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41.
James W. Male John B. Moriarty Thomas H. Stevens Cleve E. Willis 《Journal of the American Water Resources Association》1991,27(3):521-526
ABSTRACT: This paper examines the cost of water supply for small and mid-sized private water utilities. An econometric approach was employed in which data on utility costs and characteristics were used to estimate a total water supply cost function from which average and marginal costs were derived. The results suggest that although average and marginal costs decline with output, the rate of decline rapidly approaches zero, and unit costs therefore appear to remain relatively constant over a wide range of output. Implications of the results for pricing policy are examined. 相似文献
42.
本文主要论述了如下基本概念问题: 1、安全的主要经济功能是保障社会经济的增值和有效地减少事故的经济损失。本文试图构造增值函数I(S)和损失函数L(S)来描述其功能。 2、安全经济学的基本任务是研究安全的经济效益和安全的经济利益规律,使其有效地调整和协调安全与经济的关系,指导安全经济决策。 3、本文试提出发展安全经济学应遵循的三个基本原理。 4、为综合揭示安全经济规律,本文还探讨了安全经济的功能函数F(S)、成本函数C(S)、负担函数B(S)和效益函数E(S)。 5、针对实际应用,本文还提出了一种安全投资的评价方法及其优化理论。 相似文献
43.
Zachary McCormick 《Journal of the American Water Resources Association》1994,30(6):953-961
ABSTRACT: Water marketing has been proposed as one means of reallocating water supplies in the western United States. While markets for western water currently exist and may be expected to expand, the institutional constraints within which the markets must operate will limit the ultimate size and efficiency of those markets. Lack of articulation of public interests in the water resource itself leads to incomplete definition of the private rights to use the water, and it is those private rights which are sold or leased in the market. The increase in size and efficiency of any market in water rights will be dependent on the willingness of legislatures to specifically define the nature and extent of public interests in water supplies, and detailed definition is unlikely. 相似文献
44.
Roger B. Long 《Journal of the American Water Resources Association》1987,23(6):1117-1124
ABSTRACT: Pressure is increasing in the western United States to reallocate water from irrigated agriculture to other competitive uses. Since water is normally allocated through water rights and not necessarily by the price system, the question of economic efficiency is a continual concern. Study results show that returns per acre-foot of water used in western irrigation are quite high and are closely tied to the livestock industry. Returns per acre-foot of water used for crops ranged from $60 to $1,500. When water was used to support livestock, returns per acre-foot ranged from $100 to $600. Clearly, losses of water supply that reduced irrigation production could also lower farm income significantly. Estimated returns also show what alternative uses would have to pay for water under competitive market conditions. Production elasticities are also shown for various states. 相似文献
45.
Kenneth G. Maxey Norman H. Starler 《Journal of the American Water Resources Association》1987,23(5):749-759
ABSTRACT: In the past, development of Federal water resource projects depended heavily or exclusively on Federal financing of construction costs. However, pressures on the Federal budget, environmental issues, and the notion that there are economic efficiency gains when beneficiaries of Federal water resource projects increase their cost share are causing changes. The case of the Central Arizona Project Plan 6 is a noteworthy example of the transition to more non-Federal participation in water resource development. This is because the non-Federal financing is to be provided for a project already under construction. The negotiation and terms of the Plan 6 financing agreement between the Department of the Interior and multiple interests in Arizona are used as an example of how Federal water project cost sharing is in a state of transition. The negotiation process is described, a financial analysis is provided, and the terms of the agreement and policy issues that were deliberated in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government are discussed. 相似文献
46.
Paul N. Wilson Teddy J. Goldammer James C. Wade 《Journal of the American Water Resources Association》1988,24(1):1-9
ABSTRACT: Urban wastewater can be a valuable source of water and plant nutrients for agricultural producers, particularly in arid regions. The scientific literature reveals cautious optimism concerning the biological, institutional, and economic viability of irrigating crops with secondary-treated effluent. A derived effluent demand function for agricultural producers near Tucson, Arizona, reveals a potential annual demand of 11,000 acre-feet under present price and proposed delivery system conditions. In this case, wastewater could be exchanged for ground water and both the urban and rural areas would gain. 相似文献
47.
ABSTRACT: Because of its importance and the perceived inability of private sector sources to meet water demands, many countries have depended on the public sector to provide water services for their populations. Yet this has resulted in many inefficient public water projects and in inadequate supplies of good quality and reliable water. Decentralization of water management, including the use of water markets, cannot solve all of these water problems, but it can improve the efficiency of water allocation. When given adequate responsibility and authority, water user associations have effectively taken over water management activities at a savings to tax payers. Moreover, water markets add the potential benefit of improving water efficiency within a sector as well as providing a mechanism for reallocating water among sectors. The key question involves developing innovative mechanisms for reducing the transaction costs of organizing water users and of making water trades. Water rights need to be established which are recorded, tradable, enforceable, and separate from land if markets are to operate effectively. Also, institutions are needed that effectively resolve conflicts over water rights, including third party impacts and water quality concerns. 相似文献
48.
Basharat A. Pitafi James A. Roumasset 《Journal of the American Water Resources Association》2006,42(6):1441-1450
Abstract: Conserving the watershed can help to preserve ground water recharge. Preventing overuse of available water through pricing reforms can also substantially increase the value of an aquifer. Inasmuch as users are accustomed to low prices, efficiency pricing may be politically infeasible, and watershed conservation may be considered as an alternative. We estimate and compare welfare gains from pricing reform and watershed conservation for a water management district in Oahu that obtains its water supply from the Pearl Harbor aquifer. We find that pricing reform is welfare superior to watershed conservation unless the latter is able to prevent very large recharge losses. Watershed conservation that yields net gains in combination with pricing reform may cause net losses without the pricing reform. If adoption of watershed conservation delays the implementation of pricing reform, the benefits of the latter are significantly reduced. 相似文献
49.
Eric C. Schuck Gareth P. Green Janet Clements W. Marshall Frasier 《Journal of the American Water Resources Association》2006,42(6):1483-1492
Abstract: Agricultural runoff, such as dissolved mineral salts and selenium, creates pronounced downstream impacts to agricultural producers and to wildlife. The ability to manage these problems efficiently depends critically on the institutional pricing structure of irrigation water delivery agencies. An important characteristic of irrigation water delivery is whether irrigators pay per unit of water received or make one payment regardless of the quantity of water received. In this study we compare the effectiveness of agricultural runoff reduction policies in two regions that employ these different water pricing structures. We find that reduction policy is more effective and can be achieved at a lower cost when water is priced on a per unit basis and that growers have greater incentive to act on their own to reduce runoff problems. Operating under a per unit pricing system encourages water conservation and runoff reduction, which creates public benefits that are not achieved under the single-payment, fixed allotment method of irrigation water delivery. 相似文献
50.