关于完善环境污染损害赔偿法律救济的思考

随着经济的飞速发展,环境污染的现象日益严重。目前我国解决环境污染损害赔偿责任纠纷的方式包括两种,即行政处理和诉讼解决。我国环境污染损害赔偿制度尚不完善。本文就完善环境污染损害赔偿法律救济提出具体建议,即修改、完善环境污染损害赔偿相关法律制度,使其适应经济和社会可持续发展的需要。     

Game theoretic analysis of environmental impact assessment system in China

Environmental impact assessment (EIA) system has been established in China since 1973. In present EIA cases, there are four participants in general: governments, enterprises, EIA organizations and the public. The public has held responsible for both social costs and social duties. The public supervises social costs produced by enterprises discharging pollutant in EIA. However public participation is mostly deputized by governments, which severely weaken the independence of the public as one participant in EIA. In this paper, EIA refers to the different attitudes of the participants whose optional strategies may be described by a proper game model. According to disfigurements in EIA, three sides (governments, enterprises, and EIA organizations) dynamic iterative game theory, dynamic game theory of incomplete information, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium theory to analyze the reciprocity relation among governments, EIA organizations and enterprises. The results show that in a short period, economic benefit is preponderant over social benefit. Governments and enterprises both do not want to take EIA to reveal social costs. EIA organizations’ income comes from enterprises and the collusions are built between them to vindicate economic benefit. In a long run, social benefit loss caused by environmental pollution must be recuperated sooner or later and environmental deterioration will influence the achievements of economic benefit, so both governments and enterprises are certain to pursue high social benefit and willing to take EIA, helpful to increase private benefit. EIA organizations will make fair assessment when their economic benefit are ensured. At present, the public as silent victims can not take actual part in EIA. The EIA system must be improved to break the present equilibrium of three sides, bringing the public to the equilibrium to exert public supervision.     

我国排污收费制度的缺陷及完善对策

我国现行排污收费制度存在的法律制度内部规定不统一，立法严重滞后，法律制度的内容不尽合理，有关规定不适应发展社会主义市场经济的需要，操作性不强等缺陷。尽快完善排污收费制度，必须，开征环境税和资源利用补偿费，建立污染物排放总量控制法律制度，实行排污产叫量收费或超总量收费；全面推行排污许可证制度，建立排污权交易市场，允许排污许可证有偿转让；提高收费标准，逐步实现全额收费；加强排污收费监督管理，完善排污收     

协定水污染物间接排放标准的法律问题探究

以协商的方式确定水污染物间接排放标准的规定打破了人们对标准确定性、强制性的传统认识。协定标准的优势在于充分利用污水处理厂的污水处理能力,减轻企业的污水处理负担,使企业可以集中力量搞生产。协定标准具有灵活性和优越性,应充分利用。通过对协定标准概念和重要性的分析,指出协定标准存在效力不确定、缺少对协定范围的限制等问题,造成协定标准在实践中通常被忽视或者滥用。并从明确协定标准的范围、加强排污企业的管理和协定标准的监督等方面,进一步提出了限制和完善水污染物间接排放标准的建议。     

重庆灰霾治理试点工作中的政企动态博弈分析

针对重庆市挥发性有机物整治试点工作中面临的与企业博弈的实际问题,设定模型边界条件,建立基于完全信息的动态博弈分析模型,通过逆推归纳法分析博弈不同阶段下参与企业与政府的理性策略选择,求解此完全信息动态博弈模型的子博弈精炼纳什均衡并获得该情况下的博弈双方最终支付。研究表明,提高“许诺的可信性”和“威胁的可信性”是动态博弈的核心问题,通过交出决定权、切断沟通等多种方式可破解VOC试点博弈僵局。     

完善我国农村金融体系的几点思考

完善农村金融体系以最终形成一个完善、高效、健全、符合农村经济发展特点的农村金融体系是我国农村金融改革与发展的重要内容,也是发挥金融对于经济发展促进作用的重要前提。针对当前农村金融体系建设中存在的问题,要继续完善农村金融体系,保证各金融机构各司其职,发挥其各自在农村金融市场中的职能作用;调动与发挥各方的积极性与主动性,完善农村金融生态环境：完善相关法律制度。     

促进循环经济发展的税收对策

循环经济是一种全新的经济模式，它关注的是资源减量、循环及再利用的问题。通过对国外为实现循环型经济所采取的税收政策的比较，分析我国目前在该领域采取的措施和存在的问题。并根据我国的实际情况，提出了促进发展循环经济的税收对策。     

中国环境影响评价制度四方信号博弈分析

针对中国环境影响评价执行率逐步提高的同时,环境质量却持续恶化的现状,从环境经济学的理论出发,揭示了参与方之间的关系是由其经济关系决定的,取决于参与方之间的交易成本和经济收益.选用经典博弈论中的信号博弈模型对中国的环评过程进行描述,分析参与四方(政府、企业、环评单位、公众)的行动,得出博弈均衡解,按照博弈的转化条件,获得将现有均衡转变为最优均衡状态的博弈方法.分析发现,模型存在2个均衡解.目前的环境影响评价处在片面追求经济收益的状态,而追求经济和环境保护协调发展的状态,显然更符合社会发展的要求.在将公众作为参与方加入到模型后,通过计算模型总收益和总成本的变化,表明完善的公众参与体制可以实现模型均衡转化的目标.     

Time perspective and climate change policy

The tendency to foreshorten time units as we peer further into the future provides an explanation for hyperbolic discounting at an inter-generational time scale. We study implications of hyperbolic discounting for climate change policy, when the probability of a climate-induced catastrophe depends on the stock of greenhouse gasses. We characterize the set of Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) of the inter-generational game amongst a succession of policymakers. Each policymaker reflects her generation's preferences, including its hyperbolic discounting. For a binary action game, we compare the MPE set to a “restricted commitment” benchmark. We compare the associated “constant-equivalent discount rates” and the willingness to pay to control climate change with assumptions and recommendations in the Stern Review on Climate Change.“…My picture of the world is drawn in perspective…. I apply my perspective not merely to space but also to time”—Ramsey.     

水样预处理监控考核机制尚待完善问题的探讨

本文针对水样预处理质量方面存在的问题，通过对样品考核与例行监测在预处理过程中存在的差异进行分析，指出目前使用的考核样品与预处理关系松散，不利于预处理质量的提高。从而提出了建立完善水样预处理监控考核机制，提高预处理质量的措施建议。