Debating ecological justice: implications for critical environmental education

This article will briefly discuss the implications of recognition of ecological justice in relation to environmental education (EE) and education for sustainable development (ESD). It is argued that the present conception of environment taught through EE and ESD negates the subjectivity of non-human species and ignores the ethical imperatives of ecological justice. Evocating environmental ethics, major directions integrating ecological justice into EE and ESD are proposed.     

可持续发展观中的和谐环境伦理意蕴

从把握可持续发展观中的和谐环境伦理意蕴入手,就找到了解读可持续发展观内涵的一个很好的突破口。可持续发展观内涵中具有丰富的和谐环境伦理思想。可持续发展观主张“人与自然的协调发展”与和谐环境伦理意蕴是趋同的;可持续发展观主张“经济发展与资源开发利用的协调发展”与和谐环境伦理意蕴是一致的;可持续发展观主张“人类世代永续长存”与和谐环境伦理是相符的;可持续发展观主张可持续发展应成为“全球性问题”与和谐环境伦理意蕴是相适应的。     

从哲学认识论的视角看环境伦理学的自然价值观

罗尔斯顿的环境价值理论强调了自然的创造性,把自然本身看成是价值的产生者和创造者。这样,他的价值就偏离了主体设定的维度,而把价值的所予性基础抽离掉了。     

浅议环境监理员的威信及其形成机制

论述了环境监理员的工作威信源于法权作用力和自然影响力。指出环保行政主管部门乃至社会各界应用环境监理营造一个良好的氛围，以增强法权作用力；环境监理人员要不断加强自身修养，以提高自然影响力。     

A critical review of the compassionate conservation debate

Compassionate conservation holds that compassion should transform conservation. It has prompted heated debate and has been criticized strongly. We reviewed the debate to characterize compassionate conservation and to philosophically analyze critiques that are recurring and that warrant further critical attention. The necessary elements of compassionate conservation relate to the moral value of sentient animals and conservation and to science and conservation practice. Although compassionate conservation has several nontraditional necessary conditions, it also importantly allows a degree of pluralism in values and scientific judgment regarding animals and conservation practice. We identified 52 specific criticisms from 11 articles that directly critique compassionate conservation. We closely examined 33 of these because they recurred regularly or included substantial questions that required further response. Critics criticized compassionate conservation's ethical foundations, scientific credentials, clarity of application, understanding of compassion, its alleged threat to conservation and biodiversity. Some criticisms, we found, are question begging, confused, or overlook conceptual complexity. These criticisms raise questions for critics and proponents, regarding, for example, equal versus differential intrinsic moral value of different sentient animals (including humans), problems of natural and human-caused suffering of wild animals and predation, and the acceptability of specific conservation practices within compassionate conservation. By addressing recurring and faulty critiques of compassionate conservation and identifying issues for compassionate conservation to address, this review provides a clearer basis for crucial ongoing interdisciplinary dialogue about ethics, values, and conservation.     

The virtue of compassion in compassionate conservation

The role of ethics is becoming an increasingly important feature of biodiversity conservation dialogue and practice. Compassionate conservationists argue for a prohibition of, or at least a strong presumption against, the adoption of conservation policies that intentionally harm animals. They assert that to be compassionate is to care about animals and that it is antithetical to caring for animals to intentionally harm them. Compassionate conservationists thus criticize many existing conservation practices and policies. Two things together challenge the philosophical foundation of compassionate conservation. First, compassionate conservationists ground their theory in virtue ethics, yet virtue ethics permits exceptions to moral rules, so there cannot be an in-principle prohibition on adopting intentional harm-inducing policies and practices. But not all compassionate conservationists advocate for a prohibition on intentionally harming animals, only a strong presumption against it. This leads to the second point: compassion can motivate a person to adopt a harm-inducing conservation policy or practice when doing so is the best available option in a situation in which animals will be harmed no matter what policy or practice is adopted. Combining these insights with the empirical observation that conservationists regularly find themselves in tragic situations, we arrive at the conclusion that conservationists may regularly advocate for harm-inducing policies and practices from a position of compassion. Article Impact Statement: Compassionate conservationists should accept that the virtuously compassionate person may adopt harm-causing conservation policies.