Non-renewable resource prices: Deterministic or stochastic trends?

In this paper, we examine temporal properties of 11 natural resource real price series from 1870 to 1990. Recent studies by Ahrens and Sharma [Trends in natural resource commodity prices: deterministic or stochastic? J. Environ. Econom. Manage. 33(1997)59–74], Berck and Roberts [Natural resource prices: will they ever turn up? J. Environ. Econom. Manage. 31(1996)65–78], and Slade [Grade selection under uncertainty: least cost last and other anomalies, J. Environ. Econom. Manage. 15(1988)189–205], among others, find that many non-renewable resource prices have a stochastic trend. We revisit this issue by employing a Lagrangian multiplier unit root test that allows for two endogenously determined structural breaks with and without a quadratic trend. Contrary to previous research, we find evidence against the unit root hypothesis for all price series. Our findings support characterizing natural resource prices as stationary around deterministic trends with structural breaks. We additionally show that both pre-testing for unit roots with breaks and allowing for breaks in the forecast model can improve forecast accuracy. Overall, the results in this paper are important in both a positive and normative sense; without an appropriate understanding of the dynamics of a time series, empirical verification of theories, forecasting, and proper inference are potentially fruitless.     

Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players

This paper uses a dynamic model with asymmetric players to explore the question: In a second-best world, should environmental regulations for transboundary pollutants be carried out locally or centrally? We find that combined payoffs are larger with decentralized control if payoffs are sufficiently heterogeneous and initial pollution stocks are sufficiently small. This result is obtained because the central authority applies one shadow price to pollution (i.e., it uses uniform standards), whereas local authorities use different shadow prices, and therefore different standards.