure individual livelihoods against the collapse of private endeavors. When endeavors based on private and common pool resources are interconnected, investment in one can put the other at risk. We model Senegalese pastoralists who choose whether to grow crops, a private activity, or raise livestock on common pool pastureland. Livestock can increase the likelihood of locust outbreaks via ecological processes related to grassland degradation. Locust outbreaks damage crops, but not livestock, which are used for savings and insurance. We show the incentive to self-protect (reduce grazing pressure) or self-insure (increase livestock levels) changes with various property rights schemes and levels of ecological detail. If the common pool nature of insurance exacerbates the ecological externality even fully-informed individuals may make risk management decisions that increase the probability of catastrophe, creating an “insurance trap.”     

Emission reduction and profit-neutral permit allocations

The present paper addresses two policy objectives: to implement a market for pollution permits and to make regulation acceptable for businesses. Profit-neutral permit allocations are defined as the number of permits that the regulator should give for free so that post-regulation profits (i.e. a firm's profits in the products market plus the value of the allowances granted for free) are equal to pre-regulation profits. The proposed model is developed by assuming that firms use polluting technologies and compete “à la Cournot”. The paper demonstrates that a low number of free allowances is sufficient to meet these two goals. Moreover, the regulator can fully offset losses, even when the reduction in emissions is high, provided that the sectors concerned are not monopolies, both for isoelastic and linear demand functions.     

Good news for environmental self-regulation? Finding the right link

We investigate the stock market response to firm disclosure of positive environmental information and the link from that information to environmental outcomes. We classify environmental media releases by informational content and value relevance, and assess the abnormal stock returns of each type of event. While announcements of future environmental activities lead to the largest favorable stock market reactions, there is no guaranteed link from this type of information to environmental outcomes. Further analysis of the abnormal returns shows that the magnitude of the stock market reaction depends on firm financial characteristics across all event types rather than on firm environmental performance. Our results indicate that the ability for voluntary environmental information disclosure to induce environmental self-regulation is limited to the extent that firms are able to follow through with their announcements of planned environmental activities.     

Tell the truth or not? The montero mechanism for emissions control at work

We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms and the firms' maximal emissions, we find that, in line with the theoretical predictions, firms over-report their maximal emissions under free allocation of permits and under-report these under costly allocation of permits. Under Montero's mechanism, by contrast, firms almost always report their maximal emissions truthfully. However, in terms of efficiency, the difference between Montero's mechanism and costly allocation disappears with industries including more than one firm.     

Do energy prices affect employment? Decomposed international evidence

This paper analyzes the energy price-employment nexus and contributes to the literature by showing that it is important to decompose the regulatory effect into demand, cost, and factor-shift effects. This is done by means of a cross-country multi-sectoral dataset. The results show that both rising energy prices and shadow prices of energy have no significant effect on net employment when the manufacturing sectors only are analyzed. While finding significant variations across countries, the average employment effects become significantly positive once jobs in the economy as a whole are considered. This change is driven mainly by larger positive cost effects, which more than offset the negative demand effects and reductions in the positive factor-shift effects. Moreover, the paper reveals that the often implemented approach of using a simple regulation regressor, instead of decomposing the employment effect, can result in biased estimates.