Commentary: The federal ‘Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act’

The recently enacted federal law, the ‘Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act’ (United States Public Law 110–374) seeks to improve opportunities for parents and pregnant women to anticipate and understand the likely life course of children born with Down syndrome and other (unspecified) conditions. The law is in part a response to the continued growth of prenatal screening and testing. For example, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists' Practice Bulletin 77 recommends that ‘Screening and invasive diagnostic testing for aneuploidies be available to all women who present for prenatal care before 20 weeks of gestation regardless of maternal age.’ Emerging technologies anticipate an era in which the scope of prenatal screening and testing will be much larger than it is today. Inevitably, more women will find themselves facing the hard question of whether to continue or end a pregnancy in which a fetus has been found to have a significant abnormality. While the new federal law is not likely to have a major impact on obstetric practice, it may be a harbinger of renewed wide-scale public debate concerning the ethics of prenatal screening. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Human Dignity and the Dignity of Creatures

In their report for the Swiss government onthe notion of the dignity of creatures, PhilippBalzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber analyzethe relationship between human dignity and the dignityof creatures, taking them as two categoricallydifferent concepts. Human dignity is defined as the``moral right not to be humiliated,' whereas thedignity of creatures is taken to be ``the inherentvalue of nonhuman living beings.' To my mind there isno need to draw a categorical distinction between thetwo concepts. Both notions could be brought togetherunder an all-encompassing concept of the inherentvalue of living beings, humans and non-humans alike,a concept one could name ``the dignity of livingbeings.' Indeed, this very notion underlies theposition taken in the report, although this is notmade explicit by the authors themselves.As the aim of the paper is only to clarify theconcepts used, I do not go beyond this ``internal'critique of their position, i.e., I don't assess howthe claims articulated via these concepts – theclaim that humans and/or creatures have an inherentvalue consisting in a supposed intrinsic good – areto be justified, although I myself would be ratherskeptical that this might be successfully done.     

Genetic Engineering and the Dignity of Creatures

The Swiss expert report suggests thatthe inherent dignity of a living being be identifiedwith its inherent value. But the phrase ``inherentvalue of a living being' seems to connote two conceptsof inherent value. One has a morally obligatingcharacter but is counterintuitive because of itsegalitarianism. The other is one of non-moral value.It is more compatible with considered intuitions butinsufficient for substantiating the expert report'sclaim that human beings have moral duties towardsanimals and plants. The paper discusses theseconcepts. Consideration is then given to the problemof how discursive support can be generated for theexpert report's claim that human beings have the moralduty to abstain from impairing those functions andabilities of a nonuman being that members of itsspecies as a rule can practice.     

Two Concepts of Dignity for Humans and Non-Human Organisms in the Context of Genetic Engineering

The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the SwissConstitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations onthe use of genetic material that take into account the dignity ofnonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we shouldunderstand what is meant by ``the dignity of nonhuman animals,' andabout what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignitywith respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determiningwhat is meant is to clarify the difference between dignity when appliedto humans and when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of humandignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the rightnot to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it have thecognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the caseof nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignityrequires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied totheir abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value isnot absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibitbreeding manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But itdoes restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard togenetic engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowedthe uninhibited development of species specific functions, a positionshared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purposeconception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of the Genetic Make-upposition proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity,as here defended, is what is meant in the Swiss Constitution article.     

Genetic engineering and the dignity of creatures

The Swiss expert report suggests that the inherent dignity of a living being be identified with its inherent value. But the phrase “inherent value of a living being” seems to connote two concepts of inherent value. One has a morally obligating character but is counterintuitive because of its egalitarianism. The other is one of non-moral value. It is more compatible with considered intuitions but insufficient for substantiating the expert report’s claim that human beings have moral duties towards animals and plants. The paper discusses these concepts. Consideration is then given to the problem of how discursive support can be generated for the expert report’s claim that human beings have the moral duty to abstain from impairing those functions and abilities of a non-human being that members of its species as a rule can practice.