Foresty offsets in emissions trading systems: a link between systems?

An important aspect in the linking of different emissions trading schemes is the degree to which these systems allow (or ban) external offset project categories. The EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) currently allows the use of credits from energy and industry projects developed under the Kyoto Protocol’s Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) but excludes the use of carbon credits from forestry projects for compliance in the EU ETS. Forestry credits generated by the CDM have a limited lifetime and expire at the end of a project’s crediting period, or earlier if the carbon stock for which the credits have been issued ceases to exist. According to the recently adopted amendment of the EU ETS Directive forestry credits will remain to be excluded until 2020. The present article reviews how the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (Australia), the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (US) and the voluntary scheme of the Chicago Climate Exchange integrate forestry offsets into the respective system and how they deal with the risk of losing stored and credited biomass. By comparing the results of different scenarios this article shows how differences in the treatment of forestry offsets could impact the efforts to link various emission trading systems in future.

A ton is not always a ton: A road-test of landfill,manure, and afforestation/reforestation offset protocols in the U.S. carbon market

The outcome of recent international climate negotiations suggests we are headed toward a more fragmented carbon market, with multiple emission trading and offset programs operating in parallel. To effectively harmonize and link across programs, it will be important to ensure that across offset programs and protocols that a “ton is a ton”. In this article, we consider how sample offsets projects in the U.S. carbon market are treated across protocols from five programs: the Clean Development Mechanism, Climate Action Reserve, Chicago Climate Exchange, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and the U.S. EPA's former program, Climate Leaders. We find that differences among protocols for landfill methane, manure management, and afforestation/reforestation project types in accounting boundary definitions, baseline setting methods, measurement rules, emission factors, and discounts lead to differences in offsets credited that are often significant (e.g. greater than 50%). We suggest opportunities for modification and harmonization of protocols that can improve offset quality and credibility and enhance prospects for future linking of trading units and systems.     

Cap-and-trade properties under different hybrid scheme designs

This paper examines the key design mechanisms of existing and proposed cap-and-trade markets. First, it is shown that the hybrid systems under investigation (price floor using a minimum price guarantee, price collar, allowance reserve, options offered by the regulator, and offset relaxation) can be decomposed into a combination of an ordinary cap-and-trade scheme with European- or American-style call and put options. Then, we quantify and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed hybrid schemes by investigating whether pre-set objectives (enforcement of permit price bounds and reduction of the compliance costs for relevant companies) can be accomplished while maintaining the original environmental targets. Plain vanilla options are proposed as an alternative that reconciles the otherwise conflicting policy objectives.     

Baseline requirements can hinder trades in water quality trading programs: Evidence from the Conestoga watershed

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) are promoting point/nonpoint trading as a way of reducing the costs of meeting water quality goals. Farms can create offsets by implementing management practices such as conservation tillage, nutrient management and buffer strips. To be eligible to sell offsets or credits, farmers must first comply with baseline requirements. USEPA guidance recommends that the baseline for nonpoint sources be management practices that are consistent with the water quality goal. A farmer would not be able to create offsets until the minimum practice standards are met. An alternative baseline is those practices being implemented at the time the trading program starts, or when the farmer enters the program. The selection of the baseline affects the efficiency and equity of the trading program. It has major implications for which farmers benefit from trading, the cost of nonpoint source offsets, and ultimately the number of offsets that nonpoint sources can sell to regulated point sources. We use a simple model of the average profit-maximizing dairy farmer operating in the Conestoga watershed in Pennsylvania to evaluate the implications of baseline requirements on the cost and quantity of offsets that can be produced for sale in a water quality trading market, and which farmers benefit most from trading.