农民工工伤保险现状及问题分析

通过文献分析和实地调研发现,造成我国农民工工伤保险参保率低、企业逃保、退保率高、申请工伤补偿难度大的原因可分为宏观和微观两个层面:城乡二元户籍制、劳动力供求关系、工伤保险制度等因素客观上使得农民工受歧视,地位低,工伤求偿困难;企业主观上追求短期利益和侥幸心理是构成其逃保、退保的主要因素.可通过优化制度体系、强化政府监管...     

农民工参加工伤保险的影响因素研究——基于政策和企业视角的实证分析

为了解我国农民工参加工伤保险的影响因素,提高农民工工伤保险的参保率,通过对全国9个省市共3 848名农民工的问卷调查,应用Logistic回归模型分析政策的因素和企业的因素对农民工参加工伤保险的影响。结果表明,农民工是否参加工伤保险受到各地工伤保险政策以及农民工所在企业两方面的影响。从政策的角度看,个体工商户参加工伤保险的规定、工伤保险基金的统筹水平以及工伤保险的偿付方式对农民工参加工伤保险有显著影响;从企业的角度看,农民工所在企业是否建有工会、企业所有制对农民工参加工伤保险有显著影响。建议各地进一步明确工伤保险政策中对个体工商户的参保要求,继续提高工伤保险基金的统筹水平,增加农民工领取工伤保险偿付的方式。建议劳动保障部门加强对未建有工会的企业,加强对私企,特别是个体工商户的监察力度。     

中国核电保险新模式研究

核保险为中国核电工业的稳定发展起着重要的保障和促进作用.通过对比国内外核电保险模式,提出一种设想的新型核电保险载体,成立核电保险经纪公司是一种可能的选项.成立核电保险经纪公司,弥补了现在国内核电保险市场中所缺乏的重要中介方,明确了核电保险经纪公司的业务范围,遵循法律和市场地位.并进一步提出国内核电保险业能够建立核电自保组织和多样化的核电保险中介组织的设想,并对其产业结构建立了的假设运行新模式.核电新载体可以同时实现对核电公司和核共体提供服务,能够更好地促进保险的运行过程,促进保险市场良好健康地发展,从根本上保障核电安全生产顺利进行.     

巨灾保险下减灾积极性的影响因素及激励措施——基于美国巨灾保险项目的经验

讨论了保险的损失补偿职能和防灾减灾功能的关系,分析了巨灾保险框架下影响被保险人、保险人和其他利害方减灾积极性的多种因素,并基于美国的实践经验,从巨灾保险制度自身设计、政府支持和社会其他利害方的配合这三个角度剖析了调动防灾减灾积极性的各种手段和政策措施。这些经验对我国巨灾保险体系的构建具有一定的借鉴意义。研究结论表明,在合理的制度下,巨灾保险将发挥重要的防灾减灾功能。     

巨灾风险评估模型的发展与研究

巨灾已经成为全球经济损失的重要原因之一。近20年来,巨灾频繁发生,造成了重大的人员伤亡和财产损失,巨灾的发生甚至可能造成国家政治经济的不稳定。因此如何进行巨灾风险管理并减轻巨灾事件发生后所造成的损害,便成为一个相当重要的研究课题。巨灾风险评估模型作为应对巨灾风险最为有效的分析工具,近20年来得到了长足的发展,同时巨灾模型已成为巨灾保险设立的根本依据。对巨灾模型的发展与模型构架进行了综述,并结合我国的实际情况提出了一些建议。     

浅谈中国特种设备检验机构风险规避制度

探讨检验机构、政府、企业三方的利益关系,以及检验机构如何规避风险成为政府当前关心的问题。从事业单位改革的角度来看,检验机构分为三类,通过价值链条表现为检验机构、政府、企业三方的利益关系既有一体的成分,也有独立的成分。建立以检验机构相互保险为立场的公营保险是一种可能的检验机构风险规避制度。     

农业保险与可持续农业发展

农业保险的发展，对保障农业再生产的顺利进行，推动农业可持续的发展具有重要的理论意义和深远的现实意义。文章首先分析了可持续农业与农业保险的内在联系，指出农业保险可以为可持续农业发展保驾护航。接着分析了我国当前农业保险和可持续农业存在的主要问题，并将这些问题归结为来自行为主体，即政府、农民、商业企业三方面的原因。最后提出了发展我国农业保险，促进可持续农业发展的对策建议。     

震灾保险的一种实用技术途径及其实施保障

本文提出一种独特的实用型震灾保险模式,通过烈度当量折合费率(CRPIE)的实时判定及延时承保机制(DIAM)的有效运行,对投保与灾后理赔进行科学、客观的动态调制,促成自然科学与社会科学的有机结合,从而可能使震灾保险所面临的一些难题得以解决,文中还从软科学的角度提出了对上述震灾保险新机制的实施保障。     

Reducing the complexity of the flood vulnerability index

After the flooding in 2002 European governments provided billions of Euros of financial assistance to their citizens. Although there is no doubt that solidarity and some sort of assistance are reasonable, the question arises why these damages were not sufficiently insured. One explanation why individuals reject to obtain insurance cover against natural hazards is that they anticipate governmental and private aid. This problem became to be known as “charity hazard”. The present paper gives an economic analysis of the institutional arrangements on the market for natural disaster insurances focusing on imperfections caused by governmental financial relief. It provides a theoretical explanation why charity hazard is a problem on the market for natural disaster insurances, in the way that it acts as an obstacle for the proper diffusion and therefore the establishment of natural hazard insurances. This paper provides a review of the scientific discussion on charity hazard, provides a theoretical analysis and points out the existing empirical problems regarding this issue.     

Stimulating flood damage mitigation through insurance: an assessment of the French CatNat system

Flood risk has increased in France in the last 20 years and is projected to increase further in the future due to climate change and increase in exposure. Since 1982, France has had a natural disasters insurance system (‘CatNat’) in place that covers flood damage. This insurance system has been combined with what are called ‘Risk Prevention Plans’ (PPRs) in order to stimulate the undertaking of flood risk mitigation measures by communities and households. However, these schemes do not provide optimal incentives for flood damage reduction. This is confirmed by the results from a survey about flood preparedness of 885 households who live in flood-prone areas in France, which are presented in this paper. Moreover, this study provides suggestions for improvement, which are assessed on their potential economic, social and political implications. Among these suggestions are increasing the effectiveness of PPRs and increasing the incentives to apply and implement PPRs; improving the monitoring of the implementation of damage mitigation measures; and the possibility to differentiate premiums and deductibles according to flood risk.