Creating conservation strategies with value-focused thinking

Biodiversity and human well-being strategies are only as good as the set of ideas people think about. We evaluated value-focused thinking (VFT), a framework that emphasizes creating objectives and strategies that are responsive to the objectives. We performed a proof-of-concept study of VFT with 6 conservation planning teams at a global conservation organization. We developed a package of materials related to VFT, including meeting–session agendas, a virtual facilitation template, facilitator's guide, and evaluation questionnaires. We used these materials to test whether VFT applied in a group setting resulted in high-quality conservation strategies and participant satisfaction and whether our materials were scalable, meaning that someone newly trained in VFT could facilitate planning meetings that resulted in high-quality strategies and participant satisfaction, as compared with an experienced VFT facilitator. Net response indicated positive compelling, feasible, creative, and representative ratings for the conservation strategies per team. Participants indicated satisfaction overall, although satisfaction was greater for objectives than for strategies. Among the participants with previous conservation planning experience, all were at least as satisfied with their VFT strategies compared with previously developed strategies, and none were less satisfied (p = 0.001). Changes in participant satisfaction were not related to facilitator type (experienced or inexperienced with VFT) (p > 0.10). Some participants had a preconceived sense of shared understanding of important values and interests before participating in the study, which VFT strengthened. Our results highlight the advantages of structuring the development and evaluation of conservation planning frameworks around VFT.     

An introduction to decision science for conservation

Biodiversity conservation decisions are difficult, especially when they involve differing values, complex multidimensional objectives, scarce resources, urgency, and considerable uncertainty. Decision science embodies a theory about how to make difficult decisions and an extensive array of frameworks and tools that make that theory practical. We sought to improve conceptual clarity and practical application of decision science to help decision makers apply decision science to conservation problems. We addressed barriers to the uptake of decision science, including a lack of training and awareness of decision science; confusion over common terminology and which tools and frameworks to apply; and the mistaken impression that applying decision science must be time consuming, expensive, and complex. To aid in navigating the extensive and disparate decision science literature, we clarify meaning of common terms: decision science, decision theory, decision analysis, structured decision-making, and decision-support tools. Applying decision science does not have to be complex or time consuming; rather, it begins with knowing how to think through the components of a decision utilizing decision analysis (i.e., define the problem, elicit objectives, develop alternatives, estimate consequences, and perform trade-offs). This is best achieved by applying a rapid-prototyping approach. At each step, decision-support tools can provide additional insight and clarity, whereas decision-support frameworks (e.g., priority threat management and systematic conservation planning) can aid navigation of multiple steps of a decision analysis for particular contexts. We summarize key decision-support frameworks and tools and describe to which step of a decision analysis, and to which contexts, each is most useful to apply. Our introduction to decision science will aid in contextualizing current approaches and new developments, and help decision makers begin to apply decision science to conservation problems.     

A protocol for eliciting nonmaterial values through a cultural ecosystem services frame

Stakeholders’ nonmaterial desires, needs, and values often critically influence the success of conservation projects. These considerations are challenging to articulate and characterize, resulting in their limited uptake in management and policy. We devised an interview protocol designed to enhance understanding of cultural ecosystem services (CES). The protocol begins with discussion of ecosystem‐related activities (e.g., recreation, hunting) and management and then addresses CES, prompting for values encompassing concepts identified in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) and explored in other CES research. We piloted the protocol in Hawaii and British Columbia. In each location, we interviewed 30 individuals from diverse backgrounds. We analyzed results from the 2 locations to determine the effectiveness of the interview protocol in elucidating nonmaterial values. The qualitative and spatial components of the protocol helped characterize cultural, social, and ethical values associated with ecosystems in multiple ways. Maps and situational, or vignette‐like, questions helped respondents articulate difficult‐to‐discuss values. Open‐ended prompts allowed respondents to express a diversity of ecosystem‐related values and proved sufficiently flexible for interviewees to communicate values for which the protocol did not explicitly probe. Finally, the results suggest that certain values, those mentioned frequently throughout the interview, are particularly salient for particular populations. The protocol can provide efficient, contextual, and place‐based data on the importance of particular ecosystem attributes for human well‐being. Qualitative data are complementary to quantitative and spatial assessments in the comprehensive representation of people's values pertaining to ecosystems, and this protocol may assist in incorporating values frequently overlooked in decision making processes.     

Evaluating whether nature's intrinsic value is an axiom of or anathema to conservation

That at least some aspects of nature possess intrinsic value is considered by some an axiom of conservation. Others consider nature's intrinsic value superfluous or anathema. This range of views among mainstream conservation professionals potentially threatens the foundation of conservation. One challenge in resolving this disparity is that disparaging portrayals of nature's intrinsic value appear rooted in misconceptions and unfounded presumptions about what it means to acknowledge nature's intrinsic value. That acknowledgment has been characterized as vacuous, misanthropic, of little practical consequence to conservation, adequately accommodated by economic valuation, and not widely accepted in society. We reviewed the philosophical basis for nature's intrinsic value and the implications for acknowledging that value. Our analysis is rooted to the notion that when something possesses intrinsic value it deserves to be treated with respect for what it is, with concern for its welfare or in a just manner. From this basis, one can only conclude that nature's intrinsic value is not a vacuous concept or adequately accommodated by economic valuation. Acknowledging nature's intrinsic value is not misanthropic because concern for nature's welfare (aside from its influence on human welfare) does not in any way preclude also being concerned for human welfare. The practical import of acknowledging nature's intrinsic value rises from recognizing all the objects of conservation concern (e.g., many endangered species) that offer little benefit to human welfare. Sociological and cultural evidence indicates the belief that at least some elements of nature possess intrinsic value is widespread in society. Our reasoning suggests the appropriateness of rejecting the assertion that nature's intrinsic value is anathema to conservation and accepting its role as an axiom. Evaluar si el Valor Intrínseco de la Naturaleza es un Axioma o un Anatema para la Conservación     

International consensus principles for ethical wildlife control

Human–wildlife conflicts are commonly addressed by excluding, relocating, or lethally controlling animals with the goal of preserving public health and safety, protecting property, or conserving other valued wildlife. However, declining wildlife populations, a lack of efficacy of control methods in achieving desired outcomes, and changes in how people value animals have triggered widespread acknowledgment of the need for ethical and evidence‐based approaches to managing such conflicts. We explored international perspectives on and experiences with human–wildlife conflicts to develop principles for ethical wildlife control. A diverse panel of 20 experts convened at a 2‐day workshop and developed the principles through a facilitated engagement process and discussion. They determined that efforts to control wildlife should begin wherever possible by altering the human practices that cause human–wildlife conflict and by developing a culture of coexistence; be justified by evidence that significant harms are being caused to people, property, livelihoods, ecosystems, and/or other animals; have measurable outcome‐based objectives that are clear, achievable, monitored, and adaptive; predictably minimize animal welfare harms to the fewest number of animals; be informed by community values as well as scientific, technical, and practical information; be integrated into plans for systematic long‐term management; and be based on the specifics of the situation rather than negative labels (pest, overabundant) applied to the target species. We recommend that these principles guide development of international, national, and local standards and control decisions and implementation.     

From Adaptive Management to Adjustive Management: A Pragmatic Account of Biodiversity Values

Abstract: The conservation of biodiversity poses an exceptionally difficult problem in that it needs to be effective in a context of double uncertainty: scientific (i.e., how to conserve biodiversity) and normative (i.e., which biodiversity to conserve and why). Although adaptive management offers a promising approach to overcome scientific uncertainty, normative uncertainty is seldom tackled by conservation science. We expanded on the approach proposed by adaptive‐management theorists by devising an integrative and iterative approach to conservation that encompasses both types of uncertainty. Inspired by environmental pragmatism, we suggest that moral values at stake in biodiversity conservation are plastic and that a plurality of individual normative positions can coexist and evolve. Moral values should thus be explored through an experimental process as additional parameters to be incorporated in the traditional adaptive‐management approach. As such, moral values should also be monitored by environmental ethicists working side by side with scientists and managers on conservation projects. Acknowledging the diversity of moral values and integrating them in a process of collective deliberation will help overcome the normative uncertainty. We used Dewey's distinction between adaptation and adjustment to offer a new paradigm built around what we call adjustive management, which reflects both the uncertainty and the likely evolution of the moral values humans attribute to biodiversity. We illustrate how this paradigm relates to practical conservation decisions by exploring the case of the Sacred Ibis (Threskiornis aethiopicus), an alien species in France that is the target of an eradication plan undertaken with little regard for moral issues. We propose that a more satisfying result of efforts to control Sacred Ibis could have been reached by rerouting the traditional feedback loop of adaptive management to include a normative inquiry. This adjustive management approach now needs to be tested in real‐case conservation programs.     

On allegations of invasive species denialism

Science denialism retards evidenced-based policy and practice and should be challenged. It has been a particular concern for mitigating global environmental issues, such as anthropogenic climate change. But allegations of science denialism must also be well founded and evidential or they risk eroding public trust in science and scientists. Recently, 77 published works by scholars, scientists, and science writers were identified as containing invasive species denialism (ISD; i.e., rejection of well-supported facts about invasive species, particularly the global scientific consensus about their negative impacts). We reevaluated 75 of these works but could find no examples of refutation of scientific facts and only 5 articles with text perhaps consistent with one of the 5 characteristics of science denialism. We found, therefore, that allegations of ISD were misplaced. These accusations of science denialism may have arisen because invasion biology defines its subjects—invasive species—based on multiple subjective and normative judgments. Thus, more than other applied sciences its consensus is one of shared values as much as agreed knowledge. Criticisms of invasion biology have largely targeted those subjective and normative judgments and their global imposition, not the knowledge on which the discipline is based. Regrettably, a few invasion biologists have misinterpreted the critique of their values-based consensus as a denial of their science when it is not. To make invasion biology a more robust and widely accepted science and to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings and conflicts, invasion biologists could be more accepting of perspectives originating from other disciplines and more open to values-based critique from scholars and scientists outside their field. This recommendation applies to all conservation sciences, especially those addressing global challenges, because these sciences must serve and be relevant to communities with an extraordinary diversity of cultures and values.     

Applying a values-based decision process to facilitate comanagement of threatened species in Aotearoa New Zealand

Ko koe ki tēnā, ko ahau ki tēnai kīwai o te kete (you at that, and I at this handle of the basket). This Māori (New Zealanders of indigenous descent) saying conveys the principle of cooperation—we achieve more through working together, rather than separately. Despite decades of calls to rectify cultural imbalance in conservation, threatened species management still relies overwhelmingly on ideas from Western science and on top-down implementation. Values-based approaches to decision making can be used to integrate indigenous peoples’ values into species conservation in a more meaningful way. We used such a values-based method, structured decision making, to develop comanagement of pekapeka (Mystacina tuberculata) (short-tailed bat) and tara iti (Sternula nereis davisae) (Fairy Tern) between Māori and Pākehā (New Zealanders of European descent). We implemented this framework in a series of workshops in which facilitated discussions were used to gather expert knowledge to predict outcomes and make management recommendations. For both species, stakeholders clearly stated their values as fundamental objectives from the start, which allowed alternative strategies to be devised that naturally addressed their diverse values, including mātauranga Māori (Māori knowledge and perspectives). On this shared basis, all partners willingly engaged in the process, and decisions were largely agreed to by all. Most expectations of conflicts between values of Western science and Māori culture were unfounded. Where required, positive compromises were made by jointly developing alternative strategies. The values-based process successfully taha wairua taha tangata (brought both worlds together to achieve the objective) through codeveloped recovery strategies. This approach challenges the traditional model of scientists first preparing management plans focused on biological objectives, then consulting indigenous groups for approval. We recommend values-based approaches, such as structured decision making, as powerful methods for development of comanagement conservation plans between different peoples.     

Adapting participatory processes to fine-tune conservation approaches in multiactor decision settings

Conservation decisions are typically made in complex, dynamic, and uncertain settings, where multiple actors raise diverse and potentially conflicting claims, champion different and sometimes contradictory values, and enjoy varying degrees of freedom and power to act and influence collective decisions. Therefore, effective conservation actions require conservation scientists and practitioners to take into account the complexity of multiactor settings. We devised a framework to help conservation biologists and practitioners in this task. Institutional economic theories, which are insufficiently cited in the conservation literature, contain useful insights for conservation. Among these theories, the economies of worth can significantly contribute to conservation because it can be used to classify the types of values peoples or groups refer to when they interact during the elaboration and implementation of conservation projects. Refining this approach, we designed a framework to help conservation professionals grasp the relevant differences among settings in which decisions related to conservation actions are to be made, so that they can adapt their approaches to the features of the settings they encounter. This framework distinguishes 6 types of agreements and disagreements that can occur between actors involved in a conservation project (harmony, stricto sensu arrangement, deliberated arrangement, unilateral and reciprocal compromise, and locked-in), depending on whether they disagree on values or on their applications and on whether they can converge toward common values by working together. We identified key questions that conservationists should answer to adapt their strategy to the disagreements they encounter and identified relevant participatory processes to complete the adaptation.     

The need for formal reflexivity in conservation science

Conservation issues are often complicated by sociopolitical controversies that reflect competing philosophies and values regarding natural systems, animals, and people. Effective conservation outcomes require managers to engage myriad influences (social, cultural, political, and economic, as well as ecological). The contribution of conservation scientists who generate the information on which solutions rely is constrained if they are unable to acknowledge how personal values and disciplinary paradigms influence their research and conclusions. Conservation challenges involving controversial species provide an opportunity to reflect on the paradigms and value systems that underpin the discipline and practice of conservation science. Recent analyses highlight the ongoing reliance on normative values in conservation. We frame our discussion around controversies over feral horses (Equus ferus caballus) in the Canadian West and New Zealand and suggest that a lack of transparency and reflexivity regarding normative values continues to prevent conservation practitioners from finding resilient conservation solutions. We suggest that growing scrutiny and backlash to many normative conservation objectives necessitates formal reflexivity methods in conservation biology research, similar to those required of researchers in social science disciplines. Moreover, given that much conservation research and action continues to prioritize Western normative values regarding nature and conservation, we suggest that adopting reflexive methods more broadly is an important step toward more socially just research and practice. Formalizing such methods and requiring reflexivity in research will not only encourage reflection on how personal and disciplinary value systems influence conservation work but could more effectively engage people with diverse perspectives and values in conservation and encourage more novel and resilient conservation outcomes, particularly when dealing with controversial species.