THE REGULATED RIPARIAN VERSION OF THE ASCE MODEL WATER CODE: THE THIRD WAY TO ALLOCATE WATER1

ABSTRACT: Lawyers, engineers, and hydrologists are accustomed to thinking of water law as falling into one of two incompatible models: riparian rights (under which water is allocated by courts according to the relative reasonableness of the competing uses) and appropriative rights (under which water is allocated according to the temporal priority of the competing uses, largely by the action of the water users themselves but perfected by the issuance of an administrative permit). Usually unnoticed is the existence of a third approach, which I have dubbed “regulated riparianism.” Under regulated riparianism, water is allocated by water permits issued after an administrative determination of the reasonableness of the proposed use before the use is commenced. This system, now in place in about half of the states east of Kansas City (plus Hawaii), thus is fundamentally different from either the traditional ripanan rights that it replaces or the appropriative rights found in western states.     

The Supreme Court,the commerce clause,and natural resources

The Supreme Court's interpretation of the commerce clause controls the balance of power between state and federal governments in the United States. An understanding of the relationship between the different government levels is essential for resource managers concerned with resource and environmental issues. This study examines selected Supreme Court decisions between 1976 and 1988 to answer three questions raised by the commerce clause: (1) Is the regulated item an article of commerce? (2) Do state laws burden interstate commerce? (3) Is federal commerce regulation limited? The balance of power among the justices and the commerce clause theories affecting the federal role in resource management are also examined. Since ratification of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has continuously increased federal power, but states have power to act independently as long as contradictory federal laws do not exist and state law does not impermissively affect commerce. If Congress regulates an individual's use of resources, their power is unquestioned. Future Court decisions will not significantly reduce the federal role in resource management even if the Court's membership changes. Even the supporters of states' rights on the Court realize increased federal power is a necessary part of the country's evolution. The purpose of the commerce clause is to create a national economic unit with free location principles. The Court supports this purpose today and will in the future.     

On the moral acceptability of killing animals

According to a rights view it is acceptable to kill animals if they are innocent threats or shields or are in a lifeboat situation. However, according to advocates of such a view, our practices of killing animals for food or scientific research may be morally unacceptable. In this paper we argue that, even if we grant the basic assumptions of a rights view, a good deal of killing of animals for food and scientific research continues to be morally acceptable.     

Obligations to animals are not necessarily based on rights

I offer a very qualified argument to the effect that rights are grounded in a certain sort of prejudice that privileges individualistic and perhaps masculinist ways of thinking about moral life. I also propose that we look carefully at other conceptions of social ontology and moral life, including the much discussed care conception.     

WATER MARKETS AND DECENTRALIZED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES1

ABSTRACT: Because of its importance and the perceived inability of private sector sources to meet water demands, many countries have depended on the public sector to provide water services for their populations. Yet this has resulted in many inefficient public water projects and in inadequate supplies of good quality and reliable water. Decentralization of water management, including the use of water markets, cannot solve all of these water problems, but it can improve the efficiency of water allocation. When given adequate responsibility and authority, water user associations have effectively taken over water management activities at a savings to tax payers. Moreover, water markets add the potential benefit of improving water efficiency within a sector as well as providing a mechanism for reallocating water among sectors. The key question involves developing innovative mechanisms for reducing the transaction costs of organizing water users and of making water trades. Water rights need to be established which are recorded, tradable, enforceable, and separate from land if markets are to operate effectively. Also, institutions are needed that effectively resolve conflicts over water rights, including third party impacts and water quality concerns.     

The use and abuse of scientific studies

In response to Evelyn Pluhar'sWho Can Be Morally Obligated to Be a Vegetarian? in this journal issue, the author has read all of Pluhar's citations for the accuracy of her claims and had these read by an independent nutritionist. Detailed analysis of Pluhar's argument shows that she attempts to make her case by consistent misappropriation of the findings and conclusions of the studies she cites. Pluhar makes sweeping generalizations from scanty data, ignores causal explanations given by scientists, equates hypothesis with fact, draws false cause conclusions from studies, and in one case claims a conclusion opposite of what the scientist published. Such poor reasoning cannot be the basis of an argument for moral vegetarianism. A broader search of the literature and attention to reviews and textbooks in nutrition shows that each of Pluhar's claims is suspect or incorrect. Pluhar has not undermined my central claims: even if animals have certain rights and well-planned vegetarian diets are safe in complex industrialized societies, these diets cannot be so regarded if the presuppositions of high levels of wealth, education, and medical care do not exist; and, women, children, the aged and some ill persons are at greater risk on restrictive vegan diets. Thus, any duty of moral vegetarianism is not categorical but provisional in nature.     

城市土地资产经营新思路探讨

自1996年上海市成立第一家土地收购储备机构——土地发展中心后，全国各大城市已纷纷效仿它的成功经验。截止2001年8月不完全统计，全国已有大小不同的土地收购储备机构669家。实践证明，土地收购储备机制在盘活城市存量土地，促进土地集约利用，保障城市土地资产的保值增值等方面成绩卓著。然而，实践过程中，土地收购储备机制的运作也暴露出不少问题。本文通过对这些问题的分析，提出了引进公司制度完善土地收购储备机制，合理运营城市土地资产的新思路。     

3S技术在财产保险防洪救灾中的应用

分析了保险业防灾减损的研究现状,阐述了3S的技术特点及其应用领域。和如何将3S技术应用于财产保险防洪救灾领域,建立财产保险防洪救灾决策支持系统。介绍了系统的整体构架及其功能特点,该系统可与保险公司业务系统紧密结合,显示直观。同时包括保险分析、灾害分析和专题图显示等多项功能。实现了多源数据的无缝集成。因而能从理论方法和关键技术上指导保险公司的防灾减损工作。切实提高保险公司的经济效益。以深圳市为示范区,该系统在应用中取得了良好效果。     

Land Conversion for Suburban Housing: A Study of Urbanization Around Warsaw and Olsztyn,Poland

In Poland of the 1990s, urban demand for housing land around city agglomerations increased rapidly. The decreasing profitability of agricultural production also caused farmers to become interested in the sale of agricultural land for nonagricultural purposes, and new land legislation granted them the right to sell their land. Polish counties simultaneously received self-governing status, which allowed them to define the priorities for local development. Counties received additional responsibility for land management and quickly demonstrated strong support for land conversion, which was perceived as a factor of local development. This paper argues that decentralization and the extension of private control over land have led to a loss of rural landscapes in Poland because farmers, county governments, and rural society in general gained from the conversion of agricultural to housing land. Rapid urbanization has significantly reduced the availability of open space around cities and threatened valuable landscapes, for it has occurred in the absence of environmental safeguards. This paper reports findings from research in two counties, located in regions with diverse economic growth rates. Decentralization is particularly problematic if tax regulations and intergovernmental fiscal relations reward local authorities for urbanization but not environmental protection. Note: This version was published online in June 2005 with the cover date of August 2004.