Mikrobielle Sanierung von 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluol (TNT) kontaminierten Böden

Within the limits of a feasability study abouton-site bioremediation methods for TNT-contaminated soils, composting was chosen as a very promising and cheap method. This method was critically compared with those described in the literature and was primarily rated under ecotoxicological aspects. The investigated location is the former munition plant «Tanne» in the aerea of Clausthal-Zellerfeld in Lower Saxony, Germany. To estimate the autochtonic microflora, we assessed the number of aerobic heterotrophic bacteria and determined their respiration activity in soils. In addition, we isolated bacteria and examined their capacity to metabolize TNTin vitro. Both the amount of autochtonic microrganisms (4.7×10⁸ to 1.2×10¹⁰ colony forming units (cfu)/kg dryweight) as well as their respiration activity did not correlate with the concentrations of nitrotoluenes in the soils. With high contaminated soil (20 g TNT/kg dry weight) we carried out a small compost in the range of 10 liters. During 28 days of composting TNT-concentration decrease over 90% and only minor amounts of monoaminodinitrotoluenes were generated. However, an acidic pretreatment of the compost material at the end of the reaction showed that TNT could be partially resolved under these extreme conditions and that an ecotoxicological risk may still exist. Possible changes in the realization of the composting process in order to make sure that the contaminants are savely bound to the humin matrix are discussed.     

The effects of parental altruism on the governance of family‐managed firms

We draw on the economic, corporate governance, and family business literatures to explain why the effects of family on family firms makes this governance form theoretically distinct from those of public and private non‐family firms. Our thesis is that parental altruism, when combined with private ownership and owner‐management, influences the ability of the firm's owner‐manager to exercise self‐control, which, in turn, can expose some family firms to conflicts rooted in the agency threats of moral hazard, hold‐up, and adverse selection. We then discuss why some other family firms are able to minimize these dark side threats and thereby attain altruism's brighter side. Finally, we discuss how altruism's influence changes over time as ownership becomes dispersed among family members and across generations. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.