Colombia's discharge fee program: Incentives for polluters or regulators?

Colombia's discharge fee system for water effluents is often held up as a model of a well-functioning, economic incentive pollution control program in a developing country. Yet few objective evaluations of the program have appeared. Based on a variety of primary and secondary data, this paper finds that in its first 5 years, the program was beset by a number of serious problems including limited implementation in many regions, widespread noncompliance by municipal sewerage authorities, and a confused relationship between discharge fees and emissions standards. Nevertheless, in some watersheds, pollution loads dropped significantly after the program was introduced. While proponents claim the incentives that discharge fees created for polluters to cut emissions in a cost-effective manner were responsible, this paper argues that the incentives they created for regulatory authorities to improve permitting, monitoring, and enforcement were at least as important.     

Household Demand for Waste Recycling Services

Municipalities everywhere are coping with increasing amounts of solid waste and need urgently to formulate efficient and sustainable solutions to the problem. This study examines the use of economic incentives in municipal waste management. Specifically, we address the issue of recycling, if and when this waste management option is—on social welfare grounds—a preferred solution.A number of studies have recently assessed the monetary value of the externalities of alternative solid waste management options. In the present context, these subsidies could be interpreted as the implicit value of the benefits from reducing environmental externalities associated with landfilling as perceived by local government authorities. We surmise that the difference between mean households willingness to pay (WTP) for recycling services, via the purchase of a subsidized waste disposal facility, and the above (proxy) value of externalities reflects the difference between private and public perception regarding the negative externality associated with landfilling. We believe that this information is useful in determining the level of subsidization needed (if at all) to sustain any recycling program.The study is unique in the sense that its conclusions are based on revealed household behavior when faced with increased disposal costs, as well as information on WTP responses in hypothetical but related (and, therefore, familiar) scenarios. The article also explores the influence of the subsidization schemes on recycling rates. It was found that with low levels of effort needed to participate in a curbside recycling program, households participation rates are mainly influenced by economic variables and age, and households are willing to pay a higher price for the recycling scheme. When the required effort level is relatively high, however, households would pay a lower price, and the rate is influenced mainly by their environmental commitment and by economic considerations. We found that in both cases a subsidy would be required in order to achieve an efficient level of recycling. The median price that households are willing to pay for recycling devices is found to be about NIS 370 (New Israeli Shekel, approximately $90).     

Non-linear incentives,plan design,and flood mitigation: the case of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's community rating system

A basic proposition of ‘agency theory’ is that output-based performance incentives encourage greater effort. However, studies find that incentive schemes can distort effort if rewards for performance are discrete or non-linear. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Community Rating System (CRS) is a flood mitigation programme with a non-linear incentive design. Under this programme, localities are incentivised to implement a mix of 18 flood mitigation activities. Each activity is performance scored, with accumulated scores corresponding to a percent discount on flood insurance premiums for residents that hold National Flood Insurance policies. Discounts range from 0 to 45% and increase discretely in increments of 5%. With multivariate statistical and Geographic Information Systems analytic techniques, tests are made to find whether observed changes in annual CRS scores for participating localities in Florida are explained by non-linear incentives, adjusting for hydrologic conditions, flood disaster histories, socio-economic and human capital controls that can plausibly account for local mitigation activity scores over time. Results indicate that local jurisdictions are discount-seeking, with mitigation efforts partially driven by the non-linear incentive design of the CRS programme. The paper ends with recommendations to improve the operation FEMA's flood mitigation programme.     

Economic Incentives to Conserve Wildlife on Private Lands: Analysis and Policy

Some believe that provision of private property rights in wildlife on private land provides a powerful economic incentive for nature conservation because it enables property owners to market such wildlife or its attributes. If such marketing is profitable, private landholders will conserve the wildlife concerned and its required habitat. But land is not always most profitably used for exploitation of wildlife, and many economic values of wildlife (such as non-use economic values) cannot be marketed. The mobility of some wildlife adds to the limitations of the private-property approach. While some species may be conserved by this approach, it is suboptimal as a single policy approach to nature conservation. Nevertheless, it is being experimented with, in the Northern Territory of Australia where landholders had a possibility of harvesting on their properties a quota of eggs and chicks of red-tailed black cockatoos for commercial sale. This scheme was expected to provide an incentive to private landholders to retain hollow trees essential for the nesting of these birds but failed. This case and others are analysed. Despite private-property failures, the long-term survival of some wildlife species depends on their ability to use private lands without severe harassment, either for their migration or to supplement their available resources, for example, the Asian elephant. Nature conservation on private land is often a useful, if not essential, supplement to conservation on public lands. Community and public incentives for such conservation are outlined.     

Urban development grant — an early assessment of regional implications

An examination of the Urban Development Grant during its first round of operation reveals that certain regions, particularly the West Midlands and London, are winning considerably more funding than others. A change in this trend is likely to require a reassessment, by the Government, of the targetting criteria presently used to direct the grant to areas of need.     

论中国环境民事公益诉讼激励机制之完善

2015年1月6日,最高人民法院发布《最高人民法院关于审理环境民事公益诉讼案件适用法律若干问题的解释》,解决了近十几年来学者们普遍关注的问题,但尚未解决环境民事公益诉讼的根本问题.环境公益本质上属于公共物品的范畴,受制于集体行动的逻辑,加之高昂的诉讼成本,\"理性人\"一般不愿参与.因此,原告胜诉奖励制度、法律援助制度以及专项基金制度成为现阶段打破环境民事公益诉讼僵局的重要途径.     

政府与排污企业间的动态激励监控关系研究

科学的监督和有效的管理是实现环境可持续发展的必由之路,政府与排污企业的博弈是一个值得关注的重要问题。基于声誉理论,论文建立了政府与排污企业问的静态与动态激励监控模型,结论认为在动态激励监督下政府的总效用实现了帕累托改善,研究表明考虑以往业绩的两阶段最优契约对排污企业具有明显的声誉激励效应,同时表明监控机制和激励契约具有互补性,最后对机制设计中的控制参数的灵敏度以及模型的鲁棒性进行了探讨,可为政府制定合理的激励监督措施提供理论参考依据。