Challenges to liberalism: The case of Australian energy policy

This paper considers liberal and nationalist economic policy approaches to the ownership and development of Australian energy resources (oil, gas, coal and uranium). In the two decades prior to 1983, Australia pursued economic policies in relation to its energy resources which could broadly be described as ‘nationalist’. Governments of the day intervened in development decisions in an effort to enhance the ‘national interest’. From 1983, along with the deregulation of the Australian economy as a whole, policy relating to energy resources was liberalised. Development of energy reserves henceforth occurred according to the dictates of the market. This paper argues that recent Australian energy policy initiatives reflect an increase in nationalist influences and a retreat from the liberalisation agenda that dominated energy policy making in the 1980s and 1990s. Three examples are discussed where policy has been influenced by a nationalist framework: (1) the domestic gas reservation policy in Western Australia; (2) Australian government efforts to promote a ‘value adding’ nuclear processing industry and (3) Australian Labor Party policy giving preferential financial incentives for gas to liquids projects. The re-emergence of nationalism in Australia is occurring either because policy makers now favour it as a path to energy security or in some cases because they believe that appeals to nationalism will generate political support.     

The advent of liberalism and the subordination of agrarian thought in the United States

This essay contends that the ascendancy of Western liberalism after the Enlightenment worked catalytically on the development of both the Industrial Revolution and a modern agrarianism based on the widespread dispersal of small-scale property ownership. Due to power dynamics, however, as well as the liberal faith in inevitable progress, agrarian thought has remained a marginal concern in Western politics, economics, and education. Although the agrarian philosophical tradition in the United States was created by the same liberal rhetoric and argumentation that gave birth to industrialism, the two world views hinged on vastly different interpretations of the same concepts. One aim of this essay is to sort out these differences and examine their implications for a contemporary reconsideration of agrarian thought.     

The Political Import of Intrinsic Objections to Genetically Engineered Food

Many people object to genetically engineerehd (GE) food because they believe that it is unnatural or that its creation amounts to playing God. These objections are often referred to as intrinsic objections, and they have been widely criticized in the agricultural bioethics literature as being unsound, incompatible with modern science, religious, inchoate, and based on emotion instead of reason. Many of their critics also argue that even if these objections did have some merit as ethicalobjections, their quasi-religious nature means that they are entirely irrelevant when interpreted aspolitical objections regarding what public policy ought to be. In this paper, we argue that this widespread view is false. Intrinsic objections have much more political import than has previously been recognized, and indeed the requirements of political liberalism and its associated idea of liberal neutrality, once properly understood, protect intrinsic objections from many of the most common objections. That is, policy-makers may not legitimately base public policy on grounds that are inconsistent with intrinsic objections, even when they believe those objections to be flawed in the ways mentioned above. This means that in the context of a political debate about GE food, the discussion should not center on the substantive merits of the intrinsic objections themselves but rather on the appropriate political norms for achieving democratically legitimate policy on issues that touch people’s deepest religious and moral beliefs.     

The Moral Foundation of the Precautionary Principle

The Commission's recentinterpretation of the Precautionary Principleis used as starting point for an analysis ofthe moral foundation of this principle. ThePrecautionary Principle is shown to have theethical status of an amendment to a liberalprinciple to the effect that a state only mayrestrict a person's actions in order to preventunacceptable harm to others. The amendmentallows for restrictions being justified even incases where there is no conclusive scientificevidence for the risk of harmful effects.However, the liberal tradition has seriousproblems in determining when a risk of harm isunacceptable. Nevertheless, reasonable liberalarguments in favor of precaution can be basedon considerations of irreversible harm andgeneral fear of harm. But it is unclear whenthere considerations can be overridden.Within the liberal framework, the Commissionadvocates a so-called proportional version ofthe Precautionary Principle. This should beclearly distinguished from a welfare-basedapproach to precaution based on risk-aversiveweighing up of expected costs and benefits.However, in the last resort, the Commissiondoes seem to make a covert appeal to suchconsiderations.