治污投资的政府最优政策博弈

外部性的存在及制造商治污投资动机不足要求政府对制造商的行为进行相应的规制，政府在制造商的治污投资行为中主要的作用是通过各种措施使得制造裔有动机地去自觉地进行有效的治污投资;政府的主要控制手段包括直接管制及借助市场激励，政府制定环境管理策略的关键因素是“惩罚的力度与激励的强度”。基于社会福利最大化的角度；从制造商的治污投资行为出发研究政府制定环境管理规制的策略，通过一个三阶段的博弈模型分析福利增进量、洽污成本与治污效果等三个因素对“惩罚力度与激励强度”的影响。     

乡村振兴视域下农村土地利用利益相关者分析

乡村振兴的实施使得农村土地利用与管理面临更多的挑战。应用利益相关者分析、博弈均衡分析和实证案例分析,探讨乡村振兴视域下土地利用各利益相关者的关系演变。研究结果显示：（1）1949年至今,农村地区土地利用利益相关者主体数量增加,博弈关系呈现复杂化、多样化和多向化;（2）乡村振兴时期主要有六种博弈关系,并探讨了案例村实施下山脱贫、发展乡村旅游、新型经营主体进驻、城市居民促进农村发展四种博弈决策过程;（3）乡村振兴视域下,农村地区发展应关注基础设施配套、土地利用效率与生态环境协调、农户生计可持续性等问题。乡村振兴中应注重实现土地利用各利益相关者的最优均衡,降低各方风险,保护生态环境并寻求多方利益平衡。     

Game theory approach to optimal capital cost allocation in pollution control

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博弈理论在公众聚集场所消防监督管理的应用

建立了公安消防部门和公众聚集场所之间的公共安全管理模型.通过分析该模型,确定公安消防部门对公众聚集场所进行抽检的比例,对公众聚集场所不安全营业的处罚力度,以及抽检比例与处罚力度之间的函数关系.     

Sustainability and comanagement of subsistence hunting in an indigenous reserve in Guyana

Although hunting is a key component of subsistence strategies of many Amazonians, it is also one of the greatest threats to wildlife. Because indigenous reserves comprise over 20% of Amazonia, effective conservation often requires that conservation professionals work closely with indigenous groups to manage resource use. We used hunter‐generated harvesting data in spatially explicit biodemographic models to assess the sustainability of subsistence hunting of indigenous Waiwai in Guyana. We collected data through a hunter self‐monitoring program, systematic follows of hunters, and semistructured interviews. We used these data to predict future densities of 2 indicator species, spider monkeys (Ateles paniscus) and bearded sakis (Chiropotes sagulatus), under different scenarios of human population expansion and changing hunting technology. We used encounter rates from transect surveys and hunter catch‐per‐unit effort (CPUE) to validate model predictions. Paca (Cuniculus paca) (198 /year), Currosaw (Crax alector) (168), and spider monkey (117) were the most frequently harvested species. Predicted densities of spider monkeys were statistically indistinguishable from empirically derived transect data (Kolmogorov–Smirnov D = 0.67, p = 0.759) and CPUE (D = 0.32, p = 1.000), demonstrating the robustness of model predictions. Ateles paniscus and C. sagulatus were predicted to be extirpated from <13% of the Waiwai reserve in 20 years, even under the most intensive hunting scenarios. Our results suggest Waiwai hunting is currently sustainable, primarily due to their low population density and use of bow and arrow. Continual monitoring is necessary, however, particularly if human population increases are accompanied by a switch to shotgun‐only hunting. We suggest that hunter self‐monitoring and biodemographic modeling can be used effectively in a comanagement approach in which indigenous parabiologists continuously provide hunting data that is then used to update model parameters and validate model predictions.     

博弈论在弹道导弹核潜艇威慑能力定性评估中的应用

以国际政治经济学领域常用的博弈论为基础,建立了不同情况下的弹道导弹核潜艇核威慑能力的定性分析模型,其核心是分析威慑双方的策略互动,以便能够更加客观地对弹道导弹核潜艇的威慑能力进行评估。针对信息完全和信息缺失的情况,博弈论模型能够简便快捷地对弹道导弹核潜艇的核威慑效果进行评估,并能够提出提高潜艇威慑效果的具体措施。     

企业安全投资背后的利益博弈探讨

利用职业安全卫生费用模型结合博弈论原理,对企业安全投资背后的利益冲突与协调问题进行了浅析.研究表明:企业凭借资本优势在与政府和劳动者的利益博弈中为了寻求经济利益最大化减少安全投资,使企业安全度大大降低,导致事故频发是政府、企业和劳动者之间利益博弈的结果.此外,劳动者的合法权益得不到保护,造成其在利益博弈中处于弱势地位是造成安全生产现状的重要原因之一.     

A conceptual approach to model sand–gravel extraction from rivers based on a game theory perspective

Sand–gravel mining is a significant parameter of economic development and social welfare function in modern societies. As demand for aggregate increases in construction industry, conflicts for the availability of the resource and environmental impacts become more intense. The present paper describes the contested status quo in riverbed sand–gravel mining activities with an example from Greece, as a case study. The scope is to propose a methodology about good governance of the mining sector that promotes a sustainable sharing of aggregate resource by securing environment and safekeeping revenues in the mining trade market.     

基于博弈论的非点源污染控制模型探讨

随着对工业和城市生活污水等点源污染治理能力的不断增强,农业非点源污染对水质环境的影响日益凸现.相对于点源污染,非点源污染发生的不确定时间、不确定途径、不确定量等特点给治理政策的制定带来很大难度.本文从著名的公地悲剧现象出发,着力从市场博弈及政府监督博弈两个模型分析非点源污染制造者之间的博弈格局,并提出以“集体表现”的形式对非点源污染进行管理和控制.市场博弈模型中以一定的排污削减目标为前提,确定以成本最优的原则进行点源-非点源排污权交易是可行且有效率的;而政府监督博弈模型的结果显示:合理的环境补贴和惩罚机制、政府对自身声誉及公众形象的重视及维护对非点源污染治理起正向促进作用.     

环保型中小企业借贷环境分析

在经济多元发展的新历史阶段,环保型中小型企业作为正在蓬勃发展和活跃市场的重要经济个体,可以优化产业经济结构,推动循环经济发展.本文从软信息与关系型借贷研究入手,针对目前环保型中小企业财务信息不甚清晰、抵抗外界经济冲击能力有限和融资渠道特殊等特点,建立博弈模型,深入分析完全信息和不完全信息条件下,小额贷款公司与环保型中小企业客户之间的借贷关系.通过整体构建基于软信息特征的制度化信用风险控制准则,最终达到合理满足环保型中小企业激增的特殊融资需求.研究结果表明:以关系型借贷理论为依托,为满足各自的市场需求和利益保障,需要充分考虑环保型中小企业贷款客户的各类软信息,建立符合软信息时效性的信贷流程,决策权相对集中的组织结构和面向软信息收集的正向激励机制,从而实现对环保型中小企业客户贷款信用风险的有效控制,最终达到完善区域信用环境、支持中小企业发展和活跃社会主义市场经济的多重目标.