WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF TUBEWELL IRRIGATION IN BANGLADESH1

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates and estimates the welfare loss due to monopoly in tubewell irrigation water market in Bangladesh. In this context, an attempt has been made to evaluate the efficacy of the landless irrigation groups. Using cross-sectional data and regression analysis, cost and demand functions for irrigation water are estimated. The study demonstrates the relatively superior performance of the landless groups in terms of economic efficiency in shallow tubewell irrigation operation, in comparison to irrigation operation by the landowners.     

关于Ramsey模型及其改进的研究和启示

缺水已经成为我国经济发展和社会进步的重要制约因素之一．而对水价的制定到对水资源的利用效率起科十分关键的作用。本文通过对Ramsey模型及其改进的研究．得出如下启示．即实行阶梯水价既有利于实现杜会福利的优化，也可以起到节约水资源的效果。由于阶梯水价机制的设计可以为制度安排、资本进入和市场运行提供更大的弹性空间．因此．本文的政策含义是：在实施阶梯水价的背景下．政府只需对基量水价按边际成本的定价原则来严格规制．从而有效提升水务市场的运行效率。上述举措的优点在于：由于基量水价被严格规制．消费者的基本用水福利可以得到满足；超过基本用水量的水价和再生水价的相对放松规制会鼓励社会资本进入水务行业．使行业运营效率得到提高；国有资本退出水务行业使得政府财政负担减轻，同时．由于放松规制．政府的规制成本也得以降低。最终城市水务行业可以真正做到可持续的发展。     

Refuting the paradigm of water services privatisation

The aim of this article is to question the fundamental assumptions behind privatisation and public–private partnerships. The article shows that instead of radically increasing private sector involvement, public sector reforms should be seriously considered. Public–private partnerships should be implemented so that the strengths of all the stakeholders may be fully utilised.     

水权制度选择理论——基于交易成本、租值消散的研究

水资源配置大致存在完全政府配置、完全市场配置和准市场配置3种模式。中国正处于水权制度改革的过程中,水资源配置制度有从完全政府配置转向依靠市场配置的趋势。新制度经济学的交易成本理论和租值消散理论可以为新的水权制度的设计和选择提供依据。水资源的不同配置制度对应着相应的交易成本,相对较好的制度应该能在扣除交易成本之后获得较多的社会净租值。目前我国水资源管理的当务之急是根据经济理性,科学地界定好水资源的公有和私有权利,并由完全政府管制向市场体制转型。     

The role of the CMEA's foreign trade monopolies in mineral markets

The business rationality of the CMEA mineral traders is bound by several characteristics of mineral production under central planning and by the mechanics of foreign trade monopoly. These characteristics include aspects such as: priority of national economic goals over trading strategies of the Foreign Trade Organisations (FTOs) in Eastern Europe; balance-of-payment problems; the organizational complexities and the weakness of the incentive mechanism, as well as the lack of an appropriate performance criterion. It is suggested that the 30 mineral trading FTOs in the CMEA tend to perform in a manner comparable to marketing departments of the Western mineral industries but are at a clear disadvantage when compared with ‘stand alone’ Western intermediaries making profits through risk taking and abhoring bureaucracy and rigidity in management.