The Impact of Unilateral Commitment on Transboundary Pollution

To reach a common target of environmental quality, countries can choose to commit to a stream of pollution abatement right from the beginning of the game or decide upon abatement at each moment of time. Though most of the previous literature studies homogeneous strategies where no country or all countries commit to a (same) predefined policy, reality goes along a different way: some countries make more efforts than others to reduce pollutant emission. The main novelty of this paper resides in the introduction of this kind of heterogeneous strategic behavior currently observed among large pollution nations. We find that the pollution level can be lower under heterogeneous than under homogeneous strategies. A stringent environmental quality target will induce the committed player to produce an abatement effort that more than compensates the free-riding attitude of the non-committed player.     

The U.S.-China Supply Competition for Rare Earth Elements: a Dynamic Game View

Environmental Modeling & Assessment - Rare earth elements govern today’s high-tech world and are deemed to be essential for the attainment of sustainable development goals. Since the...