Agricultural technology,wealth, and responsibility

Responsibility as a dual to human rights is presented as a moral alternative to extended, complex systems of animal and ecological rights. This simple idea of responsibility is then applied to four levels of agricultural technology: animal (nature) rights, conservation, organization of agriculture, and people versus planet relationships. The stewardship argument is freed from at least some of the complications of animal rights and ecology, but leaves responsibility with humans to do the right thing.The views expressed are the author's and do not necessarily represent policies or views of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.     

Utilitarian killing,replacement, and rights

The ethical theory underlying much of our treatment of animals in agriculture and research is the moral agency view. It is assumed that only moral agents, or persons, are worthy of maximal moral significance, and that farm and laboratory animals are not moral agents. However, this view also excludes human non-persons from the moral community. Utilitarianism, which bids us maximize the amount of good (utility) in the world, is an alternative ethical theory. Although it has many merits, including impartiality and the extension of moral concern to all sentient beings, it also appears to have many morally unacceptable implications. In particular, it appears to sanction the killing of innocents when utility would be maximized, including cases in which we would deliberately kill and replace a being, as we typically do to animals on farms and in laboratories. I consider a number of ingenious recent attempts by utilitarians to defeat the killing and replaceability arguments, including the attempt to make a place for genuine moral rights within a utilitarian framework. I conclude that utilitarians cannot escape the killing and replaceability objections. Those who reject the restrictive moral agency view and find they cannot accept utilitarianism's unsavory implications must look to a different ethical theory to guide their treatment of humans and non-humans.     

THE REGULATED RIPARIAN VERSION OF THE ASCE MODEL WATER CODE: THE THIRD WAY TO ALLOCATE WATER1

ABSTRACT: Lawyers, engineers, and hydrologists are accustomed to thinking of water law as falling into one of two incompatible models: riparian rights (under which water is allocated by courts according to the relative reasonableness of the competing uses) and appropriative rights (under which water is allocated according to the temporal priority of the competing uses, largely by the action of the water users themselves but perfected by the issuance of an administrative permit). Usually unnoticed is the existence of a third approach, which I have dubbed “regulated riparianism.” Under regulated riparianism, water is allocated by water permits issued after an administrative determination of the reasonableness of the proposed use before the use is commenced. This system, now in place in about half of the states east of Kansas City (plus Hawaii), thus is fundamentally different from either the traditional ripanan rights that it replaces or the appropriative rights found in western states.     

The Supreme Court,the commerce clause,and natural resources

The Supreme Court's interpretation of the commerce clause controls the balance of power between state and federal governments in the United States. An understanding of the relationship between the different government levels is essential for resource managers concerned with resource and environmental issues. This study examines selected Supreme Court decisions between 1976 and 1988 to answer three questions raised by the commerce clause: (1) Is the regulated item an article of commerce? (2) Do state laws burden interstate commerce? (3) Is federal commerce regulation limited? The balance of power among the justices and the commerce clause theories affecting the federal role in resource management are also examined. Since ratification of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has continuously increased federal power, but states have power to act independently as long as contradictory federal laws do not exist and state law does not impermissively affect commerce. If Congress regulates an individual's use of resources, their power is unquestioned. Future Court decisions will not significantly reduce the federal role in resource management even if the Court's membership changes. Even the supporters of states' rights on the Court realize increased federal power is a necessary part of the country's evolution. The purpose of the commerce clause is to create a national economic unit with free location principles. The Court supports this purpose today and will in the future.     

On the moral acceptability of killing animals

According to a rights view it is acceptable to kill animals if they are innocent threats or shields or are in a lifeboat situation. However, according to advocates of such a view, our practices of killing animals for food or scientific research may be morally unacceptable. In this paper we argue that, even if we grant the basic assumptions of a rights view, a good deal of killing of animals for food and scientific research continues to be morally acceptable.     

Biotechnology is not compatible with sustainable agriculture

Biotechnology increases commercialization of food production, which competes with food for home use. Most people in the world grow their own food, and are more secure without the mediation of the market. To the extent that biotechnology enhances market competitiveness, world food security will decrease. This instability will result in a greater gap between rich and poor, increasing poverty of women and children, less ability and incentive to protect the environment, and greater need for militarization to maintain order. Therefore, biotechnology should be discouraged. An active program to protect and strengthen local food production and to decrease reliance on industrial agriculture should be promoted.     

Obligations to animals are not necessarily based on rights

I offer a very qualified argument to the effect that rights are grounded in a certain sort of prejudice that privileges individualistic and perhaps masculinist ways of thinking about moral life. I also propose that we look carefully at other conceptions of social ontology and moral life, including the much discussed care conception.     

WATER MARKETS AND DECENTRALIZED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES1

ABSTRACT: Because of its importance and the perceived inability of private sector sources to meet water demands, many countries have depended on the public sector to provide water services for their populations. Yet this has resulted in many inefficient public water projects and in inadequate supplies of good quality and reliable water. Decentralization of water management, including the use of water markets, cannot solve all of these water problems, but it can improve the efficiency of water allocation. When given adequate responsibility and authority, water user associations have effectively taken over water management activities at a savings to tax payers. Moreover, water markets add the potential benefit of improving water efficiency within a sector as well as providing a mechanism for reallocating water among sectors. The key question involves developing innovative mechanisms for reducing the transaction costs of organizing water users and of making water trades. Water rights need to be established which are recorded, tradable, enforceable, and separate from land if markets are to operate effectively. Also, institutions are needed that effectively resolve conflicts over water rights, including third party impacts and water quality concerns.     

The use and abuse of scientific studies

In response to Evelyn Pluhar'sWho Can Be Morally Obligated to Be a Vegetarian? in this journal issue, the author has read all of Pluhar's citations for the accuracy of her claims and had these read by an independent nutritionist. Detailed analysis of Pluhar's argument shows that she attempts to make her case by consistent misappropriation of the findings and conclusions of the studies she cites. Pluhar makes sweeping generalizations from scanty data, ignores causal explanations given by scientists, equates hypothesis with fact, draws false cause conclusions from studies, and in one case claims a conclusion opposite of what the scientist published. Such poor reasoning cannot be the basis of an argument for moral vegetarianism. A broader search of the literature and attention to reviews and textbooks in nutrition shows that each of Pluhar's claims is suspect or incorrect. Pluhar has not undermined my central claims: even if animals have certain rights and well-planned vegetarian diets are safe in complex industrialized societies, these diets cannot be so regarded if the presuppositions of high levels of wealth, education, and medical care do not exist; and, women, children, the aged and some ill persons are at greater risk on restrictive vegan diets. Thus, any duty of moral vegetarianism is not categorical but provisional in nature.