UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism Baseline Construction for Vietnam National Electricity Grid

For projects under the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a baseline has to be set to allow calculation of the greenhouse gas emissions reductions achieved. An important obstacle to CDM project development is the lack of data for baseline definition; often project developers do not have access to data and therefore incur high transaction costs to collect them. The government of Vietnam has set up all necessary institutions for CDM, wants to promote CDM projects and thus is interested to reduce transaction costs. We calculate emission factors of the Vietnam electricity grid according to the rules defined by the CDM Executive Board for small scale projects and for large renewable electricity generation projects. The emission factors lie between 365 and 899 g CO₂/kWh depending on the specification. The weighted operating and build margin reaches 600 g for 2003, while grid average reaches 399 g. Using three-year averages, a combined build and operating margin of 705 g is calculated. We hope that these data facilitate CDM project development in the electricity supply and energy efficiency improvement in Vietnam.     

Achieving the Kyoto Protocol in the U.S.: How Great are the Needed Changes?

The Kyoto Protocol requires the U.S.to reduce the rate of emissions of six greenhousegases (GHG) to 93% of their 1990 rate and to achievethis target by the 2008 to 2012 commitment period. This study assesses the magnitude of change needed inthe U.S. economy and, specifically, in the U.S. energysector, to achieve and maintain the target establishedby the Kyoto Protocol. A simple carbon (C)emissions-energy model is explained in this analysisusing four key variables. Current and future trendsin C emissions are explained by: the carbon/energy(C/E) ratio, Gross Domestic Product growth, energyprices and an energy trend variable. Potential GHGmitigation policy actions affect C emissionsindirectly by affecting at least one of these keyvariables. The analysis concludes that reducingfossil energy use in the U.S. to meet the Kyoto GHGemissions reduction target would be very costly. Technological progress that reduces C emissions wouldnot be fully sufficient without prematurely abandoningproductive capital equipment. Energy price increasesof about 14% per year, or declines in economic growthof almost 5% per year, could reduce energy demand andassociated C emissions enough to achieve the terms ofthe Kyoto Protocol.     

Carbon values,reforestation, and `perverse' incentives under the Kyoto protocol: An empirical analysis

Economic incentives for sequestering atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO₂) in forests may be an effective way to meet greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (KP). But concerns have been raised that the KP may create unintended incentives to excessively harvest existing forests if regenerated forests qualify for carbon (C) credits under the reforestation provision of Article 3.3. This paper combines an analytical model of the optimal forest rotation with both timber and C as priced outputs with data on timber and C growth and yield to different forest settings in the U.S. C prices of $50 per megagram (Mg) – the highest price evaluated– can considerably lengthen forest rotations (40 years or more), raise forest land values (as much as $1,900 per hectare), and sequester more C in the long run (up to 60 percent per acre), relative to the base case of no C compensation. However, if C payments are made for the regenerated stand only, in some situations, it is optimal to immediately harvest an otherwise premature stand at C prices as low as $20/Mg. The strength of perverse incentives to accelerate harvesting of existing forest varies by forest type, region, C price level, and institutional factors relevant to the compensation system. If C compensation were extended to existing stands, as may be possible under Article 3.4 of the KP, the perverse incentives for prematurely harvesting existing stands would not exist.     

Can the envisaged reductions of fossil fuel CO<Subscript>2</Subscript> emissions be detected by atmospheric observations?

The lower troposphere is an excellent receptacle, which integrates anthropogenic greenhouse gases emissions over large areas. Therefore, atmospheric concentration observations over populated regions would provide the ultimate proof if sustained emissions changes have occurred. The most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide (CO(2)), also shows large natural concentration variations, which need to be disentangled from anthropogenic signals to assess changes in associated emissions. This is in principle possible for the fossil fuel CO(2) component (FFCO(2)) by high-precision radiocarbon ((14)C) analyses because FFCO(2) is free of radiocarbon. Long-term observations of (14)CO(2) conducted at two sites in south-western Germany do not yet reveal any significant trends in the regional fossil fuel CO(2) component. We rather observe strong inter-annual variations, which are largely imprinted by changes of atmospheric transport as supported by dedicated transport model simulations of fossil fuel CO(2). In this paper, we show that, depending on the remoteness of the site, changes of about 7-26% in fossil fuel emissions in respective catchment areas could be detected with confidence by high-precision atmospheric (14)CO(2) measurements when comparing 5-year averages if these inter-annual variations were taken into account. This perspective constitutes the urgently needed tool for validation of fossil fuel CO(2) emissions changes in the framework of the Kyoto protocol and successive climate initiatives.     

污染场地土壤通用评估基准建立的理论和常用模型

污染场地土壤通用评估基准的建立与每个国家的经济水准及社会发展紧密相关.从国际相关领域的发展趋势来看,场地基准的建立基于风险基础之上.我国正在颁布污染场地风险评估技术导则(C-RAG),表明我国已选择风险基础上的污染场地管理模式.文章回顾了污染场地土壤通用评估基准建立的理论、方法及通用模型,并推荐污染场地评估的模型框架,...     

Carbon trading across sources and periods constrained by the Marrakesh Accords

We examine the potential effects on permit prices and abatement costs of four compliance rules governing emissions trade across sources and periods in the Kyoto Protocol: The banking rule that allows excess permits to be used later; the restoration rate rule that penalizes borrowing; the commitment period reserve rule that limits sales; and finally, the suspension rule that restricts borrowing and sales. Our framework is a two-period model where parties may be out of compliance in the Kyoto period, but are assumed to comply at a later time. Under varying assumptions about market power and US participation, we find that the rules may have pronounced effects on individual costs, but overall efficiency is not severely affected.