Why social values cannot be changed for the sake of conservation

The hope for creating widespread change in social values has endured among conservation professionals since early calls by Aldo Leopold for a “land ethic.” However, there has been little serious attention in conservation to the fields of investigation that address values, how they are formed, and how they change. We introduce a social–ecological systems conceptual approach in which values are seen not only as motivational goals people hold but also as ideas that are deeply embedded in society's material culture, collective behaviors, traditions, and institutions. Values define and bind groups, organizations, and societies; serve an adaptive role; and are typically stable across generations. When abrupt value changes occur, they are in response to substantial alterations in the social–ecological context. Such changes build on prior value structures and do not result in complete replacement. Given this understanding of values, we conclude that deliberate efforts to orchestrate value shifts for conservation are unlikely to be effective. Instead, there is an urgent need for research on values with a multilevel and dynamic view that can inform innovative conservation strategies for working within existing value structures. New directions facilitated by a systems approach will enhance understanding of the role values play in shaping conservation challenges and improve management of the human component of conservation.     

A conceptual framework for understanding illegal killing of large carnivores

The growing complexity and global nature of wildlife poaching threaten the survival of many species worldwide and are outpacing conservation efforts. Here, we reviewed proximal and distal factors, both social and ecological, driving illegal killing or poaching of large carnivores at sites where it can potentially occur. Through this review, we developed a conceptual social–ecological system framework that ties together many of the factors influencing large carnivore poaching. Unlike most conservation action models, an important attribute of our framework is the integration of multiple factors related to both human motivations and animal vulnerability into feedbacks. We apply our framework to two case studies, tigers in Laos and wolverines in northern Sweden, to demonstrate its utility in disentangling some of the complex features of carnivore poaching that may have hindered effective responses to the current poaching crisis. Our framework offers a common platform to help guide future research on wildlife poaching feedbacks, which has hitherto been lacking, in order to effectively inform policy making and enforcement.     

The changing sociocultural context of wildlife conservation

We introduced a multilevel model of value shift to describe the changing social context of wildlife conservation. Our model depicts how cultural-level processes driven by modernization (e.g., increased wealth, education, and urbanization) affect changes in individual-level cognition that prompt a shift from domination to mutualism wildlife values. Domination values promote beliefs that wildlife should be used primarily to benefit humans, whereas mutualism values adopt a view that wildlife are part of one's social network and worthy of care and compassion. Such shifts create emergent effects (e.g., new interest groups) and challenges to wildlife management organizations (e.g., increased conflict) and dramatically alter the sociopolitical context of conservation decisions. Although this model is likely applicable to many modernized countries, we tested it with data from a 2017–2018 nationwide survey (mail and email panel) of 43,949 residents in the United States. We conducted hierarchical linear modeling and correlational analysis to examine relationships. Modernization variables had strong state-level effects on domination and mutualism. Higher levels of education, income, and urbanization were associated with higher percentages of mutualists and lower percentages of traditionalists, who have strong domination values. Values affected attitudes toward wildlife management challenges; for example, states with higher proportions of mutualists were less supportive of lethal control of wolves (Canis lupus) and had lower percentages of active hunters, who represent the traditional clientele of state wildlife agencies in the United States. We contend that agencies will need to embrace new strategies to engage and represent a growing segment of the public with mutualism values. Our model merits testing for application in other countries.     

Expert judgment and uncertainty regarding the protection of imperiled species

Decisions concerning the appropriate listing status of species under the U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA) can be controversial even among conservationists. These decisions may determine whether a species persists in the near term and have long‐lasting social and political ramifications. Given the ESA's mandate that such decisions be based on the best available science, it is important to examine what factors contribute to experts’ judgments concerning the listing of species. We examined how a variety of factors (such as risk perception, value orientations, and norms) influenced experts’ judgments concerning the appropriate listing status of the grizzly bear (Ursus arctos horribilis) population in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. Experts were invited to complete an online survey examining their perceptions of the threats grizzly bears face and their listing recommendation. Although experts’ assessments of the threats to this species were strongly correlated with their recommendations for listing status, this relationship did not exist when other cognitive factors were included in the model. Specifically, values related to human use of wildlife and norms (i.e., a respondent's expectation of peers’ assessments) were most influential in listing status recommendations. These results suggest that experts’ decisions about listing, like all human decisions, are subject to the use of heuristics (i.e., decision shortcuts). An understanding of how heuristics and related biases affect decisions under uncertainty can help inform decision making about threatened and endangered species and may be useful in designing effective processes for protection of imperiled species.     

Exploring nationality and social identity to explain attitudes toward conservation actions in the United States and Australia

Understanding human attitudes toward wildlife management is critical to implementing effective conservation action and policy. Understanding the factors that shape public attitudes toward different wildlife management actions is limited, however, which can result in unpredictable public responses to interventions. We drew on comparisons between residents of 2 countries on separate continents to explore differences in attitudes toward wildlife management and determine factors important in shaping these attitudes. We surveyed representative publics via market research panels in Australia (n = 881 respondents) and the United States (n = 1287). We applied a social-identity approach and demography to identify factors that explained variance between responses about wildlife management. We compared responses between countries overall and within subgroups of respondents who strongly identified as environmentalists, animal rights activists, wildlife conservation advocates, and farmers. We created aggregate scores for the management-related response items per respondent and used regression analyses to identify the relative importance of country, identity, age, and gender in explaining variance between responses. These factors accounted for 15.3% of variance among responses. Australians overall were generally more accepting of lethal wildlife management actions than U.S. respondents. Differences in national attitudes reflected differences between United States and Australian wildlife management and policy, highlighting the importance of understanding social attitudes in shaping conservation policy. Identifying as a farmer followed by identifying as an animal rights activist most shaped attitudes toward wildlife management. Identity-related conflicts could be initiated or exacerbated by conservation interventions that fail to consider identity-related processes.     

Emotion as a source of moral understanding in conservation

Recent debates around the meaning and implications of compassionate conservation suggest that some conservationists consider emotion a false and misleading basis for moral judgment and decision making. We trace these beliefs to a long-standing, gendered sociocultural convention and argue that the disparagement of emotion as a source of moral understanding is both empirically and morally problematic. According to the current scientific and philosophical understanding, reason and emotion are better understood as partners, rather than opposites. Nonetheless, the two have historically been seen as separate, with reason elevated in association with masculinity and emotion (especially nurturing emotion) dismissed or delegitimated in association with femininity. These associations can be situated in a broader, dualistic, and hierarchical logic used to maintain power for a dominant male (White, able-bodied, upper class, heterosexual) human class. We argue that emotion should be affirmed by conservationists for the novel and essential insights it contributes to conservation ethics. We consider the specific example of compassion and characterize it as an emotional experience of interdependence and shared vulnerability. This experience highlights conservationists’ responsibilities to individual beings, enhancing established and widely accepted beliefs that conservationists have a duty to protect populations, species, and ecosystems (or biodiversity). We argue compassion, thus understood, should be embraced as a core virtue of conservation.     

Evaluating whether nature's intrinsic value is an axiom of or anathema to conservation

That at least some aspects of nature possess intrinsic value is considered by some an axiom of conservation. Others consider nature's intrinsic value superfluous or anathema. This range of views among mainstream conservation professionals potentially threatens the foundation of conservation. One challenge in resolving this disparity is that disparaging portrayals of nature's intrinsic value appear rooted in misconceptions and unfounded presumptions about what it means to acknowledge nature's intrinsic value. That acknowledgment has been characterized as vacuous, misanthropic, of little practical consequence to conservation, adequately accommodated by economic valuation, and not widely accepted in society. We reviewed the philosophical basis for nature's intrinsic value and the implications for acknowledging that value. Our analysis is rooted to the notion that when something possesses intrinsic value it deserves to be treated with respect for what it is, with concern for its welfare or in a just manner. From this basis, one can only conclude that nature's intrinsic value is not a vacuous concept or adequately accommodated by economic valuation. Acknowledging nature's intrinsic value is not misanthropic because concern for nature's welfare (aside from its influence on human welfare) does not in any way preclude also being concerned for human welfare. The practical import of acknowledging nature's intrinsic value rises from recognizing all the objects of conservation concern (e.g., many endangered species) that offer little benefit to human welfare. Sociological and cultural evidence indicates the belief that at least some elements of nature possess intrinsic value is widespread in society. Our reasoning suggests the appropriateness of rejecting the assertion that nature's intrinsic value is anathema to conservation and accepting its role as an axiom. Evaluar si el Valor Intrínseco de la Naturaleza es un Axioma o un Anatema para la Conservación     

Effect of semantics in the study of tolerance for wolves

As conservation scholars increasingly recognize the critical role of human thought and behavior in determining the persistence of biodiversity across the globe, a growing line of inquiry regarding the validity and comparability of previous applications of core psychological concepts has emerged. Specifically, inconsistent measurement and use of terms, such as attitudes and acceptance, reveal important questions about previous approaches. Given that these concepts differ by definition, yet have been used interchangeably, we explored what drives differences in people's responses when each concept is operationalized in the context of a contested wildlife species, the gray wolf (Canis lupus). To do so, we used data from a 2014 survey of U.S. residents (n = 1287) to test how measures of six concepts (i.e., acceptance, attitudes, benefits, risks, [prior] behavior, and behavioral intentions) often employed in the conservation social sciences were related with a broad set of possible explanatory variables. Despite moderate to strong correlations between all concepts measured (| Pearson's r | = 0.39–0.65, p < 0.001), results revealed considerable variation in their respective relationships with identical explanatory variables. Specifically, although wildlife value orientation (i.e., domination or mutualism) operated fairly consistently across cognitive and behavioral concepts, the relationship between the six concepts and other factors, such as social trust, identification with various interest groups (i.e., hunter, farmer, or rancher, environmentalist, and animal rights advocate), and political ideology (i.e., liberal vs. conservative), varied considerably. Our findings underscore that differences exist in these measures, which could have serious implications for conservationists integrating social science findings in their decision-making processes if they are unaware of the theoretical underpinnings of and distinctions between core psychological concepts.