Killing Tigers to Save Them: Fallacies of the Farming Argument

Abstract: The lucrative, illegal trade in tigers (Panthera tigris) remains a major conservation problem. Tiger farming has been proposed as a potential solution, with farmed tigers substituting for wild tigers. At first glance, this argument's logic seems simple: farming will increase the supply of tigers, prices will fall, and poaching will no longer be profitable. We contend, however, that this supply‐side argument relies on mistaken assumptions. First, tiger markets are imperfect, meaning they are dominated by a few producers who control price. Second, consumers prefer wild tigers to farmed tigers and therefore the two are not pure substitutes. In economic terms, products from wild tigers are luxury goods, commanding a price premium. Third, there is no evidence that farmed tigers can be produced or sold more cheaply than wild tigers. In sum, it is unlikely that farming will drive down the price of wild‐caught tigers or decrease profitability for tiger poachers. Rather, tiger farming is more likely to increase aggregate demand for tiger products and stimulate higher levels of poaching.     

Combining Auctions and Performance‐Based Payments in a Forest Enrichment Field Trial in Western Kenya

Cost‐effectiveness is an important aspect in the assessment of payments for environmental services (PES) initiatives. In participatory field trials with communities in Western Kenya, we combined procurement auctions for forest enrichment contracts with performance‐based payments and compared the outcomes with a baseline scenario currently used by the Kenyan Forest Service. Procurement auctions were the most cost‐effective. The competitive nature of the auction reduced contracting expenses (provision costs), and the result‐oriented payments provided additional incentives to care for the planted seedlings, resulting in their improved survival rates (service quantity). These gains clearly exceeded increases in transaction costs associated with conducting an auction. The number of income‐poor auction participants and winners was disproportionately high and local institutional buy‐in was remarkably strong. Our participatory approach may, however, require adaptations when conducted at a larger scale. Although the number of contracts we monitored was limited and prohibited the use of statistical tests, our study is one of the first to reveal the benefits of using auctions for PES in developing countries. Combinando Subastas y Pagos Basados en Desempeño en un Ensayo de Campo de Enriquecimiento de Bosques en el Oeste de Kenia     

A dynamic simulation model to support reduction in illegal trade within legal wildlife markets

Sustainable wildlife trade is critical for biodiversity conservation, livelihoods, and food security. Regulatory frameworks are needed to secure these diverse benefits of sustainable wildlife trade. However, regulations limiting trade can backfire, sparking illegal trade if demand is not met by legal trade alone. Assessing how regulations affect wildlife market participants’ incentives is key to controlling illegal trade. Although much research has assessed how incentives at both the harvester and consumer ends of markets are affected by regulations, little has been done to understand the incentives of traders (i.e., intermediaries). We built a dynamic simulation model to support reduction in illegal wildlife trade within legal markets by focusing on incentives traders face to trade legal or illegal products. We used an Approximate Bayesian Computation approach to infer illegal trading dynamics and parameters that might be unknown (e.g., price of illegal products). We showcased the utility of the approach with a small-scale fishery case study in Chile, where we disentangled within-year dynamics of legal and illegal trading and found that the majority (∼77%) of traded fish is illegal. We utilized the model to assess the effect of policy interventions to improve the fishery's sustainability and explore the trade-offs between ecological, economic, and social goals. Scenario simulations showed that even significant increases (over 200%) in parameters proxying for policy interventions enabled only moderate improvements in ecological and social sustainability of the fishery at substantial economic cost. These results expose how unbalanced trader incentives are toward trading illegal over legal products in this fishery. Our model provides a novel tool for promoting sustainable wildlife trade in data-limited settings, which explicitly considers traders as critical players in wildlife markets. Sustainable wildlife trade requires incentivizing legal over illegal wildlife trade and consideration of the social, ecological, and economic impacts of interventions.