沙颍河流域行政单元的排污权初始分配研究

初始排污权的有效分配是排污权交易制度实施的基础,结合中国现行行政特征,以行政单元作为排污权初始分配主体开展排污权初始分配研究。具体是：以沙颍河流域为例,根据淮河水利委员会制定的沙颍河流域水功能区划及COD、氨氮限排总量要求,以COD、氨氮作为排污权初始分配的客体,通过等比例削减方法对沙颍河流域内的行政单元进行了排污权初始分配,得到了流域内各市县级行政单元的COD、氨氮初始排放权,并在此基础上从政策可行性、区域合作性及上下游城市的协调性等方面提出了开展排污权初始分配的若干建议。     

Disequilibrium and Indivisibility of Pollution Control Equipment Under a Permit-Trading System: A Case Study of Kao-Hsiung and Ping-Tung Counties in Taiwan

A mixed-integer programming model that minimizes the social abatement cost is used to investigate whether a market equilibrium condition could be reached in a newly proposed permit-trading market for nitrogen oxide control in Taiwan. Unlike in previous studies, unit pollution abatement cost is determined endogenously by incorporating technology adoption as a binary decision variable. The results show that when technologies are lumpy and irreversible, disequilibrium might occur due to firms’ inability to manage their emission levels after installing equipment with fixed size and control capacity.

Wetland development trends in coastal North Carolina,USA, from 1970 to 1984

Coastal wetlands are a valuable resource to North Carolina, USA, representing important habitat for marine organisms and providing flood control areas and buffer zones from marine storms. An analysis of wetland development trends in coastal North Carolina from 1970 to 1984 was conducted using over 3000 files containing 15 years of permitting records. The total amount of coastal wetland area altered due to authorized development under the Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA), the Dredge and Fill Law, and Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is 1740 ha. This represents nearly 2% of the salt marsh wetlands along the coast of North Carolina. The number of permits issued steadily increased during the 1980s; however, the total amount of wetland loss decreased each year. A few large projects in the early 1970s accounted for nearly 70% of all wetland area developed during the 15-year period. Nearly two-thirds of all projects involving wetland destruction involved impacts on high marsh ecosystems. Bulkheads, canals, and filling activities made up 80% of the projects requiring permits; 62% of the permits were issued to private landowners, but this group accounted for only 16% of the losses of wetland area. Utility companies, which accounted for less than 1% of the permits issued, were responsible for 46% of the permitted wetland loss during the 15-year study period. Future studies should address agriculture and forestry practices which are exempt under CAMA laws and therefore their effects on wetland alteration have not been quantified.     

Compliance and Emissions Trading under the Kyoto Protocol: Rules for Uncertain Inventories

A solution is proposed for proving compliance with emission targets and for emissions trading in the event of uncertainties in reported emission inventories. The solution is based on the undershooting concept, from which the mathematical conditions for both proving compliance with a risk α and calculating effective emissions for trading are derived. Based on the reported emission units, the number of permits granted is reduced in proportion to the uncertainty in the inventory. A country whose inventory has higher uncertainty is thereby allotted fewer permits than a country with the same inventory but smaller uncertainty.     

鄱阳湖流域排污权初始分配模式的比较研究

排污权初始分配是排污权交易的起点和基础,在分配模式和实证研究方面需要加强。采用地区人口法、经济总量法、历史排污量法、环境容量法和综合分配法5种模式研究了鄱阳湖流域11个地市水污染物化学需氧量(COD)与氨氮的初始排污权分配。结果表明:COD和氨氮初始排污权在地市之间的分配格局相似;南昌、新余与鹰潭3市按经济总量模式分配的排污量明显高于其它模式,上饶、吉安两市人口分配模式高于其它模式,景德镇、九江两市历史排污量模式高于其它模式,赣州市环境容量模式高于其它模式,宜春市综合模式高于其它模式。综合分配模式为赣州市排污权总量最高,南昌、九江、吉安、宜春、抚州和上饶6市次之,景德镇、萍乡、新余、鹰潭4市最低。总体来看,排污权配额因分配模式不同而有所差异,综合分配模式得到的初始排污权最为合理。建议鄱阳湖流域严格执行综合分配模式下的各地市初始排污权分配额度,确保区域经济社会与生态环境的协调发展。     

排污权交易市场中具有激励相容性的双边拍卖机制

针对排污权交易市场的交易机制设计问题,描述了多个排污权出售方和购买方治污量和产量的最优决策问题,基于单边拍卖的缺点,设计出了一个激励相容的双边拍卖机制.结果表明,此机制在描述排污权交易市场竞价规则的基础上,设计出了符合排污权市场特点的出清和交易规则,不仅能保证排污权交易市场实时出清,使理性的企业披露自己真实的治污成本,而且能够使污染物平均处理成本低的企业承担更多的处理量,达到了社会治污成本最小化.最后通过算例验证了该机制的有效性和实用性.     

The Impact of Uncertainty on Banking Behavior: Evidence from the US Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Allowance Trading Program

In this paper, we study empirically whether uncertainty has an influence on trade in the US sulfur dioxide allowances market. In particular, we investigate the role of uncertainty on banking behavior. To do this, we introduce a tractable, structural model of trading permits under uncertainty. The model establishes a relation between banking behavior and risk preferences, especially prudence in the Kimball (1990) sense. We then test this model using data on allowances, for utilities submitted to the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Acid Rain Program, carried over from one year to the next. Evidence is found of imprudence, namely, utilities bank permits in order to favor higher profits. Another finding is that larger utilities do not adopt behavior significantly different from that of smaller ones. This paper was presented at the “International Workshop on Uncertainty in Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Verification, Compliance & Trading” in Warsaw, Poland, September 2004, under the title “Portfolio Management of Emissions Permits and Prudence Behavior.”     

浅谈中国排污许可证制度

排污许可证制度作为我国环境管理八项基本制度的核心,虽然已有十余年的推行实践经验,但还存在污染物排放总量控制基础不牢固,缺乏相应的实施细则和行政、刑事处罚办法支撑等缺憾。加强环境保护行政管理部门的人员和技术力量,完善相应的行政、刑事处罚办法和细则,突出排污许可证制度的核心地位并增强实践经验交流等,是我国全面推行排污许可证制度并提高管理效率的重要措施和途径。     

Choice of teenagers' vehicles and views on vehicle safety: survey of parents of novice teenage drivers

Objective

To examine parental decisions about vehicles driven by teenagers and parental knowledge of vehicle safety.

Methods

About 300 parents were interviewed during spring 2006 in Minnesota, North Carolina, and Rhode Island while teenagers took their first on-road driving tests.

Results

Fewer than half of parents surveyed said teenagers would be the primary drivers of the chosen vehicles. Parents most often cited safety, existing family vehicle, and reliability when explaining the choices for their teenagers’ vehicles. About half of the vehicles intended for teenagers were small/mini/sports cars, pickups, or SUVs — vehicles considered less safe for teenagers than midsize/large cars or minivans. A large majority of vehicles were 2001 models or earlier. Vehicles purchased in anticipation of adding a new driver to the family were more likely to be the sizes/types considered less safe than vehicles already owned. Few parents insisted on side airbags or electronic stability control, despite strong evidence of their safety benefits. Even when asked to identify ideal vehicles for their teenagers to drive, about half of parents identified less safe vehicle sizes/types. Most parents knew that midsize/large vehicles are safer than small vehicles, and at least half of parents said SUVs and pickups are not safe for teenage drivers, citing instability.

Conclusions

The majority of parents understood some of the important criteria for choosing safe vehicles for their teenagers. However, parents actually selected many vehicles for teenagers that provide inferior crash protection.

Impact on industry

Vehicle safety varies substantially by vehicle size, type, and safety features. Many teenagers are driving inferior vehicles in terms of crashworthiness and crash avoidance.     

Emission reduction and profit-neutral permit allocations

The present paper addresses two policy objectives: to implement a market for pollution permits and to make regulation acceptable for businesses. Profit-neutral permit allocations are defined as the number of permits that the regulator should give for free so that post-regulation profits (i.e. a firm's profits in the products market plus the value of the allowances granted for free) are equal to pre-regulation profits. The proposed model is developed by assuming that firms use polluting technologies and compete “à la Cournot”. The paper demonstrates that a low number of free allowances is sufficient to meet these two goals. Moreover, the regulator can fully offset losses, even when the reduction in emissions is high, provided that the sectors concerned are not monopolies, both for isoelastic and linear demand functions.