Climate change and crop diversity: farmers’ perceptions and adaptation on the Bolivian Altiplano

Crop diversity is central to traditional risk management practices on the Andean Altiplano and may find renewed importance in adapting to climate change. This study explored the role of crop diversity in farmers’ adaptation actions in eight Aymara communities on the northern Bolivian Altiplano. Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, including multifactor analysis and a community resilience self-assessment, we investigated how farmers’ use of diversity in adaptation is related to their perceptions of crop and variety tolerances and other environmental, social, and economic factors. Few crops and varieties were perceived as tolerant to increasingly intense and unpredictable drought, frost, hail, and pest and disease outbreaks. Some local crops and varieties were perceived as vulnerable to emerging conditions (e.g. oca, papalisa, isaño), whereas bitter potatoes and wild relatives of quinoa and cañahua were perceived as highly stress tolerant and provide food in harsh periods. A total 19% of households surveyed (N = 193) had introduced new crops or varieties—often disease resistant or early maturing—as an adaptive action. Introduction of commercial crops was a common adaptation action, reflecting farmers’ response to warming temperatures and changing economic opportunities, but greater sensitivity of the introduced crops may cause maladaptation. Despite intensification of cropping systems, households continue to maintain a median four potato varieties with different tolerance traits, yet this risk management practice was not perceived as adaptation. Strengthening resilience will require a combination of actions, including maintaining and expanding crop portfolios and restoring soil and ecosystem health, using both traditional and innovative approaches.     

Human Dignity and the Dignity of Creatures

In their report for the Swiss government onthe notion of the dignity of creatures, PhilippBalzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber analyzethe relationship between human dignity and the dignityof creatures, taking them as two categoricallydifferent concepts. Human dignity is defined as the``moral right not to be humiliated,' whereas thedignity of creatures is taken to be ``the inherentvalue of nonhuman living beings.' To my mind there isno need to draw a categorical distinction between thetwo concepts. Both notions could be brought togetherunder an all-encompassing concept of the inherentvalue of living beings, humans and non-humans alike,a concept one could name ``the dignity of livingbeings.' Indeed, this very notion underlies theposition taken in the report, although this is notmade explicit by the authors themselves.As the aim of the paper is only to clarify theconcepts used, I do not go beyond this ``internal'critique of their position, i.e., I don't assess howthe claims articulated via these concepts – theclaim that humans and/or creatures have an inherentvalue consisting in a supposed intrinsic good – areto be justified, although I myself would be ratherskeptical that this might be successfully done.     

Human dignity and the dignity of creatures

In their report for the Swiss government on the notion of the dignity of creatures, Philipp Balzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber analyze the relationship between human dignity and the dignity of creatures, taking them as two categorically different concepts. Human dignity is defined as the “moral right not to be humiliated,” whereas the dignity of creatures is taken to be “the inherent value of non-human living beings.” To my mind there is no need to draw a categorical distinction between the two concepts. Both notions could be brought together under an all-encompassing concept of the inherent value of living beings, humans and non-humans alike, a concept one could name “the dignity of living beings.” Indeed, this very notion underlies the position taken in the report, although this is not made explicit by the authors themselves. As the aim of the paper is only to clarify the concepts used, I do not go beyond this “internal” critique of their position, i.e., I don’t assess how the claims articulated via these concepts — the claim that humans and/or creatures have an inherent value consisting in a supposed intrinsic good — are to be justified, although I myself would be rather skeptical that this might be successfully done.