基于系统动力学的食品企业安全生产监管博弈研究

为了研究食品安全生产及监管的内在机理、影响因素及监管模式,采用演化博弈论方法建立了政府监管部门与食品企业之间的博弈模型,运用复制动态方程和系统动力学方法深入分析了食品安全生产中相关主体的决策选择。结果表明:食品企业在追求利益最大化的前提下须主动重视食品安全问题,食品企业的策略选择受安全生产投入成本、处罚成本和声誉收益的影响;政府监管部门的监管行为受监管成本、外部负效益及社会成本等多方因素的影响。因此,增大监管部门惩处力度、降低监管成本、完善社会公众监督机制、强化声誉效应是食品安全问题得以解决的有力保障。

Safety supervision game for the food-preparing enterprises based on the sys-tem dynamics

The present paper is inclined to establish a game model between the government supervision departments and the food-service companies so as to provide for the system dynamics method of the replication dynamic equation to analyze the food safety production decision-making choices of the deeply relevant entities via the evolutionary game theory for the internal mechanism that may affect the influential factors and the supervision mode for the food safety production and supervision. The results of our investigation show that,when the state authority penalty for the food companies who fail to pay enough attention to the safety production,such terms companies should be obliged to take effective measures or penalty to guarantee the safety production to enhance their supervision. And,what is more,such penalty terms from the state food monitoring companies can be made more sensitive to the impact of their decision-making strategy than to other kinds of counterparts. The regulatory behaviors of the state regulatory agencies can also be affected by lots of other factors,such as the regulatory costs,the external negative benefits,as well as the social relation costs. When,and,if the food companies fail to pay enough attention to the safety production or to the negative reactions of the consumption needs,they should choose to pay more attention to the food production safety in response to the government supervision. For the negative response of consumers tends usually to be more sensitive to the impact of the decision-making of the food production companies. In addition,such companies should also pay more regards on the penalty costs and the reputation benefits brought about by the safety production and supply. And,in contrast,when,and if,the reputation response brought by the safety production efficiency,as well as the safety production concern of the companies,and even when the government ’s tendency to supervise should never be slackened,the reputation effect of the food safety production should always aim at strengthening themselves in terms of their impact of the corporate decision-making than the government its own.