基于系统动力学的食品企业安全生产监管博弈研究

为了研究食品安全生产及监管的内在机理、影响因素及监管模式,采用演化博弈论方法建立了政府监管部门与食品企业之间的博弈模型,运用复制动态方程和系统动力学方法深入分析了食品安全生产中相关主体的决策选择。结果表明:食品企业在追求利益最大化的前提下须主动重视食品安全问题,食品企业的策略选择受安全生产投入成本、处罚成本和声誉收益的影响;政府监管部门的监管行为受监管成本、外部负效益及社会成本等多方因素的影响。因此,增大监管部门惩处力度、降低监管成本、完善社会公众监督机制、强化声誉效应是食品安全问题得以解决的有力保障。     

政府环境监管与企业最优环境策略的博弈

随着我国经济的快速发展,伴随而来的是日趋严峻的环境污染,而在政府环境监管的背景下,各个利益相关者之间的博弈在环保效果实施中发挥了很大的作用。利用博弈论的分析方法,建立了一个关于中央政府、地方政府和企业三个利益相关者之间的利益博弈模型,通过对该模型的求解得出三方的平衡状态。最后针对如何实现政府高效监管和企业最优环境策略,向博弈三方共同努力推动社会经济可持续发展提供了相关政策建议。     

工作场所正念视角下智慧矿山矿工安全行为演化博弈

为深入分析智慧矿山矿工安全行为,从工作场所正念视角出发,构建智慧矿山背景下政府监管部门、安全管理人员、矿工3方演化博弈模型,分析各博弈主体策略选择的稳定性.结果表明:工作场所正念对矿工安全行为有积极影响,矿工工作场所正念的形成对组织有正向反馈支持作用;智慧矿山背景下,政府监管部门强监管能够有效规范煤矿企业管理行为,并引...     

基于经济学视角的职业健康规制问题研究

用经济学分析工具对现有的职业健康规制进行探讨,研究规制机构、企业和劳动者三方行为主体的博弈,通过分析存在的问题,提出解决职业健康规制的对策。在理顺职业健康规制体制,健全机构的同时不断完善法规体系。同时,加强对劳动者职业健康的保障,完善第三方介入机制,并且加大对违规企业的处罚力度,提高对劳动者的赔偿。不断强化企业作为职业健康责任主体的意识,推进职业危害防治技术创新,培养"以人为本"的职业健康安全文化观念。     

流域管理与开发利用中主要问题的博弈分析

本文从博弈论的角度,通过构造博弈模型对流域管理中诸问题进行分析,旨在完善政府及流域内各理性行为个体的策略,为提高流域水资源开发利用效率提供理论依据。     

零星危险化学品快递运输风险博弈分

针对零星危险化学品运输中的安全隐患问题,应用博弈理论构建了政府、快递企业、零星危险化学品托运人的三方博弈模型,对零星危险化学品安全运输问题进行了研究。在求得博弈模型均衡解的基础上,对均衡解进行了深入分析,研究结果表明:政府的最优检查概率与快递企业的安全管理成本正相关,与快递企业发生事故时的损失负相关;快递企业实施安全管理的概率与政府对快递企业的惩罚、快递企业发生事故时政府的损失正相关,与政府的检查成本、托运人选择托运且安全运输时的收益负相关;托运人选择托运的概率与快递企业实施安全管理的成本正相关。最后为有效杜绝零星危险化学品运输事故的发生提出了相应对策。     

The feasibility of concentrated rural settlement in a context of post‐disaster reconstruction: a study of China

There is growing appreciation of the use of concentrated rural settlement as an effective means of implementing infrastructure projects and helping to achieve sustainable development in rural areas. This occurs in China through the exchange of rural residential land for urban construction. However, this policy has not been effective under normal circumstances (called development‐driven conditions) as frequently farmers are reluctant to accept such an exchange. By contrast, in a time of disaster, such as after the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan Province, China, rural victims have accepted this policy of rural residential land exchange. Employing game theory, this paper identifies the reasons for the different outcomes and it contends that the implementation of concentrated rural settlement practice under disaster‐induced conditions is more effective than its introduction under development‐driven conditions. The results of the analysis indicate that, in China, concentrated rural settlement is feasible in a context of post‐disaster reconstruction.     

Environmental consequence analysis for resource depletion

Resource depletion is of concern to both present and future generations in terms of access to resources. It is a prominent impact category within life cycle assessment (LCA) and sustainability assessment. This paper examines existing resource depletion approaches and indicators in the context of natural gas depletion, and their limitations in modelling the wider environmental consequences of resource consumption. Some existing models assume substitution of scarce fossil fuels with an alternative fossil fuel or mix, but do not consider all of the subsequent change in impacts. An additional methodology is proposed to measure the impact changes when fossil fuel substitution occurs as a result of scarcity. The methodology will demonstrate the effect of resource scarcity for individual processes but also multiple processes which operate at different levels of resource consumption with varying degrees of impacts. The methodology is applied to a scarcity situation of natural gas in Australia, where black coal is substituted for gas. It is first applied to natural gas consumed for electricity generation only. In the second case, the methodology is applied to the substitution of natural gas for both electricity generation and hydrogen production. The varying impacts on emissions to air and water, together with solid waste generation and water depletion, as a result of the substitution are used to reflect the consequences of fossil fuel depletion. The indicators also provide information on the impacts of substitution in each product, thus enabling users to prioritise products based on the impacts produced during natural gas allocation.     

Fish wars and cooperation maintenance

In this paper, a discrete-time game model related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) is considered. We divide a fishery into regions, which are exploited by single players. The center (referee) shares a reservoir between the competitors. The players (countries), which harvest the fish stock are the participants of this game.We assume that there are migratory exchanges between the regions of the reservoir. Therefore, the stock in one region depends not only on the previous stock and catch in the region, but also on the stock and catch in neighboring regions. We derive the Nash and cooperative equilibria for an infinite planning horizon.We consider two ways to maintain the cooperation: incentive equilibrium and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We investigate the cooperative incentive equilibrium in the case when the center punishes players for a deviation.Also we consider the case when the center is a player and find the Shapley value and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We introduce a new condition which offers an incentive to players to keep cooperating.     

Optimizing a warranty–based sustainable product service system using game theory

Abstract

In recent years, the concepts of sustainability and product service system have been closely associated with each other. In today’s competitive markets, due to Extended Producer Responsibility and customer environmental awareness, producers shift from ‘product-seller’ towards ‘product-service provider’ for using the environmental and economic advantages of coupling a product with services. This paper proposes a novel approach to determine the optimal warranty period and the out-of-warranty replacement period, from the point of view of the producer and the customer to minimise the total cost of usage and end of life of product. As regards the fact that adopted strategies by producers and customers sometimes are in conflict and it affects choosing the optimal product usage period, a game theory model was developed in this study. Finally, a case study with data from chain of local notebook service centres was applied to demonstrate some practical aspects of the developed model.