焦化厂静电与防火防爆技术

从安全生产的角度出发,介绍了焦化厂的生产工序及设备概况;从固体、液体、粉体、气体和人体等五个方面讨论了静电的产生机理以及静电的危害性质;重点探讨了防范静电危害的技术措施,其中分析了静电火灾和爆炸事故发生的条件,并提出了静电危害的防护对策,主要包括:工艺控制法、泄漏法、接地法、中和电荷法、封闭消尖法、防人体静电法。     

钻井井喷失控因素分析及预防对策

井喷失控是钻井中的灾难性事故,有必要开展井喷失控研究,找到井喷失控发生的原因和提出防止井喷失控的对策。在统计分析1970年到2009年间中石油发生在钻进过程中的48例井喷失控事故的基础上,通过对防喷器、节流压井管汇、套管、井喷后爆炸起火等井喷失控因素分析,并利用MLS法对上述各种井喷失控因素危险值进行评估。最后,根据井喷失控因素分析和危险值评估结果,结合现有的钻井井控设计,提出了防止钻井井喷失控的对策。     

矿井通风网络复杂度与风机控制力量化计算

为了探究矿井通风网络复杂度与风机控制力的关系,提出分支关联度、最小距离、通风网络复杂度和风机控制力的概念。利用vCad2.0进行数字实验,对网络复杂度与风机控制力的关系进行定量研究。结果表明:随着网络复杂度的增加,矿井通风系统的有效风量率减小,且认为该值减小到60%时,视为风机控制力的极限,此时网络拓扑结构为风机所能控制的最大网络复杂度。地面集中供风时,同时工作的中段数量存在上限,最大值为7。将结论用于某有色金属矿进行实证研究,找出该矿深部中段通风困难的原因,为矿井进一步整改提供理论依据。     

纺织企业噪声职业危害风险评价及降噪措施

噪声是纺织业的主要职业危害之一。纺织企业生产车间的噪声不仅会影响到纺织生产的效率、工人的工作能力及安全,还会对纺织工人的健康造成危害,甚至导致职业病。以南方某纺织企业为研究对象,对其生产车间的噪声进行了调查测量,并采用职业病作业危害、职业接触风险评估二种评价方法,对该企业各生产工序的噪声职业危害进行风险评价,得出评价结论,从声源、声传播途径、个体防护及管理制度四个方面提出了降噪措施,以便更好地加强防治,预防减少噪声职业危害。     

珠江三角洲机动车排放控制措施协同效应分析

预测了2015年珠江三角洲机动车空气污染物和温室气体排放量,设计了6类单一控制、技术控制、结构控制以及综合控制措施的情景,并运用基准线年排放清单编制和协同效应坐标系法分析了污染物与温室气体减排的协同效应.结果表明,按目前机动车保有量增长趋势,2015年污染物和温室气体将以18%~120%的幅度增加;各控制措施下污染物和温室气体排放量均有下降,且均具有正向的协同效应,但减排的贡献差异较大.6类单一控制措施中淘汰黄标车和结构性控制措施分别对各污染物和温室气体的削减效果最明显,减排幅度均在40%以上,且正向协同效应突出,但相比其他措施,结构性控制措施实施难度大.     

日本琵琶湖污染源系统控制及其对我国湖泊治理的启示

琵琶湖富营养化全面有效的控制得益于对流域污染源的系统控制. 琵琶湖流域污染源系统控制包括通过立法与监管严格控制工厂与企业的污水排放、城镇污水管网与大型污水处理设施的高度覆盖、农业集落污水处理设施的全覆盖三部分,流域污水处理系统的全覆盖及高度处理技术的普及是其最为成功的经验之一. 琵琶湖流域城镇下水道普及率达86.4%,主要污染物——TN、TP及COD_Mn的去除率分别高达90.0%、98.7%及94.6%. 琵琶湖流域同时实施了净化槽普及、设置农业集落排水处理设施、初期雨水净化处理及农田循环灌溉等具有地方特色的面源治理对策. 通过综合治理,琵琶湖主要入湖污染负荷明显减少,与1985年相比,2012年COD_Mn点源污染负荷减少了76.8%,TN减少了45.5%,TP减少了65.6%. 与之比较,我国的湖泊治理存在的问题主要包括有针对性的地方排放标准的缺失及执法力度的不足、城镇污水深度处理及运营管理技术上的差距、面源污染对策的严重不足.      

Villains,victims, and heroes: Accounting for the roles human activity plays in LOPA scenarios

When a team is analyzing a LOPA scenario, the team needs to consider all three roles played by human interaction in the scenario: that of cause, as a result of human error; that of receptor, both in terms of safety impacts (inside the fence line) and community impacts (outside the fence line); and that of independent layer of protection (IPL), considering both administrative controls and human responses. Frequently, the nature of these three roles are inter-related, and setting guidance that is internally consistent is important to using LOPA to assess risk rather than as a means to game the analyses to simply achieve a wished-for result.A number of criteria have been proposed to quantify human involvement, typically as cause, as receptor, or as IPL. Establishing a framework to look at all three in a unified way is more likely to result in analyses that are consistent from scenario to scenario.This paper describes such a framework and presents it in a way that allows organizations to review their own criteria for quantifying human involvement in LOPA. It also examines some of the published LOPA criteria for human involvement and looks at them in terms of consistency of approach between evaluation of cause, receptor, and IPL. Finally the paper makes suggestions to use in calibrating LOPA methodologies to achieve consistent and believable results in terms of human interaction within and between scenarios that have worked for other organizations.     

Uncertainties in a risk management context in early phases of offshore petroleum field development

The current risk management approach for the Norwegian offshore petroleum industry came into effect in 2001 and has been stable with minor changes for 15 years. Relatively few new installations were slated for development until quite recently, and several new projects have been started in the last few years. The paper considers the risk management approach in the pre-FEED phase and builds on two case studies selected from the most recent cases. These case studies have been evaluated with respect to how uncertainties are considered in the early phase, based on the submission of the Plan for Development and Operation, their evaluations by authorities and the supporting documents. Both case studies involve new concepts for which there is no experience from similar environments and/or water depths. In spite of what could have been expected, the case studies conclude that uncertainties have not been in focus at all during concept development. This appears to be definitely the case for the licensees, but also to be the case for the authorities. Some suggestions are presented for what could have been considered by the licensees and authorities.     

Requirements for improved process hazard analysis (PHA) methods

In order to develop better process hazard analysis (PHA) approaches, weaknesses in current approaches first must be identified and understood. Criteria can then be developed that new and improved approaches must meet. Current PHA methods share common weaknesses such as their inability specifically to address multiple failures, their identification of worst-consequence rather than worst-risk scenarios, and their focus on individual parts of a process. There has been no comprehensive analysis of these systemic weaknesses in the literature. Weaknesses are identified and described in this paper to assist in the development of improved approaches. Knowledge of the weaknesses also allows PHA teams to compensate for them to the extent possible when performing studies.Key criteria to guide the development of improved methods are proposed and discussed. These criteria include a structure that facilitates meaningful brainstorming of scenarios, ease of understanding and application of the method by participants, ability to identify scenarios efficiently, completeness of scenario identification, exclusion of extraneous scenarios, ease of updating and revalidating studies, and ease of meeting regulatory requirements. Some proposals are made for moving forward with the development of improved methods including the semi-automation of studies and improvements in the training of team members.