关于死海地区臭氧耗损现象(ODEs)的研究综述

自1997年在死海地区的大气边界层中观测到午间臭氧浓度迅速下降的现象后,研究学者们即对该地区的臭氧耗损现象(ozone depletion events,简称ODEs)展开了研究.而在此之前,大气边界层内的ODEs现象普遍被认为只会发生在极地地区的特殊大气现象.本文综述了关于死海地区ODEs研究的发展历史,主要展示了促...     

基于博弈论与可拓学的非正常接发列车人因风险评价

为更加准确且全面地对非正常条件下接发列车作业人因风险进行评价,提出基于博弈论与可拓学的人因风险评价模型。在工作人员认知机理的基础上,构建认知行为模型,考虑到人因风险指标数据的特性,利用博弈论的思想将由AHP法得出的主观权重与由熵值法得到的客观权重进行最优组合,克服了单一赋权法的不足;引用可拓学原理,建立多级可拓评价模型,修正了风险评价的偏差,使人因风险评价更加准确。实例计算表明:此方法运用到铁路非正常条件下接发列车作业人因风险评价是有效的,且可为科学制订风险控制措施提供依据。     

计及消费领域的碳补贴政策演化博弈

考虑到企业和消费者的低碳策略往往受到政府补贴政策的影响,构建了消费者、消费领域相关企业和政府的三方演化博弈模型,探讨多种因素对各主体策略选择的影响机制.研究表明:企业低碳生产的概率与政府补贴力度、消费者低碳偏好、放弃低碳生产的机会成本和市场损失正相关,与生产方式转变成本负相关;消费者低碳消费的概率与政府补贴力度、低碳偏...     

石墨烯对高等植物幼苗的毒性及机理探究

随着石墨烯产品的广泛应用和潜在的环境释放,其对生态环境的影响已引起广泛关注。为探讨石墨烯对高等植物生长的影响,探究了其对黄瓜幼苗和玉米幼苗生长的影响及其致毒机理。结果表明,水培条件下,不同浓度的石墨烯(10、50、100、500、1 000和2 000 mg·L~(-1))处理植物幼苗15 d后,对植物幼苗的生长具有抑制作用。且随着处理时间和石墨烯浓度的增加,植物幼苗生长的所有指标,包括根/地上部鲜重和干重、根长、根尖数、株高和叶面积均相应降低。另外,黄瓜幼苗比玉米幼苗对石墨烯更加的敏感。进一步研究发现,石墨烯与黄瓜幼苗根部直接接触导致的物理损伤、氧化损伤,以及营养耗竭是其致毒机理。而石墨烯对玉米幼苗的致毒机理包括物理损伤和营养耗竭。本研究为石墨烯的环境风险评价提供了基础数据。     

The impact of government incentives and penalties on willingness to recycle plastic waste: An evolutionary game theory perspective

• Punishments increase the participation probability of collectors and recyclers. • Policy-sponsored incentives make collectors and recyclers to participate earlier. • Recyclers are more sensitive to government punishments than collectors. Because governments have introduced policies involving incentives and penalties to promote the recycling of plastic waste, it is important to understand the impact of such incentives and penalties on the willingness of stakeholders to participate. In this study, government is included as a player, alongside waste collectors and recyclers, in a tripartite evolutionary game model of plastic waste recycling. The study explores the evolutionary equilibrium and performs a simulation analysis to elucidate the effect of government incentives and penalties on the willingness of other players to participate in recycling. Three conclusions are drawn from this research. First, an increase in incentives or in penalties increases the probability that collectors and recyclers will participate in the recycling process. Second, policy support incentives encourage collectors and recyclers to participate in plastic waste recycling earlier than subsidy incentives do. Finally, recyclers are more sensitive than collectors to government-imposed penalties.     

重大疫情下冷链应急物流协同配送决策博弈分析

为提高重大疫情下冷链应急物流协同配送效率,以尽可能短的时间满足疫区冷链物资需求,采用演化博弈理论构建冷链应急医疗物资协同配送决策的演化博弈模型,并将感染病毒风险系数及损失引入模型,分析冷链应急医疗保障部门与冷链物流企业配送策略选择问题。结果表明:在感染病毒风险系数一定的情况下,演化主体最终是否趋向高效策略和积极合作策略,与冷链应急医疗保障部门的投入运营维护成本、物流企业积极合作增值放大系数、积极合作的社会声誉及形象增值、正常运营经济收益等因素有直接关系。在运营维护成本增大和收益减少情景下,冷链应急医疗保障部门策略呈现波动性。研究结论可为重大疫情下冷链应急医疗物资协同配送提供参考。     

Sustainable Development in an N-Rich/N-Poor World

Sustainable development requires that per capita inclusive wealth—produced, human, and natural capital—does not decline over time. We investigate the impact of changes in nitrogen on inclusive wealth. There are two sides to the nitrogen problem. Excess use of nitrogen in some places gives rise to N-pollution, which can cause environmental damage. Insufficient replacement of nitrogen in other places gives rise to N-depletion, or loss of nutrient stocks. Neither is explicitly accounted for in current wealth measures, but both affect wealth. We calculate an index of net N-replacement, and investigate its relationship to wealth. In countries with low levels of relative N-loss, we find that the uncompensated loss of soil nitrogen in poorer countries is associated with declining rates of growth of inclusive per capita wealth. What is less intuitive is that increasing fertilizer application in both rich and poor countries can increase per capita inclusive wealth.     

Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players

This paper uses a dynamic model with asymmetric players to explore the question: In a second-best world, should environmental regulations for transboundary pollutants be carried out locally or centrally? We find that combined payoffs are larger with decentralized control if payoffs are sufficiently heterogeneous and initial pollution stocks are sufficiently small. This result is obtained because the central authority applies one shadow price to pollution (i.e., it uses uniform standards), whereas local authorities use different shadow prices, and therefore different standards.     

基于博弈论的突发性水污染事件治污决策模型

针对当前严重的水污染问题,采用博弈论对突发性水污染事件治污决策进行了研究,为事件应急管理提供理论支撑与决策支持。基于经典博弈论构建了信息不对称下突发性水污染事件中管理部门与企业之间的信号博弈模型,对信号发送方企业的类型空间、信号空间和信号接收方管理部门的行动空间进行假设,求得了模型的精炼贝叶斯均衡解,并对不同参数取值下的均衡解进行了分析。基于有限理性建立了企业群治污决策进化博弈模型,通过求解模型复制动态方程得到了不同参数取值下的进化稳定策略,并对模型进化趋势进行了分析。结果表明:对突发性水污染事件进行治污决策时,通过公开企业信息与信誉,提高对企业是否采取治污策略的奖惩力度,采用现代先进信息技术降低企业治污与管理部门检查的成本等方式有助于企业采取治污策略。     

农地整治项目投资分摊博弈机理研究——以政府和企业为例

投资主体、建设主体与受益主体不一致是导致我国农地整治项目效率偏低的根本原因,公私合作(PPP)模式是从制度层面提升我国农地整治项目效率的理想模式。本文首先界定了农地整治项目PPP模式,分析了PPP模式下农地整治项目的运行机制及其博弈关系,建立了农地整治项目投资的成本收益函数;然后以政府与农业产业化企业间的博弈为例,在探讨他们博弈要素的基础上构建了投资博弈模型,提出了二者理想的投资决策边界;最后用一个典型案例论证了本文的分析结果。研究结果表明,新增耕地面积和项目建设成本是影响农地整治项目效益发挥的主要因素。农地整治项目PPP模式顺利实施的条件是:当项目政府补贴较低时,企业投入高建设成本得到的支付不低于其保留支付。项目高效运行的条件是:当项目政府补贴较高时,企业投入低建设成本得到的支付不高于其保留支付;与投入低建设成本相比,企业选择高建设成本得到农地经营收益的增加值不小于其增加的成本值。