Probabilistic risk assessment for long-range atmospheric transport of radionuclides

A simplified means of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for long-range atmospheric transport based on a K-diffusion model is presented. In a case study, model parameters are estimated by comparing with the results of long-range atmospheric dispersion model calculations using one-year numerical weather prediction model data. It is found that the estimated ensemble mean provides a reasonable first approximation to the total dry and wet deposition from the one-year continuous release.     

Atmospheric transport patterns and possible consequences for the European North after a nuclear accident

The main purpose of this study is to examine possible impacts and consequences of a hypothetical accident at the Kola nuclear plant in north-west Russia on different geographical regions: Scandinavia, central Europe, European FSU and Taymyr. The period studied is 1991-1996. An isentropic trajectory model has been used to calculate forward trajectories that originated over the nuclear accident region. Atmospheric transport patterns were identified using the isentropic trajectories and a cluster analysis technique. From the trajectory model results, a number of cases were chosen for examination in detail using more complete transport models. For this purpose, the models MATHEW/ADPIC, DERMA and a newly developed FOA Random Displacement Model have been used to simulate the radionuclide transport and contamination in the case of a nuclear accident and their results have been compared with those of the trajectory modelling. Estimation of the long-term consequences for populations after an accident has been performed for several specific dates by empirical models and correlation between fallout and doses to humans on the basis of the Chernobyl accident exposures in Scandinavia.     

Probabilistic indicators of atmospheric transport for regional monitoring and emergency preparedness systems

In this paper, following a methodology developed within the "Arctic Risk" Project of the Nordic Arctic Research Programme, several probabilistic indicators to evaluate the risk site possible impact on the geographical regions, territories, countries, counties, cities, etc., due to atmospheric transport from the risk site region were suggested. These indicators-maximum possible impact zone, maximum reaching distance, and typical transport time-were constructed by applying statistical methods and using a dataset of isentropic trajectories originated over the selected nuclear risk site (Ignalina nuclear power plant, Lithuania) during 1991-1996. For this site, the areas enclosed by isolines of the maximum possible impact zone and maximum reaching distance indicators are equal to 42 x 10(4) and 703 x 10(4) km(2), respectively. The maximum possible impact zone's boundaries are more extended in the southeast sector from the site and include, in particular, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, and several western regions of Russia. The maximum reaching distance's boundaries are twice more extended in the eastern direction from the site (reaching the Caspian Sea) compared with the western direction. The typical transport time to reach the southern territories of Sweden and Finland, northern regions of Ukraine, and northeast of Poland is 1 day. During this time, the atmospheric transport could typically occur over the Baltic States, Belarus, and western border regions of Russia, and central aquatoria of the Baltic Sea. Detailed analysis of temporal patterns for these indicators showed importance of the seasonal variability.     

Atmospheric transport pathways from the Bilibino nuclear power plant to Alaska

The Bilibino nuclear power plant (68°03′N, 166°20′E, 340 m asl) in northeastern Siberia is the closest Russian nuclear power plant to the USA. We used an isentropic trajectory model to estimate the probability that air in the Bilibino region would be transported to Alaska following a hypothetical accident. This estimate is based on the meteorological data from 1991 to 1995. Our calculations indicate that the probability that air in the Bilibino region will be transported to Alaska is approximately 6–16%, averaged over the entire year. This probability doubles in the summer and early fall with a maximum in August of 12–33%. For the entire year the mean, median, and minimum transport times from the plant to Alaska are 4, 3.5 and 1 d, respectively. Since rapid transport (1–2 d) could bring air parcels containing short-lived radionuclides, these events potentially represent the greatest risk to inhabitants of Alaska.