煤矿企业安全监管的反联盟博弈分析

在构建包含煤矿企业各利益相关者的安全博弈关系模型的基础上,重点探讨中央政府、地方政府、煤矿企业之间的博弈及其利益的得失,进而分析危机和矿难形成的原因和机理。研究表明:地方政府与煤矿企业之间具有共同的利益,联盟动力很强,二者的联盟是煤矿企业安全事故频发的主要原因;打破地方政府与煤矿企业之间联盟的根本是降低二者选择联盟策略的收益,压缩其博弈空间。

Anti-alliance Game Analysis on Safety Supervision in Coal Industry

Based on the construction of safety game model of coal industry including different stakeholders,the gains and losses among central government,local government and coal industry in the game are discussed with emphasis. And then the inherent mechanism and causes for frequently occurring accidents in coal industry are analyzed. Research shows that cooperative motivation between local government and coal industry is strong because of common interests,their alliance is the main cause for frequently occurring accidents; the most effective measures to break the alliance is to reduce their benefits from the alliance and compress their game space.