Charity hazard—A real hazard to natural disaster insurance?

After the flooding in 2002 European governments provided billions of Euros of financial assistance to their citizens. Although there is no doubt that solidarity and some sort of assistance are reasonable, the question arises why these damages were not sufficiently insured. One explanation why individuals reject to obtain insurance cover against natural hazards is that they anticipate governmental and private aid. This problem became to be known as “charity hazard”. The present paper gives an economic analysis of the institutional arrangements on the market for natural disaster insurances focusing on imperfections caused by governmental financial relief. It provides a theoretical explanation why charity hazard is a problem on the market for natural disaster insurances, in the way that it acts as an obstacle for the proper diffusion and therefore the establishment of natural hazard insurances. This paper provides a review of the scientific discussion on charity hazard, provides a theoretical analysis and points out the existing empirical problems regarding this issue.     

FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS' ATTITUDES AND APPROACHES1

ABSTRACT: Methods of floodplain management are changing in the United States. There has been a gradual shift in emphasis from “flood control” to “management” of the floodplain. The complexities of multilevel governmental involvement in floodplain management demand an analysis of a new means to coordinate these efforts. It is the intent of this paper to discuss the role of the Corps of Engineers in this area and the problems the Corps has encountered in its endeavors. The occurrence of these problems indicates that there is a need to strengthen the federal role to ensure a comprehensive view of floodplain management.     

森林保险支付意愿及影响因素分析——基于异质性营林主体视角

基于期望效用函数理论分析了异质性营林主体的森林保险支付意愿及差异,并以传统小林农和新型林业经营主体为研究对象,以福建省382户传统小林农和88户新型林业经营主体的调研数据为基础,综合运用条件估值法、卡方检验及Cox比例风险模型,对异质性营林主体的森林保险支付意愿与差异及支付意愿影响因素进行对比与分析。研究表明：传统小林农和新型林业经营主体的森林保险意愿支付水平存在显著差异,在1000~2500元/亩保障水平下,传统小林农的意愿支付水平分别为1.911元/亩、2.941元/亩、3.532元/亩及3.979元/亩,新型林业经营主体为1.632元/亩、3.971元/亩、5.809元/亩及6.864元/亩;两类营林主体的支付意愿均随保额的提高而提高,但新型林业经营主体的提升幅度远高于小林农。异质性营林主体的森林保险支付意愿影响因素也存在明显差别,这与其在森林保险认知特征、林业生产经营特征、林业灾损特征、森林保险产品评价特征等方面存在显著差异有关。此外,林地面积对两类营林主体支付意愿均具有显著影响,规模化、集约化的林业生产经营可促进林业经营主体的森林保险愿意支付水平。     

试论中国环境投资的市场化运作

针对政府财政资金不能满足环境投资资金的短缺现象及环境投资的低效率，本文从国民经济的宏观层面分析中国环境投资市场化运作的必要性与可能性。结合现实中国环境投资市场化运作中政府、排污企业及金融企业在环境治理中存在的非市场行为。指出应规范政府、排污企业的环境投资行为，使其成为理性的环境投资主体，同时还应培育新的环境投资主体——环境投资公司。最终理源环境保护市场内部的关系。     

Theory and Model of Agricultural Insurance Subsidy

The issue of agricultural insurance subsidy is discussed in this paper aiming to make it provided more rationally and scientifically. It is started with the connection between agricultural insurance and financial subsidy. It is really necessary and crucial to implement the financial insurance due to the bad operational performance, especially in the developing countries. But the subsidy should be provided more rationally because financial subsidy has lots of negative effects. A model in competitive insurance markets developed by Ahsan et al （1982） and a farmers＇ decision model are developed to solve the optimal subsidized rate. Finally, the equation is got to calculate it. But a quantitative subsidized rate is not made here because the calculation should be under some restricted conditions, which are always absent in the developing countries. So the government should provide some subsidy for the ex ante research and preparation to get the scientific probability and premium rate.     

分洪区洪灾保险工作初探

本文从洪水过程的随机特点及防洪工作的实际需要等各个方面出发,阐述了在分洪区实行洪灾保险的必要性,结合国内外已有的实践经验,分析了这一工作得以顺利开展的可能性。并在此基础上,提出了二种洪灾保险费用计算方法,实例计算结果表明,这些方法是基本可行的。     

浅谈我国冰雹的分布规律及其保险对策

本文从冰雹灾害的分布规律着手,研究我国雹灾对策形式之一——雹灾保险,在对世界各国雹灾保险借鉴的基础上,选择我国雹灾保险的模式,建立适合我国国情的雹灾保险。     

浅议保险对企业安全监督管理之作用

通过开展适合于保险和安全监管工作的风险评估体系的研究,充分发挥保险于安全监管的作用,从而为降低职工、企业乃至全社会的风险水平,为经济的可持续发展和社会稳定提供必要的保证。     

试论推行特种设备事故责任强制保险的必要性

随着经济和社会的飞速发展,我国特种设备安全形势严峻,社会影响恶劣。我国现有特种设备责任保险,阻碍了责任保险功能的实现。本文在全面阐释特种设备事故责任强制保险基本问题的基础上提出,特种设备事故责任强制保险,具有转移特种设备相关单位的责任风险,及时、有效地使受害者获得赔付,预防事故的发生,维护社会稳定的作用,应当成为以市场化手段辅助特种设备安全监管的有效途径。     

Learning and climate feedbacks: Optimal climate insurance and fat tails

We study the effect of potentially severe climate change on optimal climate change policy, accounting for learning and uncertainty in the climate system. In particular, we test how fat upper tailed uncertainty over the temperature change from a doubling of greenhouse gases (the climate sensitivity), affects economic growth and emissions policy. In addition, we examine whether and how fast uncertainties could be diminished through Bayesian learning. Our results indicate that while overall learning is slow, the mass of the fat tail diminishes quickly, since observations near the mean provide evidence against fat tails. We denote as “tail learning” the case where the planner rejects high values of the climate sensitivity with high confidence, even though significant uncertainty remains. Fat tailed uncertainty without learning reduces current emissions by 38% relative to certainty, indicating significant climate insurance, or paying to limit emissions today to reduce the risk of very high temperature changes, is optimal. However, learning reduces climate insurance by about 50%. The optimal abatement policy is strongly influenced by the current state of knowledge, even though greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are difficult to reverse. Once the mass of the fat tail diminishes, the remaining uncertainty is largely irrelevant for optimal emissions policy.