Design principles in commons science: A response to “Ostrom,Hardin and the commons” (Araral)

Within the literature on common-pool resource management, one of the primary methodologies used is the meta-analysis of case studies, due to the difficulties of otherwise producing large-n datasets that span multiple systems. In this paper we respond to a critique of a previous meta-analysis that we have conducted, in which we evaluated Elinor Ostrom’s institutional design principles. Within our response we correct what we perceive to be factual errors contained in this critique, but more importantly we try to use this opportunity to re-evaluate our own work and expand this evaluation to the seminal work of Elinor Ostrom and the research program on common-pool resource management. We find that the original critique highlighted several important points, primarily the challenge of unpacking complex variable relationships and the conflation of diverse outcomes, and we discuss how these are challenges for the larger commons field. We conclude with some comments on how to move forward to confront these challenges.     

What’s missing from Ostrom? Combining design principles with the theory of sociocultural viability

Since 1990, Elinor Ostrom’s design principles for common property resource (CPR) institutions have been highly influential, offering a counter to pessimistic arguments about resource users’ prospects of cooperating to manage CPRs sustainably. However, the theoretical underpinnings of Ostrom’s theory have been criticised: as unfairly negative towards macro-level interventions; as utilising an overly narrow conceptualisation of rationality; and under appreciative of the role of power. These criticisms are examined using insights drawn from the theory of sociocultural viability (cultural theory, for short), a theory of plural rationality related to context. Utilising the case of Faroese whaling, the research aim is to assess the extent that cultural theory ameliorates criticisms laid at Ostrom’s design principles. It finds that Ostrom’s research trajectory was reaching the limits of methodological individualism’s ability to grasp rational behaviour and suggests the design principles may in effect be integrated with cultural theory.     

‘Enclosing country park land and the conservation of military heritage:’ an Ostromian interpretation of the fools’ paradise

British colonial military heritage structures in Hong Kong are in a state of ruin and government neglect. Urgent attention is required in the form of active management to avoid the loss of valuable heritage resources and the negative impact on the landscape and environment. This paper explores two possible alternatives – user participation and social entrepreneur participation – to achieve innovative solutions to rent dissipation of these structures situated in isolated areas within protected-area boundaries, with a focus on a specific case. Emphasis is placed on fostering public participation, involving the allocation of some property rights. Elinor Ostrom's diagnostic approach to common-pool resource problems is applied to both solutions to determine the conditions necessary to achieve the objectives. The discussions are informed by social entrepreneurship principles and a version of the Coase Theorem, the latter coinciding with Ostrom's view regarding the role of property rights in achieving sustainable outcomes.     

Conservation needs exposed by variability in common-pool governance principles

Common-pool governance principles are becoming increasingly important tools for natural resource management with communities and comanagement arrangements. Effectiveness of these principles depends on variability in agreements, trust, and adherence to institutional norms. We evaluated heterogeneity in governance principles by asking 449 people in 30 fishing communities in 4 East African countries to rate their effectiveness. The influences of individuals, their membership and role in stakeholder community groups, leadership, community, and country were tested. The membership and role of people were not the main influence on their perceptions of the effectiveness of governance principles. Therefore, drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of specific principles would be difficult to make independent of the individuals asked. More critical were individuals’ nationalities and their associations with the shared perceptions of a response-group's effectiveness of each principle. Perceptions of effectiveness differed strongly by country, and respondents from poor nations (Madagascar and Mozambique) were more cohesiveness but had fewer and weaker between-community conflict-resolution mechanisms. Overall, group identity, group autonomy, decision-making process, and conflict resolution principles were perceived to be most effective and likely to be enforced by repeated low-cost intragroup activities. Graduated sanctions, cost–benefit sharing, and monitoring resource users, fisheries, and ecology were the least scaled principles and less affordable via local control. We suggest these 2 groups of principles form independently and, as economies develop and natural resources become limiting, sustainability increasingly depends on the later principles. Therefore, management effectiveness in resource-limited situations depends on distributing power, skills, and costs beyond fishing communities to insure conservation needs are met.