Animal Rights: Autonomy and Redundancy

Even if animal liberation were to be adopted, would rights for animals be redundant – or even deleterious? Such an objection, most prominently voiced by L. W. Sumner and Paul W. Taylor, is misguided, risks an anthropocentric and anthropomorphic conception of autonomy and freedom, overly agent-centered rights conceptions, and an overlooking of the likely harmful consequences of positing rights for humans but not for nonhuman animals. The objection in question also stems from an overly pessimistic construal of autonomy-infringements thought to result from extending rights to animals, and also, of confusions that supposedly may ensue from ascribing animal rights. Whether or not a case for animal liberation and/or animal rights can cogently be made, the redundancy-or-worse objection to animal rights need pose no barrier.     

Anthropomorphic Anthropocentrism and the Rhetoric of Blackfish

The documentary film Blackfish has made a splash at the box office, impacting millions of viewers and prompting calls to legislatively prohibit orcas from being held in captive environments. This essay analyzes Blackfish in terms of its anthropomorphic communication techniques that attribute human qualities to orcas. We introduce the term “anthropomorphic anthropocentrism” to argue that the anthropomorphic construction of orcas in Blackfish may well be a story that is more about what it means to be human than a story about what it means to be orca. Furthermore, we explain the importance of anthropomorphic anthropocentrism as an analytical tool that navigates environmental and ecological frameworks. We conclude that anthropomorphic anthropocentrism’s analysis of anthropomorphic rhetoric and the human epistemological assumptions it reflects, when taken together, offer significant insights into the ways environmental communication creates and/or disrupts human–nature relationships.     

Revisiting two dogmas of conservation science

Conservation science is a morally motivated field, with implicit and explicit values built into its practice. As such, conservationists must engage with conservation ethics to interrogate underlying values. We examine cutting-edge ecological science and contemporary ethics to revisit two conservation norms that have become dogmatic in the field: ecological collectives, but not individual animals, are valuable and anthropomorphism should be staunchly avoided. Emerging studies demonstrate that individuals and their intraspecific variation can be instrumentally valuable for conservation science, and there is an emerging consensus within environmental philosophy around the moral worth of individuals. Thus, we suggest conservation science should explicitly recognize the value of individuals. We also argue that avoiding anthropomorphism is detrimental to conservation because critical anthropomorphism enables a more nuanced scientific approach—allowing conservationists to ask enlightened questions with creativity and compassion. We provide evidence that both dogmatic norms are scientifically and morally outdated and propose new normative values to push conservation towards more robust science and ethical practice.