Cross-Boundary Coordination on Forested Landscapes: Investigating Alternatives for Implementation

Cross-boundary coordination is a tool for ecosystem management whereby landowners voluntarily coordinate management practices toward economic and/or ecological landscape-scale outcomes (e.g., fiber, invasive species control, habitat). Past research indicates that it may be particularly applicable on landscapes that include small forest landholdings. To explore alternatives by which coordination might occur, we conducted seven focus groups with landowners (n = 51) who actively manage their forests in southwest Wisconsin and northeast Iowa. Focus group participants were presented with three hypothetical alternatives to coordinate with their neighbors; landowners could self-organize, work with a natural resource professional (i.e., forester), or work with an organization to complete a cross-boundary practice. In this article, we focus on the latter two alternatives and the role of two social theories—principal-agent and cooperation—in explaining landowners’ evaluations of these alternatives. Key findings are that (1) cross-boundary coordination has the potential to alleviate problems between landowners and resource professionals inherent to their typical working relationship, and (2) social relationships are a major factor contributing to landowners’ willingness to participate. We posit that cross-boundary coordination offers a non-economic incentive for landowners to work together as it may reduce the uncertainty associated with hiring a resource professional. At the same time, professionals can provide a bridging function among landowners who are unacquainted. To achieve these outcomes and expand the adoption of cross-boundary coordination, we suggest four guidelines. First, foster dialogue among landowners toward shared cognition and oversight. Second, match landowners’ practices and objectives such that there are clear benefits to all. Third, develop relationships through low risk activities where possible. Fourth, do not expect on-going commitments.

代理问题和企业制度变迁

本文运用制度变迁理论从委托代理关系-两个方面(代理成本和代理收益)对企业制变迁进行较为深入的分析,并对当前我国国有企业如何防范代理问题提出了几点建议.     

根据现代企业理论探讨煤炭企业安全管理问题

煤炭行业属于高危险性行业,降低其事故发生率,提高安全生产水平是煤炭工作者孜孜以求的目标。笔者应用委托——代理理论对煤炭安全管理问题进行探讨,分析了安全投入与安全水平、安全投入与安全报酬、事故赔偿与安全水平等之间的关系,提出了煤炭企业改善安全现状的管理对策及建议,并认为事故赔偿金过低,不足以对企业形成足够的压力,不利于企业主动提高安全水平,应加大惩罚力度,提高惩罚成本和惩处率。     

基于运输代理制的运输企业合作关系风险分析

研究运输代理制下运输代理企业和运输企业合作风险问题,既能从实践上,明晰双方的风险分担机制,从而解决双方的利益分配问题,又能从理论上,充实运输代理制有关理论的研究。笔者从委托-代理关系角度,在分析运输代理企业和运输企业之间的合作关系特点的基础上,指出了合作中存在的风险及其产生的原因,并利用委托-代理理论建立了运输产出不确定情况下的委托代理数学模型;分析了合作中双方风险分担的条件及措施,同时讨论了与之对应的最优报酬合同和剩余索取权问题,并给出了具有现实指导意义的几个新的观点。利用信息经济学的委托-代理理论,研究运输代理与运输企业之间合作关系中的风险问题,这是方法应用上的创新。