排污权交易市场中具有激励相容性的双边拍卖机制

针对排污权交易市场的交易机制设计问题,描述了多个排污权出售方和购买方治污量和产量的最优决策问题,基于单边拍卖的缺点,设计出了一个激励相容的双边拍卖机制.结果表明,此机制在描述排污权交易市场竞价规则的基础上,设计出了符合排污权市场特点的出清和交易规则,不仅能保证排污权交易市场实时出清,使理性的企业披露自己真实的治污成本,而且能够使污染物平均处理成本低的企业承担更多的处理量,达到了社会治污成本最小化.最后通过算例验证了该机制的有效性和实用性.     

消费者对不同层次安全信息可追溯猪肉的支付意愿研究

为满足消费者猪肉安全需求,防范猪肉的安全风险,国家商务部等从2010年开始分批选择若干个城市实施肉类可追溯体系.可追溯猪肉能否有效推广内在地取决于消费者的支付意愿.本文基于随机n价实验拍卖方法,对江苏无锡市区272位消费者对具有不同层次安全信息的三种类型可追溯猪肉的支付意愿进行了研究,结果表明,参与者愿意为具有可追溯属性的猪后腿肉支付一定的溢价,且对具有养殖信息与政府认证信息的可追溯猪后腿肉具有更高的支付意愿;而进一步运用MVP模型的研究证实,消费者对三种不同层次安全信息属性的可追溯猪后腿肉的偏好具有差异性.因此,政府完善猪肉可追溯体系并与政府认证机制相结合是满足消费者对不同层次安全信息的可追溯猪肉的市场需求,促进可追溯食品推广普及的重要路径.     

A Revealed Preference Approach to Estimating Supply Curves for Ecosystem Services: Use of Auctions to Set Payments for Soil Erosion Control in Indonesia

Abstract:  To supply ecosystem services, private landholders incur costs. Knowledge of these costs is critical for the design of conservation-payment programs. Estimating these costs accurately is difficult because the minimum acceptable payment to a potential supplier is private information. We describe how an auction of payment contracts can be designed to elicit this information during the design phase of a conservation-payment program. With an estimate of the ecosystem-service supply curve from a pilot auction, conservation planners can explore the financial, ecological, and socioeconomic consequences of alternative scaled-up programs. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in Indonesia, where soil erosion on coffee farms generates downstream ecological and economic costs. Bid data from a small-scale, uniform-price auction for soil-conservation contracts allowed estimates of the costs of a scaled-up program, the gain from integrating biophysical and economic data to target contracts, and the trade-offs between poverty alleviation and supply of ecosystem services. Our study illustrates an auction-based approach to revealing private information about the costs of supplying ecosystem services. Such information can improve the design of programs devised to protect and enhance ecosystem services.     

温室气体排放配额初始分配的域外考察

从欧盟、英国和美国的立法实践来看,排放配额的初始分配在排放权交易计划实施的初期基本上以无偿分配为主、有偿分配为辅。从排放配额的财产权性质、温室气体排放活动的负外部性以及分配的公平和效率等方面来看,排放配额的初始分配应当采取有偿分配方式。     

基于最优拍卖数量和资金再分配模型的碳市场有偿分配机制研究

拍卖作为一种有偿分配机制已经确立为我国碳市场配额分配的基本方式之一,而拍卖机制的灵活运用以及与市场运行之间的关系也成为实践中亟待解决的难题。传统的排放权拍卖理论以政府收入最大化作为目标函数,并没有将企业预算和交易策略纳入到分析框架中,同时对于拍卖收入资金的再分配方法缺乏可行的指导。本文将企业的成本约束(或预算)作为一个因素引入,提出了最优拍卖数量模型以及基于双重红利思想的资金再分配模型。分析表明最优拍卖数量由企业的边际减排成本和二级市场弹性系数决定,二级市场弹性系数则取决于排放的不确定性水平;边际减排成本越高的企业,其承受的拍卖成本随着拍卖价格增长越快,这可能导致减排空间小的企业承担的拍卖成本增长过高,从而产生不公平问题,因此本文提出了一种基于多轮竞价的资金分配策略,根据企业参加拍卖的投标情况间接评估企业的边际减排成本水平,并制定相应的补贴标准。最后以广东碳市场为例,从市场结构、履约成本、市场价格三个方面深入讨论了拍卖对碳市场的影响以及最优参数的选择策略。广东的经验为拍卖机制的引入提供了良好的建议:在二级市场流动性不足,价格发现能力较弱的情况下,引入拍卖机制可以快速建立一级市场的价格发现机制;由于历史法的不可靠,拍卖会将履约成本分配不合理的问题进一步放大,加剧市场的不公平问题,甚至出现劣币驱逐良币的现象,但拍卖收入资金的循环利用可以在一定程度上纠正这一问题;短期内拍卖底价是政府建立市场预期的辅助工具,是在二级市场供求关系尚未建立时的一种过渡手段,但从长期来看随着二级市场的成熟,底价政策应该逐渐放松或退出,建立起一级市场价格与二级市场价格联动的定价机制。     

Generating spatially optimized habitat in a trade‐off between social optimality and budget efficiency

Auctions have been proposed as alternatives to payments for environmental services when spatial interactions and costs are better known to landowners than to the conservation agency (asymmetric information). Recently, an auction scheme was proposed that delivers optimal conservation in the sense that social welfare is maximized. I examined the social welfare and the budget efficiency delivered by this scheme, where social welfare represents the difference between the monetized ecological benefit and the conservation cost incurred to the landowners and budget efficiency is defined as maximizing the ecological benefit for a given conservation budget. For the analysis, I considered a stylized landscape with land patches that can be used for agriculture or conservation. The ecological benefit was measured by an objective function that increases with increasing number and spatial aggregation of conserved land patches. I compared the social welfare and the budget efficiency of the auction scheme with an agglomeration payment, a policy scheme that considers spatial interactions and that was proposed recently. The auction delivered a higher level of social welfare than the agglomeration payment. However, the agglomeration payment was more efficient budgetarily than the auction, so the comparative performances of the 2 schemes depended on the chosen policy criterion–social welfare or budget efficiency. Both policy criteria are relevant for conservation. Which one should be chosen depends on the problem at hand, for example, whether social preferences should be taken into account in the decision of how much money to invest in conservation or whether the available conservation budget is strictly limited.     

全国碳市场引入配额拍卖机制的经济影响 ——基于CGE模型的分析

基于电力部门细分的CGE模型,针对碳配额分配中有偿拍卖的引入、是否配套实施碳税政策以及碳减排目标设定等关键机制问题,设置了差异化的政策情景,模拟分析了不同机制设计对碳市场及宏观经济带来的影响.研究发现:全国碳市场引入配额拍卖机制有助于降低碳交易价格、促进我国碳市场总体规模扩大并激发碳市场活力,高碳行业将成为碳配额拍卖市...     

水市场双边叫价贝叶斯博弈模型及机制设计研究

通过水权交易提高水资源的使用效率和配置效率,实现水资源最优配置。水权和水市场理论研究是水资源可持续利用的重要研究课题,而水权交易模型是水市场理论与实践中水权交易的核心。针对水权交易市场最常见的双边交易,采用双边拍卖的交易模式,通过对水权交易市场的双边交易进行描述分析,建立了水权交易买卖双方叫价拍卖的不完全信息博弈模型,给出双方叫价拍卖的机制设计。该机制具有有效性和激励相容性,最后给出算例。