Evaluating the Potential for Conservation Development: Biophysical, Economic, and Institutional Perspectives

Abstract:  The widespread conversion of rural land to low-density residential development poses an immediate threat to biodiversity and to the provision of ecosystem services. Given that development will continue and environmental stakes are high, analyzing alternative growth strategies is critical. Conservation development is one such strategy that has the potential to benefit ecosystems and diverse stakeholders including developers, homebuyers, governments, and society as a whole. Conservation development clusters homes on one part of a property to manage the most ecologically important land for the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services. We draw on lessons learned from landscape ecology, open-space development, and regional planning to weigh the biophysical, economic, and institutional evidence for and against conservation development. Conservation development offers many potential environmental and economic advantages: relatively high home values and appreciation rates, lower development costs, and social and ecological benefits to society including landscape connectivity, protection and active stewardship of important ecological assets, and the maintenance of ecosystem services. But this approach also has shortcomings: it may require enlightened institutional regulations and regional planning (and/or ecologically aware developers), it is not always more profitable than conventional development and thus may require subsidies or incentives, and additional research is required to fully understand its benefits and drawbacks. With more information on the effects of clustering, the development of flexible zoning laws, and effective regional planning, conservation development could be a viable strategy for sustaining biodiversity and ecosystem services in changing landscapes.     

Incentives for wetland creation

When information about soil quality is complete, wetland creation with a take-it-or-leave-it contract, which specifies wetland size and transfer, yields higher social benefits than if a uniform contract, which offers a payment proportional to the wetland size, had been used. This result points to a paradox because uniform contracts have been used a lot in practice.This article concentrates on the presence of asymmetric information about soil quality as a possible explanation for this paradox. It shows that the choice of instrument for wetland creation has welfare implications. Different contracts typically yield quite different social welfare surpluses and distribution between interest groups. It is not obvious, which of four contracts studied dominates when a farm characteristic affecting costs is unknown to the social planner. The probability distribution of the characteristic, the size of the excess burden, the elasticity of costs and benefits to wetland size and the cost of acquiring missing information influence the outcome.     

Reduction of Urban Runoff Through Economic Incentives: Boulder,Colorado1

ABSTRACT: The problems of increased surface runoff which follow in step with urbanization can be conceptualized in terms of environmental economics. The private transformation of land from a permeable to an impermeable surface imposes the externality of increased surface runoff upon society as a whole and especially on those downstream. The city of Boulder, Colorado, has enacted an ordinance which attempts to internalize some of these external costs and at the same time decrease surface runoff from the urban environment.     

Legal requirements for risk and vulnerability assessments in Norwegian land-use planning

Land-use planning has been promoted as an important tool for adaptation to climate change. However, its success depends on effective communication between researchers and decision-makers. A “risk and vulnerability assessment” (RVA) is one method to facilitate the interaction between the groups. RVAs have been performed in Norwegian land-use planning for about 20 years, and been mandatory for new development the last few years. The first part of the article reviews the history and current legal regulation of RVAs in Norway. Continuing, the main part discusses the distribution of authority and responsibility for different parts of the process and result. The key finding is that significant decisions are deferred to municipal discretion, for example, the necessity (if doubtful) and scope of the assessments. Other topics (such as the burden of costs and eligible performers) are largely unregulated, prompting some arguments about the need for further legislative effort.     

Colombia's discharge fee program: Incentives for polluters or regulators?

Colombia's discharge fee system for water effluents is often held up as a model of a well-functioning, economic incentive pollution control program in a developing country. Yet few objective evaluations of the program have appeared. Based on a variety of primary and secondary data, this paper finds that in its first 5 years, the program was beset by a number of serious problems including limited implementation in many regions, widespread noncompliance by municipal sewerage authorities, and a confused relationship between discharge fees and emissions standards. Nevertheless, in some watersheds, pollution loads dropped significantly after the program was introduced. While proponents claim the incentives that discharge fees created for polluters to cut emissions in a cost-effective manner were responsible, this paper argues that the incentives they created for regulatory authorities to improve permitting, monitoring, and enforcement were at least as important.     

Non-linear incentives,plan design,and flood mitigation: the case of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's community rating system

A basic proposition of ‘agency theory’ is that output-based performance incentives encourage greater effort. However, studies find that incentive schemes can distort effort if rewards for performance are discrete or non-linear. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Community Rating System (CRS) is a flood mitigation programme with a non-linear incentive design. Under this programme, localities are incentivised to implement a mix of 18 flood mitigation activities. Each activity is performance scored, with accumulated scores corresponding to a percent discount on flood insurance premiums for residents that hold National Flood Insurance policies. Discounts range from 0 to 45% and increase discretely in increments of 5%. With multivariate statistical and Geographic Information Systems analytic techniques, tests are made to find whether observed changes in annual CRS scores for participating localities in Florida are explained by non-linear incentives, adjusting for hydrologic conditions, flood disaster histories, socio-economic and human capital controls that can plausibly account for local mitigation activity scores over time. Results indicate that local jurisdictions are discount-seeking, with mitigation efforts partially driven by the non-linear incentive design of the CRS programme. The paper ends with recommendations to improve the operation FEMA's flood mitigation programme.     

Case studies in co-benefits approaches to climate change mitigation and adaptation

Attempts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions or manage the effects of climate change traditionally focus on management or policy options that promote single outcomes (e.g., either benefiting ecosystems or human health and well-being). In contrast, co-benefits approaches to climate change mitigation and adaptation address climate change impacts on human and ecological health in tandem and on a variety of spatial and temporal scales. The article engages the concept of co-benefits through four case studies. The case studies emphasize co-benefits approaches that are accessible and tractable in countries with human populations that are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts. They illustrate the potential of co-benefits approaches and provide a platform for further discussion of several interdependent principles relevant to the implementation of co-benefits strategies. These principles include providing incentives across multiple scales and time frames, promoting long-term integrated impact assessment, and fostering multidimensional communication networks.     

Between national soft regulations and strong economic incentives: local climate and energy strategies in Sweden

This paper contributes to the current discussion on whether ‘soft’ regulation actually influences policy outcomes by examining the effects of national policy instruments on municipal climate and energy planning. Sweden has experienced shifts in the incentive context over the last decades complementing soft planning regulations with stringent conditions for getting national economic support to local energy and climate action. We hypothesize that when soft regulations are surrounded by detailed conditions for getting state support, there will be higher degrees of local institutionalization of climate and energy strategies. The importance of economic support as part of national policy is confirmed by evidence from local energy and climate strategies and from interviews with local decision-makers. We also find that specific municipal features such as earlier municipal engagement in national support programs and relevant inter-municipal networks function as drivers for the institutionalization of local action.     

Designing policy incentives for cleaner technologies: Lessons from California's plug-in electric vehicle rebate program

We assess the performance of alternative rebate designs for plug-in electric vehicles. Based on an innovative vehicle choice model, we simulate the performance of rebate designs that vary in terms of vehicle technologies, consumer income eligibility, and caps on the price of vehicles eligible for subsidies. We compare these alternatives in terms of 1) the number of additional plug-in electric vehicles purchased, 2) cost-effectiveness per additional vehicle purchase induced, 3) total program cost, and 4) the distribution of rebate funding across consumer income classes. Using the status quo rebate policy in California as a reference case, we identify two alternative types of designs that are superior along all four performance criteria.